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1INTRODUCTION
1.1. Natural Resource Economics 15
“(...) Self-selection plays a dominant role in determining the size and composition of
immigrant flows.”
– Borjas (1987), p. 1.
Natural resource abundance is generally considered to be a curse rather than a bless-
ing for economic development. This dissertation examines selective mobility patterns
and changes in educational investments among local residents in response to natural
resource booms. Before I proceed with an overview of the theoretical and empirical link-
ages between resource shocks, selective mobility and educational investments, I provide
a brief introduction into each strand of the literature separately.
1.1 Natural Resource Economics
Since the seminal contribution of Sachs and Warner (1995), a whole body of literature
was devoted to the effect of natural resource abundance on measures of economic per-
formance. According to the findings of Sachs and Warner (1995), resource abundance
serves as an impediment rather than a propeller for economic prosperity based on a
cross-country panel of 97 countries. For instance, “oil revenues per capita in Nigeria
increased from USD 33 in 1965 to USD 325 in 2000, but income per capita has stag-
nated at around USD 1,100 in PPP.” (Van der Ploeg (2011), p. 367) Similarly, Iran,
Venezuela, Libya and Kuwait deteriorated economically in the course of the oil boom.
Even OPEC as a whole saw a decline in GDP per capita by 1.3 percent, while the devel-
oping world grew on average by 2.2 percent annually (Van der Ploeg (2011)). Though
challenged by recent findings of Alexeev and Conrad (2009), the conventional wisdom
of a negative association between resource abundance and economic prosperity even
holds in historical contexts. “In the seventeenth century, resource-poor Netherlands
eclipsed Spain besides the overflow of gold and silver from Spanish Colonies in the New
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World.” (Sachs and Warner (1995), p. 2) Consistently, Auty (1993) and Gelb (1988)
have shown that natural resource abundance has a significant but negative impact on
economic prosperity. The inverse relationship between economic and natural wealth
might be mediated through a Dutch disease (Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984),
Torvik (2001), Ismail (2010)), through civil conflicts, corruption and public rent seeking
activities (Auty (2001)) or through adverse effects on educational investments (Gylfa-
son (2001), Stijns (2006)).
With respect to a Dutch disease, a resource boom lays the ground for a real ap-
preciation of the exchange rate (spending effect) which translates into a boom of the
non-tradable sector and a bust of the tradable sector. The Dutch disease also goes along
with intersectoral factor movements from the tradable sector towards the resource sec-
tor and the non-tradable sector (resource movement effects). The deindustrialisation
as a consequence of the Dutch disease might retard economic prosperity in the short
run and undermine the competitiveness of the whole economy in the long run. While
the first formal Dutch disease models were set out by Corden and Neary (1982) along
with Corden (1984) and extended by Wijnbergen (1984a) and Krugman (1987), the
term “Dutch disease” goes back to the Economist in 1977, referring to an economic
downturn emerging in the Netherlands as a consequence of gas fields discovered in the
North Sea in 1959. Empirical studies testing the implications of Dutch disease models
are mostly in line with the theoretical predictions for developing countries. While El-
badawi and Soto (1997) as well as Fardmanesh (1990) confirm Dutch disease effects in
several developing countries, Bjornland (1998) can find “only weak evidence of a Dutch
disease in the UK, whereas manufacturing output in Norway has actually benefited
from energy discoveries and higher oil prices.” (p. 553)
With respect to educational investments, Gylfason (2001) shows that resource
booms might lead to a crowding out of human capital. This consistently holds in
terms of years of schooling on the demand side as well as in terms of educational expen-
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ditures on the supply side. While Gylfason (2001) refers to cross-country correlations,
the crowding out of human capital materializes even on a US state level. In figure
1.1, I report correlations between oil revenues per capita and the difference in years of
schooling between oil abundant states and a control group composed of states which
have not engaged in oil drilling throughout the 20th century.1 The control groups serve
as a reference in order to account for a counterfactual which is of particular importance
due to the path dependencies and unit roots in educational investments. In particular,
the panel on the left-hand side is based on a control group composed of all US states
which have not not engaged in any oil drilling according to Hamilton (2011) (control
group 1) and the panel on the right hand side is based on a large control group made
up of US states which have not not engaged in significant oil drilling (control group 2),
respectively. With respect to the latter, seven states with the highest oil revenues per
capita are excluded.2
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Notes: Correlation between oil revenues per capita and the difference in educational investments between oil abundant
US states and a control group. Control group 1 is composed of all US states besides of Alaska, Texas, Louisiana,
California, Oklahoma, Ohio, Wyoming, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota,
Montana, Colorado, Utah. Control group 2 is composed of all US states besides of Alaska, North Dakota, Texas,
California, New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. Data sources: Hamilton (2011), Ruggles et al. (2010).
Figure 1.1: Correlations: Oil Revenues - Schooling
1Oil production data originate from Hamilton (2011), while the years of schooling are derived from
Ruggles et al. (2010).
2Control group 1 is composed of all US states besides of Alaska, Texas, Louisiana, California,
Oklahoma, Ohio, Wyoming, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, North
Dakota, Montana, Colorado, Utah. Control group 2 is composed of all US states besides of Alaska,
North Dakota, Texas, California, New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming.
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Conspicuously, until the first oil crisis, oil windfall gains corresponded with a short-
fall in relative educational investments measured in the years of schooling by graduation
year which is consistent with the simple correlations reported in table 1.1. Again, the
outcome variable is defined as the difference in the years of schooling in oil abundant
states and the average years of schooling in control group 1 (columns (1) - (3)) and con-
trol group 2 (columns (4) - (6)), respectively. Consistently, the panel estimates point
at a negative correlation between the relative years of schooling and oil revenues per
capita. In fact, both the table and the figure report correlations without any necessary
causal implications. I will further elaborate on the causal link between natural and
human capital formation in Chapter 4 of the dissertation.
1.1. Natural Resource Economics 19
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In general, the adverse effects emerging out of resource booms are often referred to
as “resource curse”, a term originally coined by Auty (1993). However, even though
highly developed countries are not totally sheltered from a resource curse, it is well
established that resource booms primarily dampen economic prosperity in countries
with inferior political institutions and do less harm or might even be conducive to eco-
nomic development in countries with superior political institutions. “The interaction
of rich resources and fairly growth-promoting institutions seems to be rather a blessing
(...)” (Baten (2016), p. 159) From this point of view, good political institutions might
turn the resource curse into a blessing (Van der Ploeg (2011)). However, institutional
quality itself is not exogenous. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), resource
rich countries often prevent institutional reforms in order to secure their political power
and in order to extend the size of the public sector (Robinson et al. (2006)). In addi-
tion, resource windfalls might foster rent seeking activities which “lower returns to (...)
entrepreneurship with possibly large marginal effects on production.” (Van der Ploeg
(2011), p. 22) Finally, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005) point out that resource abundance
increases the likelihood of civil conflicts, as different groups are competing for resource
windfall gains. The following figure depicts correlations between the institutional qual-
ity and oil revenues per capita (panel on the right hand side) as well as coal revenues
per capita (panel on the left hand side), respectively, in a cross country panel spanning
the years from 1800-2008.3 Clearly, with respect to oil revenues per capita, the panel
depicts a concentration of oil abundant states for negative polity2-indexes, while the
relationship is almost U-shaped with respect to coal revenues per capita. Hence, the
relationship between institutional quality and resource revenues appears to be sensitive
to the specific kind of resources.
3The respective data are drawn from Haber and Menaldo (2011).
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Notes: The figures depict correlations between a polity2 - index and a coal revenues per capita (panel on the left hand side) and oil
revenues per capita (panel on the right hand side), respectively. Data source: Haber and Menaldo (2011).
Figure 1.2: Correlations: Resource Revenues - Polity2 - Index
While natural capital seems to be detrimental to economic prosperity, human capital
is generally considered to be conducive to economic growth. The skill composition of
a society is affected by selective mobility patterns as well which are introduced in the
next subsection.
1.2 Selective Migration
This dissertation is particularly devoted to the human capital acquired by migrants
relative to a specific reference group. The observation that migrants are not a ran-
dom sample of the original population dates back to the seminal contribution of Borjas
(1987) who draws from earlier work on self-selection by Roy (1951). According to the
Roy-Borjas model, a positive selection of migrants is attracted from the country of ori-
gin if the returns to skills in the destination country exceed the returns to skills in the
source country and returns to skills are sufficiently correlated across countries.
Studies relating relative skill premia to the selectivity of migration are only par-
tially in line with the Borjas model. For instance, in international migration contexts,
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Abramitzky et al. (2012) studies migration patterns between Norway and the US dur-
ing the era of mass migration and finds that the “return to migration was relatively
low (70 percent) and that migrants from urban areas were negatively selected from
the sending population.” (p. 1832) Stolz and Baten (2012) refer to the era of mass
migration as well and conclude that relative returns to skills in fact determined the se-
lectivity of migration based on cross-country data. Additional studies mainly focus on
bilateral migration patterns between Mexico and the US. In particular, Borjas (1987)
and Moraga (2011) find that Mexican immigrants moving to the US are less skilled
compared to the average Mexican resident due to relative returns to skills. In contrast,
according to Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), migrants moving from Mexico to the US
are better educated compared to the individuals left behind. However, as pointed out
by Moraga (2011), Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) do not rely on representative samples.
Rather, “U.S.-bound Mexican emigrants from 2000 to 2004 earn lower wages and have
less (more for females) schooling than non-migrant Mexicans (...)” (p. 72).
Beyond the selectivity of migration, several studies focus on the impact of migration
on the source and destination countries more generally. With respect to the source coun-
try, Beine et al. (2008) point out that the perspective of potential migration into more
developed countries might be conducive to educational investments, fostering economic
development in the source country. Moreover, there might be feedback and spillover
effects on the source country through remittances and return migration as well as the
transfer of values and norms (e.g. Docquier et al. (2016)).
With respect to the destination country, it has become consensus in the literature
that native workers with complementary skills are better off while workers with sub-
stitutable skills are worse off in the course of migration (e.g. Dustmann et al. (2005)).
In order to verify these theoretical predictions, Card (1990) made use of an influential
natural experiment arising from the Mariel Boatlift in 1980 which led to a fierce influx
of migrants increasing the workforce in Miami by 7 percent. Apparently, the influx
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neither affected unemployment nor wages of native workers in Miami. However, ac-
cording to a recent paper of Borjas (2015), these results are sensitive to the definition
of low-skilled workers. Namely, by focussing on high-school dropouts, Borjas (2015)
shows that natives earned lower wages post of the boatlift. Complementarily, Glitz
(2012) made use of the fall of the iron curtain which allowed ethnic Germans from
eastern Europe to settle in Germany. In order to foster integration and assimilation,
migrants were distributed exogenously throughout German regions. While exploiting
the exogenous settlement of migrants, the authors find “a displacement effect of 3.1
unemployed workers for every 10 immigrants that find a job, but no effect on relative
wages.” (p. 175)
The exogenous distribution is inevitable, in order to isolate the effect of migra-
tion, as migrants are often attracted by peers (Bartel (1989), McKenzie and Rapoport
(2007)). However, the relevance of peer-group and network effects in migration differ
throughout the skill distribution. Low-skilled labor is much more dependent on commu-
nities in order to overcome language barriers and to find jobs. Conversely, high-skilled
labor is generally more adaptable and is more likely to succeed even in the absence of
network effects. However, in the course of integration and assimilation, communities
might become less important. Abramitzky et al. (2013) examine the assimilation of Eu-
ropean migrants moving to the US during the era of mass migration and find that “the
average immigrant did not face a substantial occupation-based earnings penalty upon
first arrival and experienced occupational advancement at the same rate as natives.”
(p. 467)
1.3 Human Capital Development
Besides of selective migration patterns, human capital of local residents is of particular
importance for economic development. The role of educational attainment has been
particularly highlighted since the seminal contributions of Schultz (1961) and Becker
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(1962). The former took a stand for considering human capital as a complement for
non-human capital in promoting economic growth, even though “treating human be-
ings as wealth which can be augmented through investment runs counter to deeply held
values.” (Schultz (1961), p. 2) Schultz (1961) provided the first theoretical setup of
human capital formation, according to which individuals (or their parents) contrast re-
turns to skills in the future with opportunity costs at the present, in order to determine
the optimal level of educational investments. Empirically, Mincer (1974) contributed to
the literature in disentangling the effect of education and experience on earnings based
on his famous Mincer-equation. Most of the studies focus on determinants of educa-
tional investments which are approximated by years of schooling or student test scores
(e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann (2009)). However, “this emphasis has also become
controversial because the expansion of school attainment has not guaranteed improved
economic conditions.” (Hanushek (2013), p. 204)
On a macro level, the first empirical studies relating educational investments to
economic prosperity were conducted by Barro (1991) in a cross-country context. The
seminal paper of Barro (1991) spawned a whole line of research verifying the role of
human capital as a propeller for economic prosperity. These empirical studies were
preceded by several theoretical attempts to incorporate human capital into growth
models. Unlike in neoclassical growth models (Solow (1956)) in which technological
progress serves as an exogenous determinant of economic growth, endogenous growth
models proposed by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) as well as Rebelo (1990) highlight the
causes of technological progress. In this regard, educational attainment serves as an
important determinant of technological progress and economic prosperity. Historically,
however, endogenous growth models are not suitable to explain economic development
prior to the industrial revolution. As a remedy, Galor and Weil (1999), Galor and Weil
(2000) as well as Galor (2011) proposed a unified growth theory, according to which hu-
man capital plays a major role in explaining economic prosperity since the demographic
transition. In particular, the unified growth theory postulates three major epochs. On
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an early stage of development, incomes stagnate on a low level with slow technolog-
ical progress. However, with technological advancements, returns to skills increase,
and hence educational investments. The rise in income spills into further technological
progress and population growth as part of the Malthusian trap. At some point, the
Malthusian trap is replaced by a demographic transition which is characterized by a
decline in population growth corresponding with an increase in educational investments
and sustained economic prosperity.4
While educational investments are usually measured in years of schooling and ed-
ucational attainment in terms of test scores nowadays, historically, researchers might
draw upon an ABCC index which measures numerical skills in terms of age heaping
(A’Hearn et al. (2009)). In particular, the ABCC index is based on the share of people
who state their age correctly rather than providing a rounded age. According to Crayen
and Baten (2010), these measures are highly correlated with other common measures of
human capital like years of schooling and literacy. Based on these measures, historical
studies of human capital development have consistently pointed at land inequality as a
major determinant for human capital (e.g. Baten and Juif (2014)).
On a micro level, several studies focused on individual determinants of human cap-
ital. Regarding these determinants, researchers pointed at educational attainment of
parents, the number of siblings along with the family income. In particular, Solon
(1992) as well as Behrman and Taubman (1990) along with Behrman (2010) find an
intergenerational earnings coefficient between two consecutive generations of 0.80, 0.41
and 0.54, respectively. These correlation coefficients indicate that educational invest-
ments are partially inherited. Intergenerational transmissions might even be mediated
through family income which serves as a means to bear educational costs (Teachman
(1987), Blanden and Gregg (2004)). In addition, the number of siblings accounts for the
4Apart from the level of income, the distribution is affected by educational investments as well. In
a recent influential contribution, Goldin and Katz (2007) show that “secular growth in the relative
demand for more educated workers combined with fluctuations in the growth of relative skill supplies
go far to explain the long-run evolution of U.S. educational wage differentials.” (p. 1)
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time constraints parents are facing which becomes even more binding with an increasing
number of siblings (e.g. Blake (1985), Downey (2001), Ermisch and Francesconi (2001),
Teachman (1987)). However, the number of children is not exogenous with respect to
educational attainment and income (e.g. Becker et al. (1990)), which induces com-
plex feedback effects between income, the number of children and the intergenerational
transmission of educational attainment.
In the next subsection, I describe the linkages between resource booms, selective
migration and education.
1.4 Structure
This dissertation sheds light on the relationship between natural resource abundance
and the selectivity of international, intersectoral and interregional migration on the one
hand and changes in human capital development among local residents on the other
hand. In particular, as part of the dissertation, I raise the following questions: Do
resource booms spill into brain drain or brain gain effects? Do internal and interna-
tional migration patterns materialize consistently as a consequence of resource booms?
What are the mediating factors relating resource booms to the selectivity of migration?
Which role do migration networks play in migration decisions and do the network ef-
fects translate into the selectivity of migration? How can the multilateral character
of migration decisions be internalized? How do educational investments among local
residents respond to income windfalls? Are quasi-experimental setups an appropriate
framework in order to analyze selective migration and shifts in educational investments
in response to resource windfalls?
In order to tackle these questions, I divide the dissertation into 3 essays, each com-
bining theoretical models with empirical investigations. Theoretically, the setups range
from trade models in order to analyze selective migration patterns arising as a con-
1.4. Structure 27
sequence of a Dutch disease, multinomial choice models in order to analyze selective
regional mobility patterns and dynamic models of educational investments in order to
examine the response of schooling to income windfalls. Empirically, I rely on modern
econometric technics ranging from gravity equations and static as well as dynamic panel
models to quasi-experimental research designs based on difference-in-differences models
in order to derive average treatment effects and changes-in-changes setups in order to
determine quantile treatment effects. Finally, I make use of non-parametric methods
in order to take into account the multilateral character of migration decisions. These
approaches are inevitable as migrants make multilateral decisions, prospectively, even
though migration materializes as bilateral patterns, retrospectively.
In particular, in Chapter 2, I shed light on the effect of resource booms on the
selectivity of international migration patterns both theoretically as well as empirically.
Theoretically, I make use of a Dutch disease model, according to which a resource wind-
fall leads to a real appreciation of the exchange rate (spending effect), corresponding
with intersectoral factor movements from the tradable sector towards the non-tradable
sector (resource movement effect). As long as the tradable (non-tradable) sector is
skilled (unskilled) labor intensive, the boom of the non-tradable sector and the squeeze
of the tradable sector makes skilled labor particularly worth off, setting the stage for
brain drain effects. However, in order to translate into brain drain effects, the sub-
sequent decline in skilled labor income has to outweigh initial resource transfers in
absolute value. Throughout different regimes, from democratic to autocratic societies,
this sufficient condition is satisfied. In a democratic society, the incumbent maximizes
the probability of reelection for which the median voter is decisive under a majority
rule. Hence, the incumbent has an incentive to exclusively please the median voter
with respect to resource transfers. In an autocratic society, however, the political elite
maximizes income and appropriates the entire share of resource revenues.
Therefore, from a strictly theoretical point of view, in an autocratic society re-
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source windfall gains are neither forwarded to unskilled labor nor skilled labor, while
in a democratic society resource transfers are exclusively devoted to unskilled labor if
the median voter is decisive. In total, a resource boom leads to a net decline in income
of skilled labor, setting the stage for brain drain effects. However, the net decline in
income does not necessarily correspond with a contraction in total income inequality.
Empirically, the analysis rests on census data capturing migration patterns between
116 source and 23 destination countries, spanning the period from 1910 to 2009. The
econometric analysis is based on static and dynamic panel models along with a simulta-
neous equation model in order to decompose the relationship between resource booms,
income inequality and migrant selectivity in the long run. Consistently, the results are
in line with the theoretical conjectures, i.e. resource booms foster brain drain effects.
Further, the results indicate that brain drain effects might be mediated through distri-
butional effects. However, unlike the theoretical predictions which refer to labor income
inequality, the empirical section refers to total income inequality.5
While Chapter 2 investigates the selectivity of international migration patterns in
response to resource booms, Chapter 3 examines whether resource abundance impinges
on the skill composition of inter-state migration patterns within the US. Theoretically,
I rely on a multinomial choice model, according to which individuals sort themselves
into the destination state which offers the highest indirect utility under consideration
of migration costs. If low-skilled labor derives a stronger utility gain from resource
transfers, a resource boom lowers the relative educational background of prospective
immigrants. Empirically, I rely on US decennial census data between 1940 and 2000, in
order to relate oil revenues to the selectivity of interstate immigration based on static
and dynamic panel setups. Retrospectively, migration patterns materialize as bilateral
decisions, while prospectively, migration decisions are based on multilateral and mul-
tidimensional comparisons between the source and all potential destination states. In
order to take into account multilateral comparisons of multidimensional push and pull
5The intuition of an increase of income inequality in the course of resource windfalls originates from
the impression that a political elite appropriates the main share of resource windfall gains.
1.4. Structure 29
factors, I complement the static and dynamic panel model with a nonparametric ap-
proach which accounts for relative net migration in order to build an ordinal ranking of
potential destination states, as pointed out above. In particular, if individuals vote with
their feet in the sense of Tiebout (1956), the relative amount of net migration reflects
the relative standard of living (Douglas and Wall (1993) and Wall (2001)). Consis-
tently with the theoretical predictions, the results indicate that, on average, resource
abundance lowers the relative educational background of prospective immigrants and
unfolds ambiguous effects on the selectivity of emigration.
In contrast to Chapters 2 and 3 which refer to the educational background of mi-
grants, Chapter 4 investigates educational investments in response to income windfalls
among local residents. Theoretically, I show that resource windfall gains which ease the
household budget constraint through unconditional resource transfers might lower labor
supply and returns to skills in the future. In light of lower returns to skills in the future,
individuals might invest less in human capital at the present. According to Chapter 2,
a real appreciation leads to a further decline in the returns to skills due to the deindus-
trialisation, setting the stage for an additional decay in human capital investments. In
contrast, cutting progressive taxes or investing resource windfall gains into the quality
of the school system in the course of a resource windfall might be conducive to human
capital investments. However, the depletion of proportional labor income taxes is neu-
tral regarding human capital investments as the costs and benefits of human capital
investments are equally affected. Empirically, I make use of a unique oil boom in Alaska
in 1968, in order to verify or falsify theoretical predictions. Elevating fiscal capacity, the
oil boom sets the stage for the Alaska Permanent Fund in 1977 along with the depletion
of all state income taxes in 1980. I rely on a difference-in-differences setup contrast-
ing educational trends of local residents in Alaska with educational trends in a control
group composed of several US states which were not exposed to resource booms. The
results indicate a shortfall of educational investments compared to the control group as
a consequence of the income windfall.
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I proceed with Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which is devoted to the relationship
between resource booms and the selectivity of international migration.

2RESOURCE SHOCKS AND
HUMAN CAPITAL STOCKS -
BRAIN DRAIN OR BRAIN GAIN?
33
Abstract:
Based on the paradox of plenty, resource abundant countries tend to be vulnerable for
lower economic prosperity along with instable political institutions as well as corrup-
tion. This chapter sheds light on the relationship between resource abundance and
the selectivity of migration. Theoretically, I combine a Dutch disease model with a
Roy-Borjas model in order to elaborate on the relationship between resource shocks
and migrant selectivity. In this regard, I predict that skilled labor is relatively worse
off in the course of a deindustrialization as part of a Dutch disease, incentivizing brain
drain effects. Empirically, I provide evidence for the effect of resource shocks on mi-
grant selectivity based on a simultaneous equation model in order to disentangle effects
on income inequality and migrant selectivity. The results show that resource shocks,
especially oil booms, foster brain drain effects in a sample with 116 source and 23 des-
tination countries between 1910 and 2009.1
1This chapter is single-authored and a version of this chapter has been published as: Steinberg,
D. (2017), Resource Shocks and Human Capital Stocks - Brain Drain or Brain Gain? Journal of
Development Economics 127, p. 250-268.
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2.1 Introduction
“One of the surprising features of economic life is that resource-poor economies often
vastly outperform resource-rich economies in economic growth.”
– Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1985)
Whether resource abundance is a curse or a blessing for economic development has
been subject to several studies. In their pioneering paper, Sachs and Warner (1995)
delivered evidence that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources serves as
an impediment to economic prosperity based on a sample of 79 developing countries.
This disparity between natural and economic wealth, known as the “resource curse”
(Auty (1993)), is in line with the findings of several other authors (Gelb (1988) and
Gylfason and Zoega (2003)). In general, the effect appears to be particularly relevant
for countries which are prone to corruption and government inefficiencies (Van der Ploeg
(2011)).
Gylfason (2001) devoted another paper to the question, whether resource abun-
dance crowds out educational investments and concludes that “public expenditure on
education relative to national income, expected schooling for girls, and gross secondary
school enrollment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital
in national wealth across countries” (p. 847). Despite unprecedented research, most
of the studies regarding the resource curse focus on the relationship between resource
abundance and economic prosperity. Some models indicate that resource shocks lead to
distributional effects (Leamer et al. (1999), Goderis and Malone (2011), Gylfason and
Zoega (2003)), while the effects depend qualitatively on ethnic fractionalizations (Fum
and Hodler (2010)).
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According to Fum and Hodler (2010), “natural resources raise income inequality in
ethnically polarized societies, but reduce income inequality in ethnically homogenous so-
cieties” (p. 360). However, there are still some open questions. Whilst Gylfason (2001)
dedicates his paper to the effects of resource booms on educational investments of local
residents, in this chapter, I relate resource shocks to the selectivity of migrants. Specifi-
cally, the chapter raises the following questions: What can be theoretically expected for
the effect of resource shocks on the selectivity of migration? Are the selectivity effects
mediated through distributional effects, as Borjas (1987) suggests? Do the effects differ
with respect to specific country characteristics? In order to address these questions, I
complement a theoretical analysis with an empirical investigation.
Theoretically, I rely on classical Dutch disease models (Corden and Neary (1982),
Corden (1984), Torvik (2001), Ismail (2010)), according to which a resource boom
corresponds with income windfalls which eventually lead to a real appreciation of the
exchange rate.2 The real appreciation translates into a crowding out of the tradable
sector and a crowding in of the non-tradable sector (Corden and Neary (1982)).3 Pos-
tulating a relatively skill intensive tradable sector, skilled labor is relatively worse off
in the course of a Dutch disease. The latter holds in nominal as well as in real terms
due to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson (1941)). However, in
order to account for net income effects, subsequent labor income effects across the skill
distribution have to be contrasted with the initial distribution of resource windfall gains
(Goderis and Malone (2011)). Finally, I complement the Dutch disease with a Roy-
Borjas model (Roy (1951), Borjas (1987)), according to which selective migration is
explained by the relative returns to skills as long as incomes are sufficiently correlated
across states. As skilled labor encounters a decline in the returns to skills in the course
of a Dutch disease, the probability of skilled emigration increases as a consequence of
resource booms.4
2Additional Dutch disease models are provided by Alexeev and Conrad (2009), Bjornland (1998),
Krugman (1987), Lama and Medina (2012), Wijnbergen (1984a), Wijnbergen (1984b).
3The term crowding out is not meant in the sense of macroeconomics.
4Parts of the framework are related to Ismail (2010), Goderis and Malone (2011) as well as Bougheas
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Empirically, I rely on census data (Ruggles et al. (2010)) capturing migration pat-
terns between 116 source and 23 destination countries between 1910 and 2009. Ap-
parently, (quasi-) experimental research designs are not appropriate in order to relate
resource booms to the selectivity of migration. This is due to the fact that migration
decisions are multilateral decisions, i.e. the individual might compare several potential
destination states, prospectively, even though migration materializes as bilateral pat-
terns, retrospectively. However, even countries which were not affected by migration
might still be part of the choice set. Hence, all potential control groups are at least par-
tially treated and not separable such that quasi-experimental setups are inappropriate.
Rather, I rely on static and dynamic panel models relating the selectivity of migration
to the relative resource abundance between the source and host country. While the
selectivity is measured as the difference in the years of schooling of migrants and the
average years of schooling in the country of origin, resource abundance is measured
as oil revenues per capita. In order to disentangle the relationship between resource
booms, inequality and migrant selectivity, I complementarily rely on a simultaneous
equation model. The results are basically in line with the theoretical predictions, i.e. a
resource boom increase the probability of brain drain effects.
Robustness checks concern the sensitivity of the results with respect to the defini-
tion of natural resources in particular and to changes in the data set more generally.
In addition, countries implemented restrictive migration policies in the course of the
20th century which impinged on the quantity was well as the selectivity of migration.
Although individuals might have already resolved to emigrate, they might face implicit
or explicit restrictions which affect the choice of the destination country as well. I
conduct robustness checks in order to test whether migrant restrictions have a serious
impact on the results.
and Nelson (2012) but with exogenous income shocks easing the household budget constraint.
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets out a theoretical framework
which relates resource shocks, income inequality and migrant selectivity. Section 2.3
implements several econometric models in order to relate resource booms and brain
drain effects empirically. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Assumptions
In order to derive the relationship between resource shocks, especially oil abundance,
and migrant selectivity, I proceed in three steps. In a first step, I assume a country
which experiences a resource windfall. This shock exclusively induces intersectoral la-
bor movements while international migration is totally restricted. In a second step, I
dispense with migration restrictions and allow for migration across countries. Finally, I
illuminate the selectivity of international migration patterns in response to oil booms.
This trichotomy enables me to isolate the effect of resource shocks on migrant selectiv-
ity while taking into account distributional effects as an intermediary. The sequential
approach is in line with the optimization problems of individuals facing migrant re-
strictions in the short run. Allowing for perfect international mobility in the first place
would upset or even undermine Dutch disease effects. As the theoretical model does
not rely on differential equations, time indexes are omitted for the sake of parsimony.
In general, the resource abundant economy, R, comprises two sectors, manufac-
turing goods, M , which are tradable as well as services, S, which are non-tradable,
i ∈ I = {M,S}. As the economy faces exogenous world prices for the manufacturing
good, the country can be characterized as a small open economy. Both sectors employ
two sorts of labor, high-skilled labor, H, as well as low-skilled labor, L, j ∈ J = {H,L},
though, the service sector (manufacturing sector) is low-skilled labor (high-skilled labor)
intensive. This assumption is particularly relevant for developing countries in which the
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tertiary sector is not as sophisticated as in developed countries. However, in the frame-
work set out below, services only capture basic services which are non-tradable while
tradable and sophisticated business services are part of the tradable sector. In both sec-
tors, I abstract from capital in the production process in line with Goderis and Malone
(2011). However, accounting for capital as a production factor would probably even
strengthen the results, as discussed below. Meanwhile, I set out the basic framework
formally.
On the supply side, I assume perfectly competitive markets in both sectors while
production in each sector, Yi, is based on a Cobb-Douglas production technology with
constant returns to scale:
Yi = AiL
αi
i H
1−αi
i (2.1)
with 0 < αi < 1. Ai is a technology parameter and αi as well as (1 − αi) represent
production elasticities of low-skilled labor, Li, and high-skilled labor, Hi, in the service
as well as the manufacturing sector, respectively. As I assume that the manufacturing
sector (service sector) is high-skilled labor (low-skilled labor) intensive, it holds that
αS > αM . Firms in both sectors are striving for maximized profits, pii:
max
Li,Hi
pii = piAiL
αi
i H
1−αi
i − wHHi − wLLi (2.2)
subject to Li > 0, Hi > 0 (2.3)
where pi, wH and wL indicate output prices and input prices for high-skilled and low-
skilled labor, respectively. Firms wind up with the following first-order conditions:
wL = piAiαiL
αi−1
i H
1−αi
i (2.4)
wH = piAi(1− αi)Lαii H−αii (2.5)
Perfect competition precipitates zero profits in both sectors. This implies in the light
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of the dual approach that prices equal unit cost functions. Formally,
pi = ci(wL, wH , Yi = 1) =
[
wαiL
(
αiwH
1− αi
)(1−αi)
+ w
(1−αi)
H
(
(1− αi)wL
αi
)αi]
(2.6)
Further, I assume full employment of low-skilled and high-skilled labor across sectors
indicated by the following equations:
aMHYM + aSHYS = H (2.7)
aMLYM + aSLYS = L (2.8)
where aiH =
Hi
Yi
and aiL =
Li
Yi
state the average amount of low-skilled labor and high-
skilled labor which is necessary to produce one unit of output, Yi. According to the
full employment conditions, aggregate labor demand and labor supply decisions are
totally exogenous. However, sectoral labor demand functions are endogenous and can
be derived by a combination of first order and full employment conditions set out above.
With respect to low-skilled labor the sectoral demand functions are (with H = 1) (e.g.
Sayan (2005)):
LM = −
L
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
)
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αM−αS
)
(2.9)
LS =
L
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
−
(
αS
αM
)(αM+αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 2−αM−αS
αM−αS
)
p
(
1
αM−αS
)
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
−
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
)
(2.10)
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while for high-skilled labor the demand functions are given by:
HM =
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
− Lp
(
1
αS−αM
)
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
−
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
) (2.11)
HS = −
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
)
− Lp
(
1
αS−αM
)
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αM
1−αS
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
−
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αM
1−αS
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
) (2.12)
Plugging in the factor demand functions into equations 2.4 and 2.5 yields the respective
wages for low-skilled and high-skilled labor.
On the demand side, I posit a population composed of low-skilled individuals, L,
along with high-skilled individuals, H, introduced above. Further, the population com-
prises a political elite, E, entailing individuals neither being involved in the provision
of services nor in the production of manufacturing goods. Agents, l ∈ L = {H,L,E},
choose consumption of manufacturing goods, Ml, and services, Sl, in order to bring
utility, Ul, to a maximum, subject to their respective budget constraint (while manu-
facturing goods serve as a numeraire, p = pS
pM
):
max
Sl,Ml
Ul = βl logMl + (1− βl) logSl (2.13)
s.t. pSl +Ml ≤ Yl (2.14)
Unlike aggregate incomes, Y =
∑
l∈L Yl, individual incomes, Yl, differ with respect to
labor income, wHH = YH and wLL = YL, as well as with respect to the individual share
of resource income, µlR = τl(R) where τl represents the resource transfer in favor of
l with
∑
l∈L µl = 1. Hence, total incomes equal YH = wHH + µHR for skilled labor,
YL = wLL+ µLR for unskilled labor and YE = µER with respect to the political elite.
This setup is based on the assumption that transportation costs are modest such
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that resource windfall gains are easing the household budget constraint, consistently
with Torvik (2001). This assumption is standard in the literature and discussed in
more detail below. The political elite serves as a gatekeeper for the distribution of
resource transfers, (µH + µL)R = (1− µE)R, such that the shares µl are endogenously
determined by the political elite. In order to allow for flexibility across different regimes,
I do not make any further assumptions with respect to the objective of the political elite.
However, in proposition 2 below, I contrast resource transfers in democratic regimes in
which candidates compete under a majority rule as well as in autocratic regimes in
which incumbents do not encounter any competition. Without loss of generality, in
order to derive the market equilibrium, I assume a representative consumer. As usual,
the optimal decision equates the marginal rate of substitution and the relative price.
β
1− β
S
M
=
1
p
(2.15)
In light of the market clearing condition for services, S = YS, I further get for the
relative price of services in terms of manufacturing goods:
p = (1− β)Y (R)
YS
(2.16)
which is a similar expression as in Torvik (2001). While the price of the manufacturing
good is exogenously determined on the world market, the price of services is endogenous.
Based on the equation above, resource windfalls increase the price of non-tradables
in terms of tradables, dp
dR > 0, which can be interpreted as an appreciation of the
exchange rate. A real appreciation in the course of resource booms is often referred
to as spending effect as part of a Dutch disease (Corden and Neary (1982), Corden
(1984)). The real appreciation translates into a crowding out of the tradable sector in
favor of the non-tradable sector. The theoretical prediction of a deindustrialisation in
the course of a Dutch disease is confirmed by several empirical studies (e.g. Alexeev
and Conrad (2009), Bjornland (1998), Krugman (1987), Lama and Medina (2012)).
The real appreciation also translates into intersectoral labor movement effects due to
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the boom of the non-tradable sector and the squeeze of the tradable sector. Labor
reallocations directly emerge from the sectoral factor demand functions derived above
while taking into account that αS > αM :
∂HM
∂p
=
−L
(
1
αS−αM
)
p
(
1−αS+αM
αS−αM
)
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
−
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
) < 0 (2.17)
∂LS
∂p
=
−
(
1
αM−αS
)(
αS
αM
)(αM+αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 2−αM−αS
αM−αS
)
p
(
1+αS−αM
αM−αS
)
(
αS
αM
)( αM
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αM
αM−αS
)
−
(
αS
αM
)( αS
αM−αS
) (
1−αS
1−αM
)( 1−αS
αM−αS
) > 0 (2.18)
Due to the real appreciation, demand for high-skilled labor in the manufacturing sector
goes down, while demand for low-skilled labor in the service sector goes up. Though
sectoral demand functions are endogenous, aggregate demand functions are exogenous
in the first place which implies that the real appreciation does not impinge on aggregate
labor demand.
However, after the materialization of the Dutch disease, I dispense with full employ-
ment conditions, and therefore with international migration restrictions. In a scenario
with binary skills, individuals sort themselves into the country which provides them the
highest income under consideration of migration costs (Sjaastad (1962)). Formally, in a
world comprised by two countries, k ∈ {R, S}, a resource abundant country introduced
above, R, and a resource scarce rest of the world, S, an individual, j, emigrates from
R to S if income in S net of migration costs, CRS, offsets income in R. Formally based
on an Indicator, I,
Ij = log
(
Y jS (w
S
j )
Y jR(wj(R), τj(R)) + CRS
)
> 0 (2.19)
While income in the resource abundant country, YR, comprises both, labor income,
wHH and wLL, as well as resource transfers, τj, income in S is exclusively made up
of exogenous labor income. As the empirical part investigates migrant selection based
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on continuous rather than binary skills, this case has to be discussed as well. In a
world with continuous skills it will prove beneficial to assume a specific income distri-
bution following Borjas (1987) while dispensing with individual indexes for the sake of
parsimony subsequently:
Yˆ jk = µk + 
j
k (2.20)
where µk is a deterministic component reflecting mean incomes in country k while k
is a stochastic component reflecting individual specific deviations from the mean. The
stochastic components are normally distributed with zero mean and a variance given
by σ2k. Formally,
jk ∼ N(0, σ2k) (2.21)
The correlation coefficient reflecting the transferability of skills across countries k is
given by
ρRS =
σRS
σRσS
(2.22)
In the specific setting, the probability of emigration can be stated as follows:
PRS = P (S − R > −µS + µR + piRS) (2.23)
or equivalently
PRS = 1− Φ
(−µS + µR + piRS
σS−R
)
(2.24)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a normally distributed variable.
In line with the general expression above, the probability of migration from country R
to S increases (decreases) with mean incomes in country S (in country R). Additionally,
migration costs from R to S impinge negatively on the probability of migration, whilst
piRS =
CRS
YR
. Analogous to Borjas (1987), I can compare expected wages if the individual
migrates with the counterfactual of expected wages if the same individual would not
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have been migrated:
E(YˆS|MRS > 0) = µS + ρSS−RσS
 φ(−µS+µR+piRSσS−R )
Φ
(
−µR+µS−piRS
σS−R
)
 (2.25)
E(YˆR|MRS > 0) = µR + ρRS−RσR
 φ(−µS+µR+piRSσS−R )
1− Φ
(
−µR+µS+piRS
σS−R
)
 (2.26)
where φ denotes the probability density function of a normally distributed random
variable. Following Borjas (1987), I can equivalently state
E(YˆS|MRS > 0) = µS + σRσS
σS−R
(
σS
σR
− ρ
) φ(−µS+µR+piRSσS−R )
1− Φ
(
−µS+µR+piRS
σS−R
)
 (2.27)
E(YˆR|MRS > 0) = µR + σRσS
σS−R
(
ρ− σR
σS
) φ(−µS+µR+piRSσS−R )
1− Φ
(
−µR+µS+piRS
σS−R
)
 (2.28)
Under the assumption that ρ > σR
σS
along with σS > σR, individuals migrating from R
to S are positively selected compared to the average skills in R. According to these
inequalities, the attraction of a positive selection is based on two conditions. First, cor-
relations of skill premia across countries are sufficiently high. Particularly, individuals
in the upper tail of the income distribution in the source country are supposed to be in
the upper tail of the income distribution in the destination country as well. This condi-
tion implies that skills are sufficiently transferable across states and holds particularly
for migration patterns between similar countries. Second, skill premia in the resource
scarce country have to offset skill premia in the resource abundant country. In con-
trast, if it holds that ρ > σS
σR
and σR > σS, than individuals migrating from R to S are
adversely selected relative to average skills in R. This holds under the assumption that
the income distribution in R is more dispersed compared to the income distribution in S.
Studies relating relative skill premia and the selectivity of migration come to differ-
ent results and mainly focus on bilateral migration patterns between Mexico and the
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US. Borjas (1987) analyzes migration patterns between the US and Mexico based on
census data from 1970 and 1980 and concludes that comparatively high earnings-skill-
ratios are attributable to migrants from regions characterized by low income inequality.
Similarly, Moraga (2011) sheds light on bilateral migration between the same countries,
showing that between 2000 and 2004 Mexican emigrants had less schooling compared
to individuals left behind. This indicates that migrants were on average adversely se-
lected. Diametrically opposed and contradictorily to Borjas (1987), Chiquiar (2005)
finds that Mexicans in the US are on average positively selected based on Mexican and
US census data from 1990 and 2000. But according to Moraga (2011), these results
are due to a sample selection bias. Kaestner and Malamud (2014) concludes that mi-
grants from Mexico to the US are neither positively nor negatively selected. Rather
their educational background is similar to those of Mexican residents. Belot and Hat-
ton (2012) investigate migrant selection in a sample comprising 70 source and 21 host
countries. Regarding these countries, migration costs arising from colonial ties and
distances between source and destination countries appear to be much more important
in explaining migrant selectivity. Relative income dispersions are significant only if
poverty constraints are considered. Stolz and Baten (2012) test the Borjas model in
the era of mass migration and confirm the theoretical predictions.
The following section makes use of the assumptions set out above in order to elabo-
rate on the relationship between resource shocks and the selectivity of migration while
taking into account binary skills.
2.2.2 Resource Shocks and Migrant Selectivity
In order to shed light on the effect of resource windfalls on the selectivity of migration,
I start out with a lemma showing that brain drain effects are propelled if the resource
windfall leads to a decline in high-skilled wages (necessary condition), sufficient enough
in order to compensate for the initial resource transfer (sufficient condition). The subse-
quent proposition 1 shows that the necessary brain drain condition, a decline in skilled
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labor income in the course of resource booms, is always satisfied as long as the manu-
facturing sector is relatively high-skilled labor intensive and the production technology
has constant returns to scale. In addition, proposition 2 suggests that the sufficient
brain drain condition is satisfied in a democracy as well as in an autocracy.
Lemma: A resource windfall, dR > 0, leading to a decline in skilled labor income,
sufficient enough in order to compensate for initial resource transfers, increases the
probability of skilled emigration. A resource windfall, dR > 0, leading to an increase in
unskilled labor income reduces the probability of unskilled emigration.
Proof: Differentiating equation (2.19) with respect to resource revenues yields:
∂IH
∂R = −
(
w′H(R)H + τ ′H(R)
wH(R)H + τH(R) + CRS
)
> 0 (2.29)
∂IL
∂R = −
(
w′L(R)L+ τ ′L(R)
wL(R)L+ τL(R) + CRS
)
< 0 (2.30)
According to these derivatives, the effect of resource shocks, dR, on the migration indi-
cator depends qualitatively on w′j(R)j + τ ′j(R). If the resource boom leads to a decline
in skilled labor income, w′H(R)H < 0, which offsets the initial resource transfer in ab-
solute value, |w′H(R)H| > τ ′H(R), the skilled migration indicator increases, ∂IH∂R > 0.
Correspondingly, a rise in unskilled labor income, w′L(R)L > 0 is sufficient for a decline
in the unskilled migration indicator, ∂IH
∂R < 0. Assuming exogenous incomes in S, the
migration indicator corresponds with the probability of emigration. 
The lemma sets out necessary and sufficient conditions for brain drain effects in
the light of the theoretical setup described above. A rise in the probability of skilled
emigration requires a decline in labor income (necessary condition) which more than
compensates the initial resource transfer (sufficient condition). However, a rise in labor
income of unskilled labor is sufficient in order to reduce the unskilled emigration prob-
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ability.5 The following proposition 1 proves whether the necessary condition is satisfied
in the theoretical setup posited above.
Proposition 1: A resource windfall, dR > 0, leads to a decline in real high-skilled
labor incomes and a rise in real low-skilled labor incomes if αS > αM .
Proof : Following Feenstra (2016) and Corden (1984), totally differentiating the
zero profit conditions in equation 2.6 while taking into account that pˆ = d ln p = dp
p
,
leads to an expression relating output price changes to input price changes: pˆM
pˆS
 =
1− αM αM
1− αS αS
×
 wˆH
wˆL
 (2.31)
The coefficients can be interpreted as the cost elasticities of factor price changes, implic-
itly depending on relative labor intensities. Isolating factor prices on the left-hand-side
of the equation yields an expression which describes factor prices as a function of output
prices.  wˆH
wˆL
 = 1| λ |
 αS −αM
αS − 1 1− αM
×
 pˆM
pˆS
 (2.32)
with the determinant given by:
| λ |= αS − αM
 > 0 if αS > αM< 0 if αS < αM (2.33)
Based on the previous expression, I can relate Dutch disease induced output price
changes, pˆ = pˆS − pˆM > 0, to input-price-responses wˆ = wˆH − wˆL, which is similarly
5It is worth mentioning that these results hold under the assumption that all workers have accu-
mulated sufficient wealth in order to bear CRS prior to the oil boom. If some of the unskilled workers
would have encountered fiscal constraints such that they are not able to bear CRS a resource boom
might enable these workers to realize their migration decision. However, simultaneously the incentive
for emigration is reduced due to the increase in income. As the setup above does not allow for wealth
accumulation, these effects are not part of the model.
48 Chapter 2. Resource Shocks and Human Capital Stocks
stated in Feenstra (2016):
wˆH − wˆL = pˆM(αS − αM) + (pˆM − pˆS)αM
(αS − αM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<pˆM ,αS>αM
(2.34)
− pˆS((1− αM)− (1− αS))− (pˆM − pˆS)(1− αS)
(αS − αM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>pˆS ,αS>αM
(2.35)
wˆH − wˆL
 < 0 if αS > αM> 0 if αS < αM (2.36)
A Dutch disease, pˆ = pˆS − pˆM > 0, materializes in less dispersed labor income distri-
butions as long as αS > αM . The contraction of the labor income distribution is due
to both, a rise in low skilled labor incomes and a decline in high skilled labor incomes
in real as well as in nominal terms. The latter immediately follows from the zero profit
condition in equation 2.6. Therefore, w′L(R)L > 0 and w′H(R)H < 0 hold unambigu-
ously in this setup. However, net income effects of resource booms are unambiguously
positive for low-skilled labor and ambiguous for high-skilled labor. A resource boom
precipitates negative net income effects for skilled labor if |w′HH| > τ ′H(R), giving rise
to brain drain effects in light of the lemma above. 
In light of proposition 1, the resource windfall leads to a real appreciation which
translates into a boom in the service sector and a squeeze in the manufacturing sec-
tor. As the service sector (manufacturing sector) is low- (high-)skilled labor intensive,
low-skilled labor is better off, while high-skilled labor is worse off with respect to labor
income. Namely, the manufacturing sector intends to set free more high-skilled labor
than the service sector is striving for. Hence, the zero profit conditions require lower
wages for skilled labor. This is an application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, say-
ing that an increase in the output price leads to an increase in the factor price used
disproportionately in the respective sector and a decline in the price of the other fac-
tor of production. Through magnification effects, subsequent wage effects offset initial
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price effects translating into real changes in the income distribution. This is in line with
Goderis and Malone (2011) who investigate Gini coefficients in resource abundant coun-
tries. However, whether brain drain effects are fostered in the course of resource booms
depends on net income effects rather than labor income effects. In contrast to labor
income, net income effects internalize the initial distribution of resource windfall gains
as well. While net incomes of low-skilled labor are raised unambiguously, high-skilled
labor faces lower net incomes if |w′H(R)H| > τ ′H(R), increasing the probability of brain
drain. This is in line with the results of the Borjas model above. A resource boom
translating into a less dispersed income distribution gives rise to brain drain effects.
However, whether the sufficient brain drain condition, |w′H(R)H| > τ ′H(R), is satisfied,
has to be discussed separately for democratic and autocratic societies in the course of
proposition 2.
Proposition 2: A resource windfall, dR > 0, satisfies |w′H(R)H| > τ ′H(R) in a
democratic society under majority rule as well as in an autocratic society.6
Proof : In a democracy under majority rule with two candidates, c = 1, 2, the
median voter is decisive. If candidate 1 splits resource transfers between skilled and
unskilled labor, µ1L < 1, µ1H > 0 (µcj is the share candidate c attributes to individ-
ual j), candidate 2 takes a stand for µ1L +  = µ2L, µ1H −  = µ2H (with  small)
attracting additional voters as long as L > H which holds by definition. If and only if
µ1L = µ2L = 1 and µ1H = µ2H = 0 neither candidate 1 nor candidate 2 has an incen-
tive to deviate. From the equilibrium transfers and proposition 1 directly follows that
|w′H(R)H| > τ ′H(R). In an autocracy, the incumbent does not encounter any electoral
competition and sets µE = 1, leading to |w′H(R)H| > τ ′H(R) in light of proposition 1
as well. 
6I postulate that voters in a democracy exclusively decide upon the distribution of resource windfall
gains. Further, in an autocracy the incumbent is exclusively interested in windfall gains.
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In light of proposition 2, resource windfall gains are either forwarded towards low-
skilled labor serving as the median voter or towards the political elite. Hence, low-skilled
labor is unambiguously better off in the course of resource booms, receiving a higher
labor income along with a potential resource transfer. However, high-skilled labor is
unambiguously worse off, earning lower labor incomes which are not compensated by
resource transfers. This sets the stage for brain drain effects.7
The theoretical predictions were based on the assumption that resource windfalls
materialize as transfers rather than serving as factors of production in the manufactur-
ing sector which is standard in the literature as transportation costs are modest. Even
if some of the resources might spill into the production of the tradable good, as long as
exchange rate effects eventually lead to a decline in the manufacturing sector, skilled
labor is relatively worse off. The net decline in the tradable sector is supported by sev-
eral empirical studies testing the theoretical predictions of Dutch disease models (e.g.
Elbadawi and Soto (1997) and Fardmanesh (1990)). Moreover, I dispensed with capital
in the production technology of manufacturing goods. However, accounting for capital
might even strengthen the distributional effects in the course of a deindustrialisation, as
capital income is unequally distributed in favor of skilled labor. Hence, not accounting
for capital in the production technology rather biases the results towards zero.
Finally, in order to take up the parameters of the Borjas model from the previous
section, I confront inequality effects arising out of a Dutch disease with income cor-
relations in light of the Borjas model. As pointed out previously, the correlation of
income across countries, ρ, along with relative net returns to skills, denoted as
YjR
YjS
,
are particularly important in order to predict selectivity effects. In an effort to relate
resource booms to the selectivity of migration, I have to differentiate between three
7But even in case of positive resource transfers in favor of high skilled labor, on average, individuals
migrating from R to S are better selected after the resource boom as long as the decline in the
probability of skilled emigration falls short of the decline in the probability of unskilled emigration in
absolute value.
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different cases.8
(1) ∆p > 0, |w′HH| > τ ′H(R), YHR < YHS and ρ > YHRYHS .
Firstly, I posit that the resource boom sets the stage for a real appreciation, trans-
lating into a contraction of relative returns to skills. If the contraction of the returns
to skills is sufficiently strong in order to fall short of returns to skills in the resource
scarce country and the transferability of skills across countries is sufficient as well, the
resource boom carries over to brain drain effects.9
(2) ∆p > 0, |w′HH| > τ ′H(R), YHR > YHS.
Secondly, I posit that the resource boom sets the stage for a real appreciation,
translating into a contraction of relative returns to skills. However, the contraction of
the returns to skills is insufficient in order to fall short of the returns to skills in the
resource scarce country. In this case resource booms do not promote brain drain effects.
(3) ∆p > 0, |w′HH| > τ ′H(R), YHR < YHS and ρ < YHRYHS .
Thirdly, I posit that the resource boom sets the stage for a real appreciation, trans-
lating into sufficient distributional effects in order to promote brain drain effects. How-
ever, the correlation of income is insufficient between the resource abundant and the
resource scarce country. In this case, the resource boom does not promote brain drain
effects of migration.
The parameter constellations exclusively hold in a setup with two countries. In
8The conditions exclusively refer to high skilled labor as low skilled labor is unambiguously better
off in the course of a resource boom.
9This holds under the assumption that migration costs are zero.
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a framework with multiple countries, individuals self-select themselves into the most
appropriate one as long as migrant restrictions are precluded. Hence, with multiple
countries it is more likely that skilled labor encounters various alternatives abroad
when experiencing a decline in income at home.
In the following section, I examine the relationship between resource shocks and
emigrant selectivity empirically.
2.3 Evidence
2.3.1 Empirical Framework and Data
The empirical framework mainly draws upon longitudinal data based on Ruggles et al.
(2010) which capture migration patterns between 116 source and 23 destination coun-
tries spanning the period from 1910 to 2009, commonly known as IPUMS (Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series).10 In the baseline regression I posit the following equation
of interest which relates the selectivity of emigration to relative oil revenues per capita
along with several additional covariates, denoted as X ijt.
SELECTIV ITYijt = αij +χt +φ (RESOURCESit −RESOURCESjt) + ξX ′ijt + ijt
(2.37)
In line with Grogger and Hanson (2011) as well as Stolz and Baten (2012), the data
set is collapsed for source-destination country pairs, ij, and aggregated by decades.11
Hence, αij captures country pair fixed effects while χt indicates time fixed effects sim-
ilar to Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003). Whilst the former accounts for variables which
differ between country pairs but are time invariant, the latter captures variables that
change over time but are invariant across states. The SELECTIVITY of migration
10Data on migrant selection were descriptively assembled by Monschauer (2013) based on Ruggles
et al. (2010).
11As the statistical analysis is restricted by the availability of covariates, estimation results rely on
a shorter time span than the availability of data on migrant selectivity.
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is determined for 2.1 million individuals migrating from 116 source to 23 destination
countries as the difference between the years of schooling of emigrants compared to the
average years of schooling in the source country, respectively. Basically, the definition
of migrant selection is far from clear-cut in the literature. The definitions range from
actual wages of migrants relative to the wages of local residents (Borjas (1987), Kaest-
ner and Malamud (2014)) over potential wages of migrants predicted by education,
age and marital status (Chiquiar and Hanson (2002)) to various educational measures
(Stolz and Baten (2012), Belot and Hatton (2012)) relative to the average in the source
country, respectively. Hence, the selectivity measure in this paper is consistent with
the latter. 73 censuses are taken into account based on IPUMS from which information
on the years of schooling of migrants and their place of birth as well as the country
and place of residence are drawn. The data set is complemented by recently collected
data from Barro and Lee (2012) providing information on the average years of schooling
in each source country. Besides of recent census data, Barro and Lee (2012) rely on
historical school enrollment rates. The Barro and Lee (2012) sheets date back to 1950
and indicate the education for 5 year age cohorts between 20 and 65 years for half of
a decade. Through taking into account the old cohorts in 1950, Monschauer (2013)
retraces the years of schooling until 1910.
In order to account for the dynamics of migration, the analysis is based on the
assumption that the average age of migrants is 25 which is consistent with data from
the United Nations which state that modal migration ages are between 23 and 27 years
(United Nations (2011)). Most of the individuals migrate between countries with similar
economic backgrounds. The United States are the only highly-developed, industrialized
country representing a host country in the data set. Therefore, migration patterns into
high income European countries are not considered (Monschauer (2013)).
As the years of schooling are only captured retrospectively, the data set provides no
information on whether the education of migrants was actually acquired in the country
54 Chapter 2. Resource Shocks and Human Capital Stocks
of origin or the country of destination. However, since most of the migrants arrive in the
destination country at ages between 23 and 27, the problem appears to be negligible.
Furthermore, the sign of a potential bias is indeterminate. If migrants are positively
selected compared to the source country, they might acquire less education in the host
country relative to a counterfactual in which these individuals would not have been
migrated.
Another potential pitfall that has to be addressed is that migrants face restrictions
regarding the choice of the destination country. Especially in the 20th century, indus-
trial countries implemented several restrictions which served as an impediment for the
free movement of people. These restrictions often imply the conditionality of a right
of residence. Permissions might be conditioned on a recent employment contract with
an income exceeding a certain threshold or certain additional criteria. Particularly,
migrant restrictions are apparent in the United States as the only high income indus-
trial destination country in the data set. Additionally, illegal migration streams are not
captured which are expected to be negatively selected on average, at least in compar-
ison with the destination country. This might induce an upward bias in the migrant
selectivity data. In order to account for migrant restrictions and additional unobserved
heterogeneity, I control for country pair and time fixed effects.
By means of a Kernel density estimator, I show that migrant selectivity is approx-
imately normally distributed. The density estimation depicted below is based on an
Epanechnikov Kernel and a bandwidth given by 0.5752. This is the optimal bandwidth
minimizing the mean integrated squared error (MISE) if migrant selectivity follows a
Gaussian distribution and the Kernel used is normally distributed as well.12
12I estimate the density of migrant selectivity using a non-parametric approach which is standard. In
the univariate case I have: fˆ(x) = 1nhn
∑n
i=1K
(
x−xi
hn
)
where K is the density, n the number of obser-
vations, hn the bandwidth and xi indicates migrant selectivity. The criteria for choosing the optimal
bandwidth is the commonly used MISE (Mean Integrated Squared Error) which is given by MISE =
E
[∫ (
fˆ(x)− f(x)
)2
dx
]
=
∫
V
[
fˆ(x)
]
dx+
∫
Bias
[
fˆ(x)
]2
dx ≈ 1nh
(∫
K(v)2dv
)
+ 14k
2
2h
4
∫
f
′′
(x)2dx.
Note that there is an inherent trade off in the minimization as for the variance to be small I would
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(2010).
Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Estimate: Migrant Selectivity
The independent variable RESOURCESit−RESOURCESjt captures relative oil
revenues generated in the source and destination country based on Haber and Menaldo
(2011). More precisely, resource revenues are measured in terms of prices from 2007
(constant prices determined on the world market) and relative to population size, an
approach which is also consistent with Hamilton and Clemens (1999). Additionally,
the procedure is superior to a specification which captures the gross domestic prod-
uct in the denominator (Fum and Hodler (2010), Hodler (2006), Brunnschweiler and
Bulte (2008)). The latter would be more of an indicator for resource dependence rather
than resource abundance. In the course of further robustness checks I additionally rely
on resource income generated by oil, natural gas, coal, precious metal, and industrial
metal industries. Since I am interested in the relationship between resource revenues
like to choose a large bandwidth whereas for the bias to be small I would like the bandwidth to be as
small as possible. In order to find the optimal bandwidth, I minimize the asymptotic MISE over the
bandwidth h, which yields: hoptimal =
1
n
2
5 k
2
5
2
(
∫
K(v)2dv)
1
5
(
∫
f ′′ (x)2dx)
1
5
. Finally, in order to find K, I need to plug
the optimal bandwidth into the asymptotic MISE and minimize that same asymptotic MISE over K.
This yields Koptimal(t) =
3
4×5 12
(
1− 15 t2
)
1(t2 ≤ 5) which is called the Epanechnikov kernel.
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per capita and migrant selectivity, the main coefficient of interest is φ. I expect the
selectivity of emigrating individuals to be positively related to the abundance of natural
resources. Namely, resource windfalls are expected to reduce labor income inequality
which gives rise to brain drain effects. However, resource abundance might serve as
push and pull factors in migration decisions. Hence, I build differences in resource
revenues between source and destination countries. The following figure descriptively
associates relative oil revenues per capita and emigrant selectivity, visualizing a positive
relationship in line with the theoretical predictions.
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Notes: The figures depicts correlations between oil revenues per capita and the selectivity of migration. Data sources: Haber and Menaldo
(2011), Ruggles et al. (2010).
Figure 2.2: Scatter Plot: Oil Revenues per Capita - Migrant Selectivity
However, as most of the observations are clustered between -4000 and + 4000 USD
of oil revenues, I provide an additional scatter plot relating emigrant selectivity to
relative oil revenues per capita while excluding observations with oil revenues above
4000 USD per capita, again leading to a positive correlation.
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Notes: The figures depicts correlations between oil revenues per capita and the selectivity of migration for oil revenues between 4000 and
+4000 USD. Data sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011), Ruggles et al. (2010).
Figure 2.3: Scatter Plot: Oil Revenues per Capita - Migrant Selectivity (Subsample)
The covariates, X ijt, are inspired by Belot and Hatton (2012) along with Stolz and
Baten (2012). Similarly to Stolz and Baten (2012), I claim that in order to emigrate,
individuals need a certain amount of income. Hence, I control for the gross domestic
product per capita in the source country in order account for poverty constraints which
might serve as an impediment for emigration. The required income increases with the
distance between the source and destination country even though the distance is not
exogenous due to self-selection. In particular, I assume that high-skilled individuals
can overcome poverty constraints more easily. In order to reduce potential feedback
effects, I consider the gross domestic product per capita in the previous period. In gen-
eral, gross domestic products capture additional resource revenues as well. However,
resource income is measured in constant prices whilst GDP is measured in nominal
terms before taking the logarithm. Therefore, perfect collinearity is ruled out between
these variables. Figure 2.4 visualizes a scatter plot relating GDP per capita and migrant
selectivity. Apparently, a rise in income per capita allows even unskilled labor to bear
migration costs, incentivizing migration.
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Notes: The figures depicts correlations between GDP per Capita and the selectivity of migration. Data sources: Haber and Menaldo
(2011), Ruggles et al. (2010).
Figure 2.4: Scatter Plot: GDP per Capita - Migrant Selectivity
Additionally, I approximate network effects of migration by accounting for the num-
ber of people who moved previously from the same country of origin to the respective
destination country. According to Cohn (2009), migration costs decrease in the course
of friends and relatives already hosted in a specific destination. If communities consist of
people from the same country of origin, individuals share a similar cultural background.
Therefore, it is much easier to gather information regarding job positions, to initiate
relationships and to overcome language barriers. Consistently with Chiquiar (2005),
Belot and Hatton (2012) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010), I expect a selectivity-
quantity tradeoff in migration. In essence, the selectivity of migration decreases with
the size of the community in the residence country. Whilst skilled individuals are very
adaptable even in the absence of any community effects, low-skilled individuals have
to rely on networks in order to succeed. However, the following figure relating the
quality and the log-transformed quantity of migration only shows a slightly negative
correlation.
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Figure 2.5: Scatter Plot: Selectivity-Quantity-Tradeoff in Migration
As community effects can be approximated by measures of cultural proximity, I
further take into account a dichotomous variable which is 1 if languages in source and
destination countries coincide and 0 otherwise. Consistently, I add a dummy variable
for colonial ties between source and host countries which is 1 if source and destination
countries have a colonial history and 0 otherwise. I expect both variables, common
languages as well as colonial ties, to be negatively related with the selectivity of mi-
gration since low-skilled workers are more likely to self-select into countries which are
culturally proximal. These sorting effects lead to the endogeneity of bilateral migration
patterns, though, I directly account for self-selection with the dependent variable. Vari-
ables capturing cultural proximities are standard in gravity trade models which relate
the number of tradable goods to push and pull factors in country i and j, respectively
(Anderson and Van Wincoop (2002)). Since these variables affect the costs of migra-
tion, they necessarily impinge on the selectivity of migration as well. Higher migration
costs are more easily borne by high-skilled individuals. Variables which are common in
gravity models as well are distances between source and destination countries affecting
migration costs, which are more easily borne by high-skilled individuals as well. Hence,
I expect the effect of migration costs on migrant selectivity to be positive.
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As Acemoglu et al. (2001) already pointed out, the quality of political institutions
has a significant impact on economic development. Since these institutions might also
be conducive to the selectivity of migration, I account for the openness and degree of
democratization. By means of a polity2 variable, made available, for instance, by Prze-
worski et al. (2000), which ranges from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy), I capture
these effects. As democracy serves as a push and pull factor, I account for the difference
in democratization between source and destination countries.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before I proceed with the econometric analysis, I provide a descriptive overview captur-
ing all the variables I make use of below. Specifically, table 2.1 reports the mean, the
standard deviation as well as the minimum and maximum for each variable included in
the data set described above. Based on the descriptives, I capture 2,572 cases of mi-
grant selection. Migrants are selected based on census data which are representative, at
least on a national level. However, the dataset does not capture all of the migrants but
rather a sample for bilateral migration patterns between 116 source and 23 destination
countries. Whether the results are externally valid even beyond countries included in
the sample is further discussed below. In table 2.2, I display the number of migration
patterns for a set of countries included in the data set. Regarding emigration, I rely
on a number of patterns ranging from 131 cases in Rwanda to 178,218 cases in Colom-
bia. Conversely, regarding immigration patterns the numbers range from Jamaica with
1,250 cases to the United States with 808,279 cases, respectively.
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2.3.3 Data Analysis
Baseline Model
In order to test the predictions raised in the theoretical section, I proceed in three steps.
First, as a baseline framework, I mainly rely on random effects and fixed effects models
with robust standard errors, respectively. Second, I account for partial adjustments in
migrant selection by means of dynamic panel models. Third, I disentangle the impact
of resource booms on income inequality and migrant selectivity based on a simultaneous
equation model.
As part of the baseline setup restated below,
SELECTIV ITYijt = αij + φ (RESOURCESit −RESOURCESjt) + ξX ′ijt + ijt
(2.38)
I start out with a Hausman test in order to check whether the error components model
is more efficient compared to the deviations-from-means estimator. In contrast to the
fixed effects estimator, the random effects estimator treats fixed effects as part of a
composite error term, αij + ijt = ηijt. Both, fixed and random effects estimators
impose strict exogeneity13,
E(ijt|Xijt, RESOURCESijt, αij) = 0 (2.39)
for t = 1, ..., T , but the random effects estimator additionally hinges on
E(αij|Xijt, RESOURCESijt) = 0 (2.40)
As the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is rejected with χ2 = 35.55 for the baseline
model, I henceforth mainly rely on the fixed effects estimator.
13I abstract from time-fixed effects in a first step. Further, for the sake of parsimony, I account for
differences of oil revenues as RESOURCESijt = RESOURCESit − RESOURCESjt as well as for
other differenced variables.
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The results of the baseline setup are reported in table 2.3 below. In particular,
three different estimators are considered, a pooled OLS estimator in columns (1) - (4),
a random effects estimator in columns (5) - (8) and a fixed effects estimator in columns
(9) - (12), even though the results of the fixed effects estimator serve as the main ref-
erence in light of the Hausman test. Both the random effects and the fixed effects
models rely on country pair fixed effects, while I complementarily control for time fixed
effects (columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12)) following Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003).
Moreover, I test for non-linearities in the relationship between migrant selectivity and
resource revenues and the relationship between migrant selectivity and the polity2 in-
dex (columns (1)-(12)). In addition, I test for pairwise interactions between oil revenues
and the polity index (columns (6), (8)), between oil revenues and a civil war dummy
(columns (2), (4) (10), (12)) and finally between the polity2 index and the civil war
dummy (columns (3), (7)). The results do not refute the theoretical claim that resource
booms foster brain drain effects. Apparently, oil revenues per capita, the main variable
of interest, appears to be positively and significantly related to the selectivity of emigra-
tion (in the absence of civil wars and a polity index equal to 0). In other words, a rise
in relative oil abundance corresponds with an increase in brain drain effects, captured
by the years of schooling of emigrants compared to the average years of schooling in
the source country. This association appears to be qualitatively consistent through all
model specifications. Moreover, the results display significant non-linearities in the rela-
tionship between relative oil abundance and migrant selectivity. Namely, oil abundance
sets the stage for brain drain effects, though this effect is decreasing in the level of oil
abundance. I test the robustness of this finding with respect to the dynamic setup in
section 2.3.3.2 below. Whether brain drain effects are mediated through distributional
effects, as the theory suggests, is not clear-cut. In order to account for mediating effects
through income inequality, I have to rely on a simultaneous equation model in section
2.3.3.3.
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With respect to covariates, the quantity as well as the selectivity of migration are
negatively associated in the pooled OLS model as well as the random effects specifica-
tions with time fixed effects. The larger the number of individuals migrating between
two countries in one period, the lower the selectivity of emigration in the following
period. This inverse relationship indicates that for low-skilled individuals existing com-
munities and networks are much more important while high-skilled individuals appear
to be more adaptable. In other words, the results suggest a quantity-selectivity-trade-off
in migration. However, as opposed to the other specifications, the fixed effects estimates
do not display any apparent selectivity-quantity tradeoff. Physical costs of migration
are captured by distances between source and destination countries and are positively
related to the selectivity of emigrating individuals. Migration costs are more easily
borne by high-skilled individuals. Hence, the results are consistent with the theoretical
predictions.
Moreover, the average income per capita in the source country seems to dampen
brain drain effects which signifies that in developed countries individuals encounter
lower poverty constraints of migration. Yet, the relationship is insignificant in several
fixed effects specifications, especially while accounting for time fixed effects as well. An-
other variable indicating development and institutional quality is the polity-index rang-
ing from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). Apparently, the selectivity of migration
and the polity index are not significantly associated while accounting for country pair
fixed effects. Likewise, interacting oil revenues with a civil war dummy does not lead to
significant estimates in the fixed effects specifications legitimized by the Hausman test
either. In general, I expect that more developed countries with good institutions are
less prone to a resource curse. Countries with good institutions are often able to ease
the natural resource curse or even turn it into a blessing due to institutional quality
(Van der Ploeg (2011)). “Norway is the world’s third largest petroleum exporter after
Saudi Arabia and Russia, but is one of the least corrupt countries in the world and en-
joys well developed institutions, far sighted management and market friendly policies.”
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(Van der Ploeg (2011), p. 368) Therefore, even though the quality of institutions is not
exogenous but depends on natural resource wealth (Isham and Busby (2005)), countries
lacking in institutional quality may hardly turn the curse of natural resources into a
blessing. This presumption is consistent with Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)
who hypothesized that corruption and the transfer of money to elites is the main reason
for the contraction of Nigeria’s economy in the course of resource findings. However,
with respect to migration, better institutions might correspond with trade openness as
well setting the stage for migration opportunities in the course of a Dutch disease. Yet,
neither the interaction between oil revenues and the polity2 index nor the relationship
between oil revenues and the civil war dummy are significant according to the estimates
of the static panel model.
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In the next section, I set out a dynamic panel model in order to account for partial
adjustments in the selectivity of migration.
Dynamic Panel Model
A dynamic panel model of migrant selectivity is specified as follows:
SELECTIV ITYijt =αij + βSELECTIV ITYijt−1+
γ(RESOURCESit −RESOURCESjt) +X ′ijtδ + ijt
(2.41)
Again, the consistency of the fixed effects estimator depends on the strict exogeneity
assumption implying that idiosyncratic error terms and covariates are uncorrelated in
each period. Formally,
E[ijt|xijt, RESOURCESijt, αij] = 0 (2.42)
for t = 1, ..., T .14 Conversely, estimators based on the within or first difference trans-
formation necessarily give rise to correlations between ijt and SELECTIV ITYijt−1 in
dynamic panel models. In turn, these correlations lead to inconsistent estimates for N
tending to infinity and T fixed (Nickell (1981)).
In essence, there are three potential remedies. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested
to build first differences in order to remove fixed effects and to instrument the endoge-
nous regressor, ∆SELECTIV ITYi,t−1, with an additional exogenous lag in levels or
differences. In contrast, the remedy proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) makes use
of all available lags of the endogenous variable in a generalized method of moments
(difference GMM) approach in order to instrument lagged differences while improving
efficiency. However, instruments in levels are reasonably weak for variables in differences
if the variable of interest follows a random walk. Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998)
14I abstract from time fixed effects in a first step.
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propose a different estimator which makes use of a combination of lagged differences
and levels while instrumenting the lagged dependent variable (system GMM). Table 2.4
below displays system GMM estimates of the parameters in equation 2.41 which are
more efficient compared to those of the difference GMM approach. Columns (1) - (12)
rely on country pair fixed effects while columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10) complementarily
provide time fixed effects. Moreover, the columns differ with respect to the inclusion of
interactions between oil revenues and the polity2 index along with a civil war dummy
(columns (3)-(12)), respectively, test for non-linearities in the relationship between oil
revenues and emigrant selectivity (columns (1)-(2), (5)-(12)), and account for a second
lag in the outcome variable (columns (9)-(12)). Additionally, Hansen-J-test statistics
are provided in order to test for the exogeneity of instruments through overidentifying
restrictions.
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The results of the dynamic panel depicted above are mainly consistent with the
previous findings according to the main coefficient of interest, γ, and robust through all
specifications. Hence, relative oil abundance between source and destination countries
is positively related to the selectivity of emigration, and therefore to brain drain ef-
fects.15 However, in contrast to the static panel model above, the specifications do not
depict significant non-linearities in this relationship while accounting for country pair
and time fixed effects. Interacting oil revenues with the polity2 index leads to a positive
and significant coefficient (in the absence of civil wars), at least while controlling for
country pair and time fixed effects. However, this might originate from the fact that
countries with good political institutions are more open and skilled individuals are more
mobile across developed countries. Moreover, in democratic societies the median voter
theorem in the previous section pointed at larger resource transfers in favor of unskilled
labor, setting the stage for brain drain effects. In addition, interacting the civil war
dummy with oil revenues suggests that in case of a civil war even less skilled individ-
uals are forced to emigrate. Again, average incomes per capita and emigrant selection
are negatively associated, though the coefficients turn insignificant while controlling for
time fixed effects. Finally, the results indicate a strong persistency of migrant selection
over time.
Up to now, I exclusively focused on the direct effect of resource abundance on
migrant selectivity. However, in the theoretical section 2.2.1, inequality effects served as
an intermediary between resource booms and brain drain effects. Hence, I disentangle
the effects of resource booms and inequality on the one hand and the relationship
between income inequality and migrant selectivity on the other hand by means of a
simultaneous equation model. The framework is at the center of the following section.
15In specifications with interactions this holds in the absence of civil wars and a polity2 index that
equals 0.
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Simultaneous Equation Model
In order to verify whether brain drain effects are mediated through inequality effects, I
construct a simultaneous equation model (SEM). This model treats income inequality
and migrant selectivity as endogenous while applying a three-stage-least squares (3SLS)
procedure in order to estimate two equations simultaneously. While the first equation
relates relative resource abundance and inequality, the second equation associates rel-
ative income inequality and migrant selectivity. Formally, I construct the following
simultaneous equation model:
GINIit−GINIjt = γij+(RESOURCESit−RESOURCESjt)ζ+W ′ijtα+uijt (2.43)
SELECTIV ITYijt = θij + (GINIit−1 −GINIjt−1)β +X ′ijtpi + ηijt (2.44)
which can be written more compactly as
Y = Z ′ξ +  (2.45)
Consistently with the previous sections, the dependent variable, SELECTIVITY, is de-
fined as the difference between the years of schooling of emigrants and the average years
of schooling in the source country while the variableRESOURCESit−RESOURCESjt
is specified as the difference in oil revenues per capita in constant prices of 2007 between
the source and the destination country. The variable GINI captures Gini coefficients as
long as they are available for respective time periods and countries and is differenced
between source and destination countries as well. Complementarily, I rely on inequality
measures based on height data (height GINI) which I draw from Zanden et al. (2014)
and Baten and Mumme (2010) for those countries for which Gini coefficients are not
available. The use of height data is based on the assumption that income inequality
and the variation in human height are correlated.16 The main variables of interest are
accompanied by a set of additional covariates, indicated by W ijt (equation 2.43) and
16Moradi and Baten (2005) relate income inequality and the coefficient of variation of human height
based on the following formula, Giniit = −33.5 + 20.5CVit.
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X ijt (equation 2.44), which might impinge on income inequality and migrant selectiv-
ity, respectively. In the equation explaining migrant selectivity these variables mainly
coincide with those of the baseline setup as long as they are not time invariant and
swept out by first differences. In the equation explaining income inequality, covari-
ates are selected based on the literature. Essentially, I refer to Roine et al. (2009) in
selecting appropriate covariates. Variables which were shown to be relevant comprise
the share of exports as part of the gross domestic product capturing the quantity of
market integration. Further, I control for the share of people living in urban areas and
the polity2 index which might impinge on the income distribution as well. Moreover,
I account for public expenditures as a share of gross domestic product as well as edu-
cational inequality. Again, in order to account for push and pull factors, I include the
difference of bilateral covariates between source and destination countries.
In an effort to estimate the simultaneous equation model above, I proceed in two
steps. First, I build first differences of equation (2.43) and (2.44) in order to expunge
fixed effects γij and θij, respectively, sweeping out time-invariant covariates. Second,
I rely on a three-stage-least-squares approach which combines a 2SLS estimator with
a generalized-least-squares estimator. Namely, the 2SLS estimator can be specified as
follows in light of the notation above:
ξˆ2SLS =
(
Zˆ ′Zˆ
)−1
Zˆy (2.46)
In contrast to the 2SLS estimator, the 3SLS is based on the estimated residuals E(σˆ′σˆ) =
Σˆ⊗ I:
ξˆ3SLS =
(
Zˆ ′[Σˆ⊗ I]Zˆ
)−1
Zˆ ′[Σˆ⊗ I]y (2.47)
where I is the identity matrix.
The following table shows estimates of the structural equation model based on
three-stage-least squares estimates described above. In columns (1) to (10) of table 2.5
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below I account for different combinations of covariates in order to test the sensitivity of
the results through various specifications based on a 3SLS procedure while controlling
for country pair fixed effects. Complementarily, the specifications in columns (6) to
(10) account for time fixed effects.
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Apparently, increasing relative oil revenues lead to relatively less dispersed income
distributions in light of the estimates above. Based on the theory, an appreciation of the
exchange rate crowds out the tradable sector in favor of the non-tradable sector, setting
the stage for a contraction of the income distribution. This result is empirically in line
with the findings of Fum and Hodler (2010) and Goderis and Malone (2011). While
the former find that resource booms lower income inequality as long as the country is
ethnically homogenous, the latter conclude that Gini coefficients are generally nega-
tively correlated with resource abundance in the short run. In contrast, Gylfason and
Zoega (2003) rely on an endogenous growth model and find a positive correlation be-
tween resource dependence measured as the share of natural to total wealth and income
inequality. However, theoretically, the authors do not allow for Dutch disease effects
in an open economy, and empirically, the authors account for resource dependence in
general rather than oil abundance in particular.
In contradiction to Borjas (1987), relative income dispersions only translate into
brain drain effects while accounting for lagged rather than contemporaneous Gini coef-
ficients. Nevertheless, based on lagged Gini coefficients, lower skill premia in the source
country lead to further brain drain effects. However, the coefficients of the simultaneous
equation model should be interpreted cautiously. Firstly, Gini coefficients and covari-
ates are primarily available for high income countries which might lead to a sample
selection issue. Secondly, the Borjas model does not exclusively rely on relative income
dispersion in order to explain migrant selectivity. Rather, the results of the model are
fundamentally based on the income correlation coefficient across countries. As long as
income is not sufficiently transferrable, especially between developing and developed
countries, a contraction of the income distribution does not necessarily foster brain
drain effects. Thirdly, Gini coefficients capture aggregate income inequality whilst the
theoretical conjectures exclusively refer to within inequality between skilled and un-
skilled labor. However, if a political elite appropriates a significant amount of windfall
gains aggregate inequality might increase while within inequality between skilled and
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unskilled labor might see a decline.
Hence, in order to test the robustness of the results, I provide sensitivity checks in
the appendix based on different data on migrant selectivity and income inequality, even
for contemporaneous relationships. Before, I provide further robustness checks in the
following section.
Further Robustness Checks
Confirming the robustness of the results for different model specifications requires sev-
eral additional checks. First, I have to test whether the results are just limited to oil
abundant countries or whether the results can be generalized to different kinds of re-
sources as the title of the paper suggests. In the regression table 2.6 depicted below,
I relate the selectivity of migration to an aggregate resource measure based on Haber
and Menaldo (2011). Namely, the variable comprises income generated in oil, natural
gas, coal, precious metal, and industrial metal industries. Based on aggregate resource
revenues, the results are still in line with the baseline specification. Aggregate resource
abundance appears to foster brain drain effects. The resources accounted for are all
point-source natural resources in line with the theoretical predictions. Namely, the
manufacturing and service sector was not explicitly accompanied by a resource sector.
Rather, resource income was considered in the budget constraint of local residents.
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Second, I have to encounter two potential selectivity issues, sample selection bi-
ases as well as self-selection biases. Introductorily, I already touched on the latter,
self-selection biases, suggesting that bilateral migration streams are not exogenous.
Rather, individuals self-select themselves into destination countries based on relative
skill premia in source and all potential destination countries under consideration of mi-
gration costs. This problem is particularly relevant for investigating the effects on the
quantity of migration and could be tackled with a conditional logit framework. But
since I directly refer to the selectivity of migration, I explicitly allow and account for
sample selection with respect to the schooling of migrants. Therefore, this problem is
negligible in my setup as long as the correlation between the quantity and the selectivity
of migration is sufficiently low.
The former, sample selection biases, are addressed by randomly selecting individ-
uals and countries. Since I exclusively focus on representative survey data, I do not
face any sample selection issues at first sight. But since the data are mainly based on
bilateral migration patterns between a selection of countries and not based on all po-
tential source and destination countries, I have to check whether the country selection
facilitates external validity. Therefore, I exemplarily compare GDP per capita for the
set of source countries, the set of destination countries and for all countries available in
the World Bank development indicators dataset by decades 1960-2000.
Decade Source Countries Destination Countries All Countries
1960 690.3153 652.4576 516.2651
1970 981.3153 1001.26 873.5599
1980 2916.806 2974.765 2716.802
1990 5121.846 5038.228 4325.012
2000 8043.441 8113.205 7435.319
Notes: Mean GDP per capita in current USD for different samples. All countries comprise those for which World Bank
(2015) data are available.
Table 2.7: Mean GDP for different samples
According to the table above, the sample of source and destination countries is not
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fully representative, but differences are not large enough to totally undermine external
validity.
2.4 Conclusion
The general question whether the abundance of natural resources is a curse or a bless-
ing has been investigated for more than three decades. While most of the papers focus
on the relationship between resource booms and economic development, I illuminate
the relationship between resource booms and the selectivity of migration. The main
contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, I set out a theoretical framework re-
lating resource shocks and migrant selectivity. Second, I related resource abundance
and migrant selectivity empirically based on several panel models. Namely, I aimed at
answering the following research questions: Does resource abundance impinge on the
selectivity of emigration? Is the impact of resource abundance on migrant selectivity
mediated through income inequality, as Borjas (1987) suggests? Do the effects differ
with respect to specific country characteristics?
Theoretically, income inequality served as an intermediary between Dutch disease
effects and brain drain effects. Namely, a resource boom elicits a Dutch disease materi-
alizing in an appreciation of the exchange rate which crowds out the tradable in favor
of the non-tradable sector. Based on the assumption that the tradable (non-tradable)
sector is relatively high-skilled (low-skilled) labor intensive, high-skilled labor is worse
off while low-skilled labor is better off post of the resource boom. As long as initial
resource transfers do not compensate the decline in the returns to skills of high-skilled
labor, the Dutch disease lays the ground for brain drain effects through the lens of the
Borjas model.
Empirically, I relied on panel models which account for migrant selectivity between
116 source countries and 23 destination countries between 1910 and 2009. Specifically,
2.4. Conclusion 81
I pursued fixed and random effects panel estimates as a baseline setup and carried the
empirical analysis forward to dynamic panel estimates and a simultaneous equation
model. The former accounts for partial adjustments in migrant selectivity while the
latter disentangles the impact of resource booms on income inequality and migrant se-
lectivity. The results do not refute the theoretical claim that resource booms lead to
brain drain effects. These brain drain effects appear to be mediated through distribu-
tional effects, as confirmed by sensitivity checks.
Introductorily, I referred to Gylfason (2001) in raising the question whether there
is an inverse relationship between natural capital and human capital. According to
the results, adverse effects of resource windfalls on human capital are not limited to
local residents. Rather, resource booms might even crowd out human capital through
migration.
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2.5 Appendix: Sensitivity Check Simultaneous Equa-
tion Model
In the simultaneous equation model in section 2.3.3.3, I simultaneously related resource
abundance, income inequality and migrant selectivity in order to test whether a resource
boom leads to brain drain effects mediated through distributional effects. Consistently,
as part of a sensitivity analysis, I perform the same steps as in section 2.3.3.3, while
accounting for alternative measures of migrant selectivity and income inequality. With
respect to migrant selectivity, I rely on a novel brain drain database assembled by the
German Institute for Employment Research (IAB) capturing the ratio of migrants with
an upper degree relative to the total number of migrants above age 25 between 1980
and 2010 (Bruecker et al. (2013)). In particular, the dataset captures migration pat-
terns into 20 OECD member state countries for 5 year intervals, while classifying and
trisecting qualifications in lower, middle and upper final degrees based on national cen-
sus data. The variable BRAIN DRAIN is accounted for as the change in the stock of
migrants with an upper degree relative to the overall number of migrants moving from
country i to j in period t. With respect to income inequality, I rely on GINI coefficients
provided by the World Bank (World Bank (2015)) for the period 1980 to 2010 in table
2.8 below.
Formally, the analysis makes use of a simultaneous equation model set out and
described in section 2.3.3.3, though accounting for different sources for GINI coefficients
and migrant selectivity as described above.
GINIit−GINIjt = γi+(RESOURCESit−RESOURCESjt)ζ+W ′ijtα+uijt (2.48)
BRAINDRAINijt = θi + (GINIit −GINIjt)β +X ′ijtpi + ηijt (2.49)
2.5. Appendix: Sensitivity Check Simultaneous Equation Model 83
which can be written more compactly as
Y = Z ′ξ +  (2.50)
The following table provides estimates for the coefficients set out above. In columns (1)
to (4) I provide pooled 3SLS estimates estimates for different model specifications in or-
der to test the sensitivity of the results. Complementarily, specifications in columns (5)
to (8) account for time fixed effects while specifications in columns (9) to (12) account
for both source country and time fixed effects. Apparently, the results do not refute
the theoretical claim that a resource windfall leads to a decline in income inequality
translating into brain drain effects. As opposed to section 2.3.3.3, this even holds for
contemporaneous relationships between income inequality and migrant selectivity.
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3RESOURCE BOOMS AND THE
SELECTIVITY OF INTERNAL
MOBILITY
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Abstract:
While Chapter 2 was devoted to the selectivity of international migration patterns,
Chapter 3 examines the selectivity effects of interstate migration patterns arising as a
virtue of resource booms. Theoretically, I show that natural resource booms lower the
relative educational background of prospective immigrants. This especially holds if re-
source abundant states embark on a policy of resource transfers in the course of further
fiscal capacity. Empirically, I examine selective interstate mobility patterns, relying on
US census data spanning the years between 1940 and 2000. The empirical results are
mainly in accordance with the theoretical predictions. Namely, a resource boom lowers
the educational background of prospective immigrants and unleashes ambiguous effects
on the selectivity of emigration.1
1This chapter is single-authored and has been submitted to an academic journal.
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3.1 Introduction
“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his
preference pattern (...).”
– Tiebout (1956), p. 418.
In Chapter 2, I showed that a resource boom lays the ground for brain drain effects
in international migration contexts. The theoretical predictions were based on Dutch
disease models (Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984)), according to which natural
resource booms lead to a real appreciation of the exchange rate (spending effect) along
with intersectoral factor movements towards the non-tradable sector (resource move-
ment effects). Due to the distributional effects in the course of the deindustrialisation,
the Dutch disease fosters brain drain effects. Complementarily, Chapter 3 examines
selectivity effects of US interstate migration patterns in response to resource windfalls.
In particular, I raise the following questions: What are the underlying mechanisms in
relating resource booms to the skill composition of internal migration patterns? Are the
empirical results in line with the theoretical conjectures? Are non-parametric methods
appropriate in order to model the multilateral character of migration decisions?
In order to address these questions, I combine a theoretical model with an empiri-
cal investigation. Theoretically, I rely on a simple model, according to which the fiscal
authority encounters further fiscal capacity in the course of resource booms, setting
the stage for resource transfers. As long as low-skilled labor derives a stronger utility
gain from resource windfall gains, a resource boom is negatively associated with the
selectivity of immigration. Complementarily, a Dutch disease translating into a boom
of the service sector and a bust of the tradable sector strengthens this result through
intersectoral resource movements. However, as opposed to international migration pat-
terns analyzed in Chapter 2, even regions lacking natural resources might be exposed
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to factor reallocations as a consequence of exchange rate effects. Hence, Dutch disease
models are not an appropriate reference in order to analyze selective regional migration
patterns as a consequence of resource booms.
The findings of this chapter are embedded into several strands of literature which
shed light on the determinants of (selective) regional migration patterns, especially
within the US. In particular, Borjas et al. (1992) relies on the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth and shows that relative returns to skills across US states serve as
the main determinant of selective migration patterns. “Persons whose skills are most
mismatched with the reward structure offered by their current state of residence are
the persons most likely to leave that state, and these persons tend to relocate in states
which offer higher rewards for their particular skills.” (p. 159) These results are consis-
tent with the theoretical predictions Borjas (1987) raised in his seminal paper. Beyond
Borjas et al. (1992), the evidence with respect to the Borjas model is relatively mixed
and mainly focuses on cross-country migration, as pointed out in Chapter 2. While
Moraga (2011) verifies that relative inequality determines the selectivity of migration
in line with the Borjas model, Chiquiar (2005) falsifies the theoretical predictions based
on migration patterns between Mexico and the US. Kaestner and Malamud (2014) refer
to migration streams between Mexico and the US as well and conclude that Mexican
migrants in the US approximate a random sample of the Mexican population. Stolz
and Baten (2012) examine selective international migration patterns and confirm the
predictions of the Borjas model during the era of mass migration. In accordance with
the predictions of his seminal paper, Borjas (2002) analyzes interstate mobility patterns
in response to differentials in welfare spending and concludes that welfare spending is
negatively associated with the selectivity of internal immigration. According to Razin
et al. (2011), this result is externally valid for migration patterns in Europe as well.2
Empirically, I rely on US census data capturing migration patterns between 1940
2These results are further in line with the findings of Enchautegui (1997), McKinnish (2007) Levine
and Zimmerman (1999)
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and 2000. States which were exposed to significant oil booms in the respective period
include Texas, Alaska, Wyoming and Louisiana. Especially in the second half of the
20th century, the US experienced a sharp increase in oil revenues, initially mainly driven
by Texas. Peaking in the oil crisis in 1973, the US saw a fierce decline in oil drilling
subsequently, though production was pushed up again transitorily with the completion
of the Trans-Alaska pipeline as of 1977. After the second peak in 1977, US oil drilling
dropped sharply and persistently. The oil boom corresponded with a substantial influx
of workers. For instance, the population in Texas increased from almost 10,000,000 in
1960 to 20,000,000 in 2000.
In order to relate resource booms to the selectivity of interstate migration, I proceed
in three steps. In a first step, I construct a selectivity measure based on the years of
primary, secondary and college education acquired by internal migrants relative to the
average educational attainment in the state of origin. In a second step, I set out an
econometric model linking the quantity and selectivity of migration to oil revenues per
capita along with several covariates. In a third step, I test the robustness of the results
based on a dynamic panel model and account for the relative standard of living through
a non-parametric approach. With respect to the latter, I make use of seminal contri-
butions of Douglas and Wall (1993) and Wall (2001), according to which relative net
migration serves as a means in order to set out an ordinal ranking of states. Even though
migration decisions materialize retrospectively as bilateral decisions, prospectively, mi-
gration decisions are multilateral since migrants contrast all potential destination states
with each other under consideration of migration costs. Hence, a multilateral approach
is of particular importance in order to analyze migration decisions.
Moreover, in order to internalize counterfactual trends in migrant selection, I com-
pare the evolution in migrant selection within oil abundant states with the respective
evolution in a control group composed of several US states which have not been ex-
posed to any oil boom. Through all econometric specifications, the results are basically
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in line with theoretical predictions, i.e. resource booms lower the relative educational
background of immigrants, while the effects on the selectivity of emigration are am-
biguous. Finally, I verify whether the results are driven by migrants moving into the
service sector or by migrants taking up positions in the oil extraction industry.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I provide a theoretical setup
relating resource windfalls to the selectivity of migration. In section 3.3, I confront the
theoretical predictions with data from interstate migration patterns throughout the US.
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Theory
In order to derive the link between resource booms and the skill composition of internal
migration, I rely on a multinomial choice model in the spirit of McFadden et al. (1973),
McFadden (1978) and Maddala (1983). In particular, I posit an economy which is
composed of N individuals, k ∈ K = {1, ..., N}, distributed across M states, j ∈ J =
{1, ...,M}. Let Vkj denote the indirect utility individual k derives in state j, while
individual incomes are made up of a deterministic component, x′kjβ, and a stochastic
component, kj, according to the following equation:
Vkj = x
′
kjβ + kj (3.1)
Each individual chooses the destination state which maximizes indirect utility, Vkj, out
of the indirect utility set, {Vk1...VkM}, while dispensing with migration costs which are
modest in internal migration contexts. Formally,
Prob(Vk = j) = Prob(Vkj = max{Vk1, ..., VkM}) (3.2)
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Assuming a stochastic component which is i.i.d. extreme value distributed, i.e.
F (kj) = exp(− exp(−kj)) (3.3)
carries over to the following probability of individual k choosing state j, Prob(Vk =
j|xkj),
Prob(Vk = j|xkj) =
exp(x′kjβ)∑M
j=1 exp(x
′
kjβ)
(3.4)
which goes back to Maddala (1983). Due to the extreme value distribution, the stochas-
tic components of the indirect utility derived in each state are independent of the
stochastic components of the indirect utility derived in all other states. This assump-
tion is standard and often referred to as independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
in the literature (e.g. Luce (2005)). In addition, it is worth mentioning that individual
choices are exclusively determined by aggregate covariates which might be interacted
with individual covariates in a conditional logit framework.
Within the conditional logit framework set out above, I assume that state j ex-
periences a resource windfall and provides each inhabitant an unconditional resource
transfer, xkjr. The change in the probability of migration into the resource abundant
state, j, in response to changes in control xkjr is given by:
∂Prob(Vk = j|xkj)
∂xkjr
= Prob(Vk = j|xkj)(1− Prob(Vk = j|xkj)βr (3.5)
Conspicuously, the effect of resource windfall gains on the immigration probability
depends on the impact of resource windfall gains on indirect utility, βr, and on all co-
variates, xkj.
In order to evaluate the effect of resource windfall gains on the selectivity of migra-
tion, I discuss the general results above based on a specific deterministic utility function.
Suppose an agent living in country j chooses consumption, c, and labor, l, in order to
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maximize utility, U = cα(1 − l)β with 0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1 subject to his budget
constraint, pc = (1 − τ)wl +R. Time is normalized to one and the individual trades
off work, l, and leisure, 1− l. In addition, τ equals a proportional income tax, whilst R
represents resource transfers. The indirect utility individual k derives in state j arising
out of this optimization problem is given by:
Vkj =
(
(1− τj)wk
p
)α(
1 +
Rj
(1− τj)wk
)α+β
ααββ
(α + β)α+β
(3.6)
Conspicuously, unconditional resource transfers unambiguously increase the indirect
utility across all skill levels. However, the positive association is stronger the lower the
net wage, and hence the productivity of the worker under reasonable assumptions due
to the decline in marginal utility. Therefore, resource windfall gains are particularly
beneficial for low-skilled labor even in the absence of a Dutch disease. However, in light
of equation 3.5, a positive association between resource windfall gains and indirect util-
ity is necessary though not sufficient to go along with an increase in the probability of
immigration. Rather, the selectivity effects of resource windfall gains also depend on
the initial relative attractiveness of the resource abundant state, as individuals make
discrete rather than continuous choices. However, as long as the number of alternative
countries becomes large, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of low-skilled
migration increases more fiercely in the course of resource windfall gains. Besides of di-
rect selectivity effects of unconditional transfers, a resource boom precipitates a Dutch
disease which corresponds with a boom in the service sector and a bust in the manufac-
turing sector. As the service sector is relatively low-skilled labor intensive, low-skilled
labor is better off in the course of resource booms. This might contribute to the selec-
tivity effects of immigration as well.
In the following section, I illuminate the relationship between resource booms and
the selectivity of interstate migration empirically. In this regard, I make use of static
and dynamic panel models as well as a nonparametric approach, accounting for the mul-
tilateral character of migration decisions. However, before I proceed with a prescriptive
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analysis, I provide descriptive statistics in the following section.
3.3 Evidence
3.3.1 Descriptive Analysis
In a first step, I descriptively relate relative resource revenues to the selectivity of
migration patterns. With respect to oil revenues, Hamilton (2011) provides data on
oil production for US states between 1850 and 2000. US states with substantial oil
production throughout the 20th century entail Texas, Alaska, Louisiana, California
and Colorado. As displayed in the panel on the left-hand side of figure 3.1 below,
aggregate US oil drilling was modest until the beginning of the 20th century and went
up subsequently until the first oil crisis in 1973 with 3,400,000 barrels per day, followed
by an almost persistent downturn. According to the disaggregated panel on the right
hand side of figure 3.1, the increase in aggregate oil production at the beginning of the
20th century was mainly driven by Texas preceding the first oil crisis and by Alaska
following the first oil crisis. In Texas, large scale oil drilling began in the 1930’s on a
fairly low level and peaked in the 1970’s with 1,300,000 barrels per day, followed by
a persistent decline, while large-scale oil drilling in Alaska began in 1977. With the
first oil crisis, rigid legal disputes with respect to the construction of the Transalaska-
Pipeline came to an end and the Transalaska Pipeline was completed between 1973 and
1977. With the completion of the Transalaska-Pipeline connecting Prudhoe Bay in the
North and Valdez in the south, US aggregate oil production saw a transient increase.
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Figure 3.1: US Oil Drilling
Alaska in particular exhibited some peculiarities. Firstly, production started abruptly
rather than steadily after the completion of the pipeline in 1977, setting the stage for
a boom in the whole economy. While oil production in Alaska was 63,398 barrels per
day in 1976, oil production went up to 169,201 barrels per day in 1977, followed by a
steady decline after the second oil crisis in 1979. Secondly, oil production serves as the
main propeller for the state economy. Therefore, Alaska is a distinct laboratory in order
to shed light on the selectivity effects of emigration and immigration as a consequence
of the oil boom. I will make use of the fierce increase in oil production in Alaska in
order to ascertain the responses in educational investments among local residents in
Chapter 4 while excluding migrants from the sample. However, in order to examine the
selectivity effects of immigration in response to oil booms, I draw upon data from all
US states with significant oil production throughout the 20th century.3
While Texas, Alaska, Louisiana, California, Colorado and Wyoming constitute the
states with the largest oil production throughout the 20th century, according to the
separate panels in figure 3.2 and 3.3, Indiana, Kansas and North Dakota contributed
to aggregate oil drilling as well. In recent years, newly discovered oil fields, especially
in Montana, serve as the main contributor to the increase in aggregate oil production.
3States with minor oil production might be grouped as suggested by Hamilton (2011).
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Figure 3.2: Oil Production by US States 1
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Notes: The figures depict trends in US state oil production in barrels per day. Data source: Hamilton (2011).
Figure 3.3: Oil Production by US States 2
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Complementarily, figures 3.4 and 3.5 display oil revenues per capita on a US state
level between 1945 and 2000. While annual oil revenues per capita in Alaska peaked
in 1980 with 20,000 USD per capita, oil revenues per capita in Texas reached the max-
imum of slightly below 1,000 USD in 1980 due to the large population size compared
to Alaska. Further states with substantial oil revenues per capita throughout the 20th
century include Louisiana, Wyoming and Montana as well as North Dakota.
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Figure 3.4: Oil Revenues per Capita by US States 1
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Figure 3.5: Oil Revenues per Capita by US States 2
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The following map summarizes the sum of oil revenues per capita between 1940 and
2000 for each US state besides Alaska by collapsing the time series above.
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Notes: The map depicts the sum of oil revenues per capita by US states over the 20th century. Oil revenues per capita are given as oil
revenues per day according to Hamilton (2011) divided by the population size. Data source: Hamilton (2011).
Figure 3.6: US Oil Drilling
Complementarily, in figure 3.7, I relate the selectivity of interstate immigrants to oil
revenues per capita. In particular, the figure refers to the selectivity of migrants moving
into oil abundant states as listed in figures 3.2 and 3.3. The selectivity of migration
is measured as the difference between the years of schooling of immigrants and the
average years of schooling in the state of origin. Again, historical oil production data
originate from Hamilton (2011) while data on the selectivity of migration are obtained
from Ruggles et al. (2010). In line with the theoretical conjectures, the figure depicts
a negative association between oil abundance and the relative educational background
of immigrants while oil abundance are measured in oil revenues per day, in accordance
with Hamilton (2011).
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Figure 3.7: Immigrant Selectivity - Oil Revenues
However, the correlations reported in figure 3.7 are insufficient as long as the se-
lectivity of interstate migration decreases throughout the 20th century across all US
states, while oil revenues per capita increase. The former might be due to a decline
in poverty constraints materializing across all US states or due to an increase in aver-
age educational attainment and a given educational background of migrants. Hence, I
compare the average selectivity of immigration into oil abundant states with the aver-
age selectivity of immigration into all states including oil abundant states in figure 3.8
and into states not engaging in oil drilling in figure 3.9. Apparently, since the 1960’s
migrant selectivity into oil abundant states fell short of the average migrant selectivity,
a shortfall which is even more succinct compared to the selectivity of migration while
excluding oil abundant states. Hence, I can conclude that oil revenues per capita are
negatively associated with the selectivity of immigration, even compared to a control
group approximating a counterfactual. I refer to these counterfactual trends again in
the empirical section below. Before I exploit the data structure more carefully by setting
out static and dynamic panel models. The latter accounts for dynamic adjustments in
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the selectivity of migration as well.
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Notes: The figure contrasts the selectivity of immigration into oil abundant states with the average selectivity of immigration across
all states. The selectivity of immigration is measured as the difference in the years of schooling of immigrants and the average years of
schooling in the state of origin. Data source: Hamilton (2011), Ruggles et al. (2010).
Figure 3.8: Relative Selectivity 1
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Notes: The figure contrasts the selectivity of immigration into oil abundant states with the average selectivity of immigration across all
states while excluding oil abundant states as source and host states. The selectivity of immigration is measured as the difference in the
years of schooling of immigrants and the average years of schooling in the state of origin. Data source: Hamilton (2011), Ruggles et al.
(2010).
Figure 3.9: Relative Selectivity 2
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These panel models are introduced in the next section of this chapter.
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
In a second step, I examine the selectivity of interstate migration patterns within the
US as a consequence of oil abundance in the source and host state based on US census
data between 1940 to 2000. In particular, as a baseline setup, I posit the following
econometric model, relating the selectivity of migrants moving from state i to j to oil
revenues in the source and host state along with further covariates:
SELECTIV ITYijt = αij + φOILREV PCit + piOILREV PCjt +X
′
itγ +X
′
jtλ+ ijt
(3.7)
while the identification again relies on a strict exogeneity assumption:
E(ijt|Xijt, OILREV PCijt, αij) = 0 (3.8)
for t = 1, ..., T and Xijt serving as a vector of all covariates in the source and host state
and OILREV PCijt as a vector of oil revenues per capita in the source and host state.
In contrast to Chapter 2, I account for all covariates in the source and host state
separately in order to disentangle push and pull factors. In addition, I focus on natural
resource booms as a pull factor of immigration rather than as a push factor for emigra-
tion. Similar to Chapter 2, the data are collapsed for decades and state pairs, in order
to capture long run changes in migrant selectivity. The model is inspired by a gravity
equation proposed by Zipf (1946), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) as well as Anderson
and Van Wincoop (2001) which explains migration and trade by push and pull factors
in the source and host state in the case of migration or exporter and importer coun-
tries in the case of trade.4 However, as opposed to gravity equations and the setup in
Chapter 2 which focused on international migration, distances are less important for
4In order to avoid feedback effects, migration patterns are captured within 5 years before the
respective census.
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interstate migration patterns within a country.
As pointed out previously, the outcome variable, SELECTIV ITYijt, is defined
as the difference in the years of primary, secondary and college education of migrants
moving from state i to j and the average years of schooling in state i, drawn from US
census data (Ruggles et al. (2010)). The years of schooling are consistently defined
across states and over time, and therefore a reliable and comparable measure for the
selectivity of migration. To preclude that the results are driven by families with chil-
dren moving across US states, I restrict the analysis to individuals above age 25 who
are more likely to have completed their education. In addition, I include the average
age of migrants as an additional control variable in various specifications. In essence,
labor and interstate mobility declines over the life cycle with respect to both skilled
and unskilled labor, while overall, the mobility of skilled labor exceeds the mobility of
unskilled labor. However, even without restricting the analysis to individuals above
25, the average age shows only moderate differences between oil abundant states with
28.90244 years and non-oil oil abundant states with 29.36241 years (see table 4.1).
Again, in order to ascertain the distribution of the outcome variable, I provide Ker-
nel density estimates of migrant selectivity in figure 3.10, according to which migrant
selection in fact approximates a Gaussian normal distribution.5 Apparently, migrants
are on average positively selected, as less educated individuals encounter less opportu-
nities which is reflected in lower mobility (e.g. Abramitzky et al. (2013)).
5As set out in Chapter 2, I estimate the density of educational investments based on a non-
parametric approach which is standard.
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Figure 3.10: Kernel Density Estimate: Migrant Selectivity
The independent variables OILREV PCit and OILREV PCjt are defined as oil rev-
enues per capita in the source state i and host state j, respectively. Oil revenues are
defined as the product of state oil production per day on a US state level provided by
Hamilton (2011) and the respective oil price which is invariant across states. Again,
as the chapter is devoted to the relationship between resource abundance rather than
oil dependence and the selectivity of interstate migration, I account for oil revenues
per capita rather than per aggregate GDP. The main coefficients of interest are φ and
pi, capturing the relationship between resource abundance and the selectivity of immi-
gration and emigration, respectively. In order to avoid the analysis to be restricted to
migration patterns between resource abundant states, I provide separate specifications
with oil revenues serving as push and pull factors, respectively. Moreover, I control
for state pair fixed effects, αij in order to control for time constant unobserved hetero-
geneity across states. I further control for time dummies which is standard in gravity
equations (e.g. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003)) and panel data models in general (e.g.
David et al. (2007)). The inclusion of time effects is inevitable in light of figure 3.8
and 3.7 which suggest time specific effects which are invariant across state pairs. While
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Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) proposes a three-way gravity equation with time effects
and importer and exporter fixed effects, I account for state pair fixed effects.
In order to improve the efficiency of the estimates and in order to preclude con-
foundedness, I further control for additional push and pull factors in the source state i
and the host state j, Xit and Xjt, respectively. These covariates entail US state incomes
per capita provided by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). The role
of incomes per capita as a covariate is twofold. Firstly, state incomes per capita mainly
reflect pecuniary constraints which confine migration decisions (e.g. Abramitzky et al.
(2013)). Secondly, state income per capita serves as an indicator for the relative stan-
dard of living, severely affecting migration decisions as well. The relative standard of
living might also be affected by the provision of public goods through fiscal expendi-
tures. Hence, I control for fiscal expenditures per capita in the source and host state as
well, originating from the United States Census Bureau (2015). In additional robustness
checks, I further account for differences in the living standard originating from taxes
and transfers as a percentage of state incomes and the population density originating
from United States Census Bureau (2015) as well. In order to test the predictions of
the Borjas model within a country, I further include income inequality measures for the
source and host state through state Gini coefficients provided by Sommeiller and Price
(2014). As pointed out in Chapter 2, Borjas (1987) suggests that relative returns to
skills between the source and host state determine the selectivity of migration. Namely,
under the assumption that incomes are sufficiently correlated across states and the re-
turns to skills in the destination state exceed returns to skills in the source state, a
positive selection of immigrants is attracted on average.
Moreover, I control for the quantity of migration between state pairs as well, captur-
ing potential network effects in migration decisions. Workers often self-select themselves
into destination states which are populated by people with similar socio-economic and
cultural backgrounds, as emphasized by Bartel (1989), Beine and Salomone (2013) as
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well as McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) in light of international migration patterns into
the US. However, since cultural disparities are modest across states within the US, com-
munity effects are less relevant for internal migration patterns, in contrast to Chapter
2. Further, a selectivity-quantity trade-off might hold by definition since skilled labor
is less abundant compared to unskilled labor.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for all covariates, i.e. the number of ob-
servations along with the mean and standard deviation as well as the minimum and
maximum values of all variables I make use of in the prescriptive analysis below. As
the OLS estimator is based on a normal distribution of the error term rather than a
normal distribution of independent variables, the consistency of estimates is not af-
fected by the distribution of covariates. However, I provide log-transformations of all
independent variables which are greater than zero and not defined as percentages. In
line with the descriptive statistics shown in figure 3.2 and 3.3, oil revenues as well as
covariates are grouped for certain country pairs, following the definitions of Hamilton
(2011). Apparently, though consistently positive, the selectivity of migrants moving
into oil abundant states with 0.7511925 falls short of the selectivity of migrants moving
into other states with 0.9060558.
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In the following section, I proceed with the discussion of the results of the static
panel model.
3.3.3 Results
Static Panel Model
Table 3.2 reports estimates for the relationship between absolute oil abundance in the
source and host state and the selectivity of migration based on the econometric model
set out in equation 3.7 above. While the specifications in columns (1) to (3) rely on a
pooled OLS estimator, the estimates shown in columns (4) to (6) are based on a random
effects and the setups in columns (7) to (9) on a fixed effects estimator. However, in
light of a Hausman test statistic for the baseline model of χ2 = 109, the fixed effects
estimates serve as the main reference. Complementarily, the estimates in columns (4)
to (9) control for state pair fixed effects with clustered standard errors in the sense
of Stock and Watson (2008) which is standard in gravity equations. In order to take
into account that numerous US states do not generate oil revenues, I provide separate
estimates for oil revenues serving as push and pull factors, respectively.
Qualitatively, in line with the theoretical predictions, oil abundance in destina-
tion states is significantly and negatively associated with the relative educational back-
ground of immigrants throughout all specifications, while the relationship between oil
abundance and the selectivity of emigration is insignificant. In general, a reversal in the
sign of the coefficient between the pooled OLS model and the random and fixed effects
model might be an example of the Simpson’s Paradox (Simpson (1951)), according to
which a relationship which is apparent on a state level might turn insignificant or even
reverses in a pooled sample or vice versa. However, the respective coefficient is consis-
tently insignificant across all specifications. Quantitatively, the coefficients relating oil
revenues per capita and migrant selectivity range between -0.0197 and -0.0351, both
significant at the 1 percent level.
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In contrast to oil revenues, the covariates accounted for are consistently available
for all states, and hence do not set the stage for implicit sample selection issues due to
missing values. Therefore, I do not provide separate analyses for different sets of co-
variates in the source and destination state. In essence, the results are at least partially
in line with the predictions of the Borjas model, i.e. in the pooled OLS model (column
1) a rise in returns to skills in the destination state corresponds with an increase in
the selectivity of immigration. The larger returns to skills in the source state the lower
the relative educational background of prospective immigrants. I will elaborate on the
empirical evidence for the Borjas model in more detail below.
Moreover, state incomes per capita and fiscal expenditures serve as a pull factor
for skilled interstate migration. However, causality might, at least partially, go from
the selectivity of migration to state incomes per capita as well. However, these poten-
tial feedback effects do not impinge on the relationship of interest, as oil production
is exogenous. Further, the results indicate network effects of migration in line with
the theoretical conjectures. The larger the amount of interstate migration, the lower
the selectivity of prospective immigration. This is remarkable in light of the fact that
across US states cultural disparities are modest and migrants do not have to overcome
language barriers in contrast to international migration (e.g. Bartel (1989)). However,
in a static framework in which skilled labor is less abundant compared to unskilled
labor, this might even hold by definition. The scarcity of skilled labor might lead to a
decline in the selectivity of migration in the course of additional migration.
Complementarily, in table 3.3, I further control for average ages. Apparently, the
average age is negatively associated with the selectivity of migration which might just
reflect a strong upward trend in educational investments due to path dependencies.
The theoretical predictions referred to resource windfall gains which are particularly
valuable for low-skilled labor. One specific instance was the Alaska Permanent Fund
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established in 1976 which will be studied in more detail in Chapter 4 with respect to
the effect on educational investments among local residents. Moreover, all state income
taxes were totally abolished in Alaska in 1980, so state income taxes have to be ac-
counted for as well. In order to verify whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion
of taxes and transfers, I additionally control for the share of income tax revenues along
with the share of transfers relative to total state incomes in table 3.4 below. In line
with the estimates reported in table 3.2, the results show that resource abundance pulls
down the selectivity of immigration. However, in the fixed effects setup the coefficient
turns insignificant. This indicates that the selectivity effects might in fact at least be
partially driven by transfers and taxes in line with the theoretical conjectures. This
result is consistent with the results derived by Razin et al. (2011), McKinnish (2007)
and Levine and Zimmerman (1999). I will further elaborate on the mediating factors
in light of a dynamic panel model below.
Moreover, in table 3.5, I additionally control for the unemployment rate in the
source and host state. Apparently, though the significance slightly declines, the rela-
tionship between relative oil abundance and selective migration is still significant and
remains qualitatively unaffected by the inclusion of further covariates. However, the
decline in the selectivity might be due to missing values in earlier time periods as well.
Finally, table 3.6 tests the sensitivity of the selectivity measure to shifts in the educa-
tional indicator. In particular, table 3.6 reports estimates based on a slightly different
definition of the years of schooling. In particular, the years of schooling are calculated
for individuals above grade 8. This is due to the fact that in the census data years of
schooling between grade 4 and 8 are grouped which slightly biases the average years
of schooling. However, qualitatively, changes in the definition of the indicator do not
impinge on the respective coefficient of interest. As reported in table 3.6, the results
are insensitive to different definitions of the educational indicator.
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Thus far, I dispensed with sector specific disparities in the relationship between
resource abundance and the selectivity of interstate migration. Therefore, in table 3.7,
I restrict the sample to migrants taking up position in the oil extraction industry. Ap-
parently, the baseline results are not driven by migrants moving into the oil extraction
industry. Rather, neither the selectivity of emigration nor the selectivity of immigration
is consistently associated with oil abundance based on the restricted sample of workers
while the number of observations is reduced. This suggests that the selectivity effects
are not directly induced by employment effects in the oil extraction industry which is
consistent with the fact that oil extraction is not very labor intensive (e.g. Auty (1993))
Complementarily, in table 3.8, I restrict the sample to migrants taking up positions
in the service sector. Obviously, migrants taking up positions in the service sector con-
tribute to the selectivity effects of migration shown in the baseline results. Consistently
through all specifications, a rise in oil revenues per capita lowers the selectivity of im-
migrants working in the service sector which is significant at the 1 percent level. With
coefficients ranging between -0.0287 and -0.0518, the effect of oil revenues per capita
on selective migration is even stronger compared to the baseline specification. This
result is in line with the theoretical conjecture that a resource boom translates into an
expansion of the non-tradable sector which is relatively low-skilled labor intensive and
a contraction of the tradable sector which is relatively high-skilled labor intensive.
In addition, in tables 3.9 and 3.10, I provide panel estimates while excluding Alaska
and Texas, respectively, which exhibit the highest rates of oil drilling in the US through-
out the 20th century. Accordingly, the results are still consistent with the theoretical
predictions. Excluding Alaska and Texas lowers the relative educational background of
immigrants in response to oil booms even further. On the one hand, Alaska abolished
all state income taxes as a consequence of further fiscal capacity which was particularly
beneficial for skilled labor. On the other hand, Alaska implemented a Alaska Perma-
nent Fund which is particularly beneficial for unskilled labor. I will further elaborate
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on the case of Alaska in Chapter 4 with respect to the educational investments of local
residents.
Moreover, in the appendix, I perform the same empirical steps, though restricting
the sample to in- and out-migration based on individual data. Again, in order to avoid
missing values while accounting for resource revenues in the source and host state, I
provide separate analyses for resource revenues serving as push and pull factors. Con-
sistently, the main results remain unaffected, i.e. oil revenues lower the selectivity of
immigration and might increase the selectivity of emigration, a result which is mainly
driven by immigrants working in the service sector rather than the oil extraction sector.
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Controlling for Counterfactual Trends
Thus far, I relied on a selectivity measure which was defined as the years of schooling of
migrants net the average years of schooling in the source state. However, the selectivity
of migration might follow some path dependencies. For instance, for a given educa-
tional background of migrants the selectivity of migration might decline if the average
educational attainment increases in the source state. Alternatively or additionally, the
average educational attainment of migrants might have declined relative to the state
average. In order to preclude that the estimates are driven by a general decline in
the average selectivity of interstate migrants throughout the 20th century, table 3.11
reports estimates of the baseline setup, while accounting for the relative selectivity,
RELSELECTIVITY, which is defined as the difference in migrant selectivity into oil
abundant states and the average migrant selectivity between states not engaging in oil
drilling. The difference in the selectivity of migration is displayed in the descriptive sec-
tion in figures 3.8 and 3.9, while relying on a pooled sample of states. Apparently, the
selectivity of immigration decreases even relative to the average selectivity of migrants
across non-oil abundant states. In fact, as bilateral migration patterns are preceded
by multilateral comparisons of all potential destination states, the control group is not
totally untreated. Rather, the control group is in the choice set of each individual,
and hence partially treated. Therefore, the control group should be interpreted as an
approximation as part of a robustness check. Complementarily, I will make use of a
non-parametric approach, in order to account for the multilateral character of migration
decisions below. Before, I rely on the following econometric framework:
RELSELECTIV ITYijt = αij + φOILREV PCit
+piOILREV PCjt +X
′
itγ +X
′
jtλ+ ijt
(3.9)
which coincides with the previous model except with respect to the outcome variable.
In line with the baseline specification, the results indicate a decline in the relative se-
lectivity of immigration. This result is robust for the inclusion of state pair fixed effects
124 Chapter 3. Resource Booms and Internal Mobility
as well (columns (5) - (8)). Hence, I can conclude that the baseline relationship is not
driven by a general decline in the selectivity of immigration.
3.3. Evidence 125
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
R
e
la
t
iv
e
S
e
le
c
t
iv
it
y
T
im
e
E
ff
e
c
t
s
?
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
O
il
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
s
p
e
r
C
a
p
it
a
-0
.0
2
6
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
4
8
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
4
7
3
∗∗
-0
.0
5
6
6
∗∗
-0
.0
2
4
5
∗∗
-0
.0
4
4
9
∗∗
-0
.0
4
7
3
∗∗
-0
.0
5
6
6
∗∗
(
0
.0
0
9
9
4
)
(
0
.0
1
7
2
)
(
0
.0
1
9
4
)
(
0
.0
2
5
9
)
(
0
.0
1
0
3
)
(
0
.0
1
7
8
)
(
0
.0
1
9
4
)
(
0
.0
2
5
9
)
P
o
p
u
la
t
io
n
0
.1
1
6
∗∗
∗
0
.1
7
9
∗∗
∗
0
.1
5
2
∗∗
0
.1
6
3
0
.1
1
6
∗∗
∗
0
.1
6
7
∗∗
∗
0
.1
5
2
∗∗
0
.1
6
3
(
0
.0
2
1
8
)
(
0
.0
6
4
4
)
(
0
.0
6
7
3
)
(
0
.1
0
6
)
(
0
.0
2
1
7
)
(
0
.0
6
3
4
)
(
0
.0
6
7
3
)
(
0
.1
0
6
)
P
o
p
u
la
t
io
n
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
0
.1
1
3
∗∗
∗
0
.1
8
7
∗∗
∗
0
.1
7
2
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
4
∗∗
0
.1
1
8
∗∗
∗
0
.1
8
5
∗∗
∗
0
.1
7
2
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
4
∗∗
(
0
.0
2
3
7
)
(
0
.0
4
8
6
)
(
0
.0
5
0
2
)
(
0
.0
6
1
1
)
(
0
.0
2
4
1
)
(
0
.0
4
8
5
)
(
0
.0
5
0
2
)
(
0
.0
6
1
1
)
G
D
P
p
e
r
C
a
p
it
a
0
.0
2
8
7
1
.1
4
6
∗∗
∗
1
.2
5
2
∗∗
∗
1
.7
0
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
8
8
1
.1
2
0
∗∗
∗
1
.2
5
2
∗∗
∗
1
.7
0
3
∗∗
∗
(
0
.0
6
9
6
)
(
0
.3
3
4
)
(
0
.4
3
4
)
(
0
.6
4
7
)
(
0
.0
6
8
5
)
(
0
.3
3
8
)
(
0
.4
3
4
)
(
0
.6
4
7
)
G
D
P
p
e
r
C
a
p
it
a
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
0
.0
4
7
2
-0
.5
0
7
∗∗
-0
.4
7
6
∗∗
-0
.4
9
1
∗
0
.0
1
8
2
-0
.5
6
1
∗∗
-0
.4
7
6
∗∗
-0
.4
9
1
∗
(
0
.0
6
3
2
)
(
0
.2
1
1
)
(
0
.2
3
2
)
(
0
.2
8
8
)
(
0
.0
6
9
2
)
(
0
.2
1
9
)
(
0
.2
3
2
)
(
0
.2
8
8
)
F
is
c
a
l
E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
r
e
s
0
.0
7
8
0
∗
0
.0
6
3
0
0
.0
6
8
0
0
.1
1
0
0
.0
7
7
0
∗
0
.0
6
3
0
0
.0
6
8
0
0
.1
1
0
(
0
.0
4
4
1
)
(
0
.0
6
5
4
)
(
0
.0
6
7
8
)
(
0
.0
7
4
8
)
(
0
.0
4
5
9
)
(
0
.0
6
7
2
)
(
0
.0
6
7
8
)
(
0
.0
7
4
8
)
F
is
c
a
l
E
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
r
e
s
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
-0
.0
5
1
7
∗∗
0
.0
3
5
7
0
.0
9
5
1
∗∗
0
.0
7
1
6
-0
.0
4
1
5
∗
0
.0
4
8
3
0
.0
9
5
1
∗∗
0
.0
7
1
6
(
0
.0
2
0
8
)
(
0
.0
3
5
7
)
(
0
.0
3
7
1
)
(
0
.0
4
3
9
)
(
0
.0
2
1
3
)
(
0
.0
3
7
0
)
(
0
.0
3
7
1
)
(
0
.0
4
3
9
)
A
g
e
-0
.0
4
2
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
3
0
1
(
0
.0
1
3
4
)
(
0
.0
2
2
2
)
Q
u
a
n
t
it
y
M
ig
r
a
t
io
n
-0
.0
8
5
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
4
3
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
4
0
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
0
5
∗∗
-0
.1
0
5
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
4
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
4
0
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
0
5
∗∗
(
0
.0
2
6
7
)
(
0
.0
4
9
8
)
(
0
.0
4
9
4
)
(
0
.0
4
8
5
)
(
0
.0
2
5
5
)
(
0
.0
4
8
9
)
(
0
.0
4
9
4
)
(
0
.0
4
8
5
)
G
in
i
1
.8
2
7
0
.7
5
6
0
.7
7
9
-3
.6
6
8
2
.2
4
6
0
.7
2
0
0
.7
7
9
-3
.6
6
8
(
1
.8
4
5
)
(
3
.9
7
3
)
(
3
.9
8
7
)
(
4
.4
7
0
)
(
1
.8
7
2
)
(
4
.0
0
7
)
(
3
.9
8
7
)
(
4
.4
7
0
)
G
in
i
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
0
.7
8
8
0
.6
8
5
0
.2
6
6
1
.1
8
2
0
.9
6
1
0
.8
9
2
0
.2
6
6
1
.1
8
2
(
1
.2
1
7
)
(
1
.5
1
7
)
(
1
.6
1
7
)
(
1
.7
1
6
)
(
1
.2
2
5
)
(
1
.5
4
2
)
(
1
.6
1
7
)
(
1
.7
1
6
)
D
e
n
s
it
y
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
0
.0
0
0
1
5
5
0
.0
0
0
2
9
2
∗
0
.0
0
0
2
0
4
0
.0
0
0
1
6
2
0
.0
0
0
2
9
2
∗
0
.0
0
0
2
0
4
(
0
.0
0
0
1
8
0
)
(
0
.0
0
0
1
6
1
)
(
0
.0
0
0
1
7
1
)
(
0
.0
0
0
1
8
0
)
(
0
.0
0
0
1
6
1
)
(
0
.0
0
0
1
7
1
)
D
e
n
s
it
y
0
.0
0
0
9
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
4
0
.0
0
1
8
8
∗
0
.0
0
0
8
8
1
0
.0
0
1
0
4
0
.0
0
1
8
8
∗
(
0
.0
0
0
6
7
3
)
(
0
.0
0
0
7
3
3
)
(
0
.0
0
1
0
6
)
(
0
.0
0
0
6
7
8
)
(
0
.0
0
0
7
3
3
)
(
0
.0
0
1
0
6
)
T
a
x
e
s
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
-0
.3
0
3
0
.8
6
2
0
.8
1
0
-0
.6
1
8
0
.8
6
2
0
.8
1
0
(
2
.7
4
5
)
(
2
.8
9
8
)
(
3
.1
8
6
)
(
2
.8
8
3
)
(
2
.8
9
8
)
(
3
.1
8
6
)
T
a
x
e
s
-9
.3
6
9
∗
-8
.5
0
2
∗
-1
3
.8
8
∗∗
-8
.8
3
9
∗
-8
.5
0
2
∗
-1
3
.8
8
∗∗
(
4
.9
9
0
)
(
4
.8
6
3
)
(
6
.4
5
9
)
(
5
.0
3
7
)
(
4
.8
6
3
)
(
6
.4
5
9
)
T
r
a
n
s
fe
r
s
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
-4
9
.8
1
∗∗
-4
6
.2
3
∗
-4
9
.8
1
∗∗
-4
6
.2
3
∗
(
2
1
.9
9
)
(
2
6
.1
6
)
(
2
1
.9
9
)
(
2
6
.1
6
)
T
r
a
n
s
fe
r
s
-1
6
.5
6
-1
9
.8
1
-1
6
.5
6
-1
9
.8
1
(
2
4
.2
3
)
(
2
7
.0
3
)
(
2
4
.2
3
)
(
2
7
.0
3
)
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
0
.0
2
1
5
0
.0
2
1
5
(
0
.0
5
0
1
)
(
0
.0
5
0
1
)
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
(
s
o
u
r
c
e
)
0
.0
2
1
8
0
.0
2
1
8
(
0
.0
1
8
1
)
(
0
.0
1
8
1
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
-1
.6
9
3
-0
.5
0
5
0
.4
2
7
4
.0
9
4
-3
.1
2
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
5
6
0
.4
2
7
4
.0
9
4
(
1
.1
5
2
)
(
2
.7
6
0
)
(
3
.6
6
3
)
(
5
.2
7
0
)
(
1
.1
8
3
)
(
3
.0
5
8
)
(
3
.6
6
3
)
(
5
.2
7
0
)
N
1
1
9
3
5
6
6
5
6
6
4
2
1
1
1
9
3
5
6
6
5
6
6
4
2
1
R
2
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
6
7
0
.0
8
1
9
0
.1
4
6
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
6
7
N
o
te
s:
R
el
a
ti
v
e
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
se
le
ct
iv
it
y
re
g
re
ss
ed
o
n
o
il
re
v
en
u
es
p
er
ca
p
it
a
in
th
e
so
u
rc
e
a
n
d
h
o
st
st
a
te
st
a
te
.
R
el
a
ti
v
e
S
el
ec
ti
v
it
y
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
in
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
se
le
ct
iv
it
y
in
to
o
il
a
b
u
n
d
a
n
t
st
a
te
s
re
la
ti
v
e
to
st
a
te
s
la
ck
in
g
o
il
re
v
en
u
es
.
T
h
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(1
)
to
(8
)
re
p
o
rt
p
o
o
le
d
O
L
S
es
ti
m
a
te
s.
C
o
m
p
le
m
en
ta
ri
ly
,
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
co
lu
m
n
s
(5
)
to
(8
)
a
cc
o
u
n
t
fo
r
ti
m
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
G
D
P
p
er
C
a
p
it
a
,
fi
sc
a
l
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
a
n
d
th
e
q
u
a
n
ti
ty
o
f
m
ig
ra
ti
o
n
a
re
lo
g
-t
ra
n
sf
o
rm
ed
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
th
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
m
o
d
el
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
fo
r
st
a
te
p
a
ir
s.
*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
T
ab
le
3.
11
:
S
ta
ti
c
P
an
el
M
o
d
el
b
as
ed
on
R
el
at
iv
e
S
el
ec
ti
v
it
y
126 Chapter 3. Resource Booms and Internal Mobility
In the next section, I complement the static panel models with a dynamic panel
setup.
Dynamic Panel Model
In the baseline model, I did not allow for partial adjustments in the outcome variable.
In order to account for path dependencies in migrant selection even across US states, I
augment the baseline specification similarly to Chapter 2 as follows:6
SELECTIV ITYijt =αij + βSELECTIV ITYijt−1+
φOILREV PCit + piOILREV PCjt +X
′
itγ +X
′
jtλ+ ijt
(3.10)
Again, the identification rests on the strict exogeneity assumption,
E(ijt|Xijt, αij) = 0 (3.11)
for t = 1, ..., T where Xijt comprises all covariates in the source and host state. As
already pointed out in Chapter 2, the strict exogeneity assumption implies that the
idiosyncratic error term is uncorrelated with all covariates in each period. Due to the
dynamics, the standard deviations-from-means and random effects estimators lead to
inconsistent estimates. Again, basically three estimators might serve as a remedy in
dynamic panel setups. The estimator suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) makes
use of a further lag of the lagged dependent variable as an instrument for the first lag.
Alternatively, in the approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) all available addi-
tional lags of the lagged dependent variable serve as instruments. Finally, Blundell and
Bond (1998) construct instruments composed of a system of further lagged differences
and levels of the lagged dependent variable in order to improve the efficiency of the
estimates.
6This model is similar to the one set out in Steinberg (2017) in international migration contexts.
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In table 3.12, I report system GMM estimates proposed by Blundell and Bond
(1998) (columns (1) to (9)), relating relative oil abundance to the selectivity of migra-
tion patterns in a dynamic setup. Again, in order to preclude implicit sample selection
issues due to missing data, I provide separate specifications with oil revenues per capita
serving as pull factors in the destination state (columns (1), (4), (7)), as push factors
in the source state (columns (2), (5), (8)) and for specifications with oil revenues serv-
ing as push and pull factors (columns (3), (6), (9)). Moreover, the specifications in
columns (4) to (6) control for income tax revenues as a percentage of income and the
specifications in columns (7) to (9) complementarily control for time effects following
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) and transfers as a percentage of state incomes. With
respect to the coefficient of interest, in line with the static panel model above, the re-
sults indicate that resource abundance lowers the selectivity of immigration, whilst the
estimates even indicate brain drain effects when dispensing with taxes and transfers.
The coefficients range between 0.0260 and 0.0535 which is slightly above the estimates
in the previous specifications. Conversely to the previous specifications, accounting for
taxes and transfers in the dynamic panel model does not reduce the significance of the
coefficient attached to the selectivity of immigration.
With respect to covariates, in light of the summary statistics in table 3.1, it be-
came apparent that the population density differs between resource abundant states
and non-resource abundant states. In order to preclude that the results are affected
by disparities in population density, I control for the population density rather than
population size in the dynamic panel model. Apparently, the population densities in
the source and host state are consistently positively associated with selected migration
which suggests that skilled labor is more mobile across densely populated states while
population density might be positively associated with opportunities. However, the
main coefficient of interest remains still significant. In addition, the estimates do not
point at a clear pattern with respect to path dependencies in the selectivity of migration
as most of the estimates are insignificant.
128 Chapter 3. Resource Booms and Internal Mobility
Additionally, the results again indicate a quantity-selectivity trade-off in migration,
in coherence with the static panel model. However, the estimates are partially, though
not fully consistent with the predictions of the Borjas model. An increase in income
inequality in the source state lowers the selectivity of emigration. This indicates that
returns to skills in fact impinge on the selectivity of migration, even though the estimate
is not highly significant. In particular, an increase in returns to skills in the source state
is particularly beneficial for skilled labor, lowering the average selectivity of emigration.
Again, in tables 3.13 and 3.14, I further separate the specifications for internal
migrants taking up positions in the oil extraction sector and the service sector, respec-
tively. Consistently with the static panel models, the selectivity effects of immigration
are not driven by migrants moving into the oil extraction industry. Rather, the esti-
mates suggest that migrants taking up positions in the service sector contribute to the
selectivity effects of internal migration.
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In the following section, I make use of a nonparametric approach in order to account
for the multilateral character of migration decisions.
3.3.4 Multilateral Approaches
The static and dynamic panel model build upon a bilateral approach, according to
which the selectivity of migration is exclusively determined by push and pull factors
in the source and destination state. However, migration decisions are prospectively
multilateral decisions, even though they materialize retrospectively as bilateral migra-
tion patterns. In addition, although I controlled for time and state pair fixed effects
along with several covariates in the static and dynamic panel models above, the relative
standard of living is partially intangible. Yet, if individuals vote with their feet, the
relative net migration serves as a means in order to account for the relative standard
of living. This especially holds for internal mobility patterns which are not exposed to
explicit migration restrictions. Moreover, within a country, emigration and immigra-
tion patterns are captured centrally through census data and net migration rates can
easily be determined. In order to explicitly account for the relative standard of living,
I follow the approach proposed by Douglas and Wall (1993) and Wall (2001), relying
on bilateral net migration streams.7
In this regard, I refer to equation 3.1 which was set out in the theoretical section,
though dispensing with individual specific indices for the sake of parsimony. I posit
that indirect utility in state j, Vj, is composed of non-pecuniary amenities, Aj, and
pecuniary income, Yj, according to the following function:
Vj = α lnAj + β lnYj + j (3.12)
with α > 0 and β > 0. Since migration is exclusively determined by the indirect utility
in the source state and all potential host states while dispensing with migration costs,
7I henceforth dispense with time indexes for the sake of parsimony.
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relative net migration might be described by the following model:
Ωij = µj − µi + β ln
(
Yj
Yi
)
+ ij (3.13)
with µi = αAi and Ωij representing net migration rates between states i to state j. As
the potential for migration increases with the population size in the source and host
state, net migration rates are defined relative to the product of the population size in
state i and j, respectively (e.g. Zipf (1946), Wall (2001)). Formally,
Ωij =
mij −mji
PiPj
(3.14)
where mij−mji equals the net migration between state i and j and Pi and Pj represent
the population size in state i and j, respectively. In this model, relative net migration
serves as a measure for the relative standard of living. Under the assumption that
individuals self-select themselves into the state which provides them the highest utility,
the relative standard of living might be approximated multilaterally through accounting
for all bilateral net migration streams. In this regard, I define a variable, dj, which is
1 (-1) if the relative bilateral net migration between i and j is positive (negative) and
0 otherwise. As I control for common pecuniary push and pull factors, in the following
model proposed by Douglas and Wall (1993), the coefficient attached to the variable,
λ, serves as an approximation for the relative standard of living:
Ωij =
M∑
j=1
λjdj + βln
(
Yj
Yi
)
+ ij (3.15)
with
M∑
j=1
λj = 0 (3.16)
Controlling for the relative standard of living leads to the estimates displayed in
table 3.15 below. All specifications control for state fixed effects based on the relative net
migration as defined above, while the net migration indicator sums up to 0. In order to
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internalize this restriction, the estimates are derived through constrained regressions. In
contrast to the previous static and dynamic panel estimates, all covariates are captured
as the difference between the host and source state. As I focus on the quantity of
migration rather than the selectivity of migration in the framework set out above, I
have to contrast selectivity levels below and above the state average. In particular,
the specifications in columns (1) to (4) depict estimates based on a restricted sample
of migrants who exhibit a selectivity below the average, while the estimates shown
in columns (5) to (8) are restricted to migrants who characterized by a selectivity
above the state average. Further, the specifications differ with respect to the covariates
controlled for. Consistently, relative oil revenues per capita serve as a strong pull factor
for negatively selected migrants (columns (1) to (4)), while positively selected migrants
are not significantly attracted by relative oil abundance (columns (5) to (8)). These
results are in line with the theoretical predictions and previous findings.
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3.4 Conclusion
Introductorily, I raised the question whether natural resource booms impinge on the
selectivity of immigration and emigration patterns within the US. In order to tackle
this question, I combined a theoretical analysis with an empirical investigation.
Theoretically, I set out a simple multinomial choice model in the spirit of McFad-
den et al. (1973) and Maddala (1983), according to which oil windfall gains ease the
household budget constraint. However, as low-skilled labor derives a stronger utility
gain from resource windfall gains compared to skilled labor, a resource windfall lowers
the relative educational background of prospective immigrants. These selectivity effects
are strengthened by the boom in the service sector throughout the whole economy due
to a Dutch disease.
Empirically, I relied on static and dynamic panel models inspired by a gravity
equation to relate the selectivity of migration to relative resource abundance based on
US census data between 1940 and 2000. In order to internalize path dependencies in
the selectivity of migration, I further compare changes in selective migration into oil
abundant states with the average change of migrant selection across other US states.
Complementarily, in order to account for multilateral migration decisions, I made use of
a nonparametric approach based on the relative net migration across states. In essence,
the results are in line with the theoretical predictions, i.e. resource abundance is nega-
tively associated with the selectivity of immigration. These selectivity effects are driven
by migrants taking up positions in the service sector rather than the oil extraction in-
dustry.
While Chapter 2 shows that a resource boom translating into a Dutch disease might
lead to brain drain effects internationally, this paper suggests that selective migration ef-
fects of resource booms might even materialize regionally. Moreover, Chapter 2 pointed
3.4. Conclusion 137
at resource shocks serving as a push factor, while Chapter 3 highlights the role of re-
source shocks serving as a pull factor.
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4INCOME WINDFALLS AND
EDUCATIONAL SHORTFALLS -
EVIDENCE FROM THE ALASKA
OIL BOOM
143
Abstract:
While Chapters 2 and 3 analyzed selective migration patterns as a consequence of re-
source booms, this chapter is devoted to educational investments of local residents.
Theoretically, I make use of a simple model of human capital formation, showing that
resource windfall gains might lower labor supply and the returns to skills. Moreover,
the results suggest that investing the additional resource revenues into the quality of
the education system is more conducive to human capital development than easing the
household budget constraint through transfers. Empirically, I make use of an enormous
oil boom in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, where a large oil field was discovered in the 1960’s.
The results of a difference-in-differences model based on US census data spanning the
years from 1940 and 2010 indicate that the resource windfall gave rise to a shortfalls
of human capital development compared to a control group composed of several US
states. The shortfall of average years of schooling even materializes in comparison to a
synthetic control group.1
1This chapter is single-authored and has been submitted to an academic journal.
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4.1 Introduction
“Lottery winners slightly increased their family size after the lottery more than
non-winners, but were not more likely to send their children to school.”
– Bleakley and Ferrie (2016), p. 1455.
The skill composition of a population is affected by educational investments of local
residents as well as by the selectivity of immigration and emigration. While Chapter 2
and 3 were devoted to selective migration patterns as a consequence of resource booms,
Chapter 4 aims at determining the educational investments of local residents in response
to income windfalls. Gylfason (2001) hypothesized that natural capital might crowd out
human capital, and thereby impede economic development in the long run. The latter
might be part of a curse of natural resources more generally (e.g. Baten (2016)). The-
oretical models of human capital formation have a long tradition in economics, arising
out of seminal contributions of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962). Unlike static models
of human capital development (e.g. Andersson and Konrad (2003)), endogenous growth
models highlight the importance of human capital investments for economic prosperity
(e.g. Lucas (1988), Romer (1986), Rebelo (1990)).
Referring to Gylfason (2001), Stijns (2006) questions whether the negative asso-
ciation between resource abundance and educational investments is robust to various
measures of educational attainment and resource abundance. In contrast to the findings
of Gylfason (2001), “subsoil wealth and resource rents per capita are shown to be sig-
nificantly correlated with improved indicators of human capital accumulation.” (Stijns
(2006), p. 1060) However, beyond cross-sectional correlations, the literature still lacks
a coherent theory and a causal analysis relating resource abundance and educational
investments. Therefore, I raise the following questions: How can the relationship be-
tween resource abundance and human capital investments be theoretically explained?
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Does the relationship between natural and human capital depend on the specific char-
acter of policy interventions? Are supply and demand side effects equally important
for promoting human capital investments? How can the effect of resource abundance
on educational attainment be empirically identified? In order to tackle these questions,
I combine a theoretical model with an empirical specification.
Theoretically, I set out a simple framework of educational investments, accord-
ing to which individuals maximize life-time utility subject to an intertemporal budget
constraint. I show that resource booms mitigate human capital investments of local
residents under certain conditions. In essence, resource windfall gains which are easing
the household budget constraint through lump sum transfers affect educational invest-
ments through two channels. First, as pointed out in Chapter 2, a Dutch disease leads
to a deindustrialisation along with intersectoral factor movements from the tradable
towards the non-tradable sector (Corden and Neary (1982), Corden and Neary (1982)).
On the one hand the deindustrialisation leads to a decline in returns to skills and on
the other hand the boom in the service sector makes unskilled labor better off.2 Hence,
a Dutch disease might disincentivize educational investments. Second, unconditional
resource transfers might lower labor supply and returns to skills in the future, set-
ting the stage for lower educational investments at the present. The larger the share
of resource revenues forwarded to individuals, the stronger the human capital responses.
Alternatively, the government encountering further fiscal capacity might contem-
plate to cut taxes. Lowering proportional labor income taxes is neutral regarding human
capital investments as costs and returns of human capital investments are equally af-
fected (Eaton and Rosen (1980), Trostel (1993)).3 However, lowering taxes on interest
income unleashes negative effects on human capital investments since investments in
physical capital are incentivized at the costs of human capital (Heckman (1976), Trostel
2Goderis and Malone (2011) study Gini coefficients and find that Gini coefficients contract in the
course of a resource boom.
3In contrast, Rebelo (1990) finds a negative relationship between taxation and human capital ac-
cumulation as educational costs are not fully deductible.
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(1993)). Investing resource revenues into the quality of the education system is con-
ducive to human capital investments as long as the costs of educational investments are
reduced.
Empirically, I refer to the Alaska oil boom, in order to test the theoretical predic-
tions. In 1968, a large oil field was discovered in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, which affected
the economy through various channels. Firstly, the oil boom unleashed employment
effects both in the oil extraction industry as well as in secondary sectors. Secondly,
the oil boom set the stage for further fiscal capacity which might have been invested
in public goods in general. In light of resource windfall gains, the state government
elicited a fundamental tax enactment in 1980. As part of the tax reform, both personal
income taxes as well as the sales taxes were totally repealed. The tax reform directly
impinged on expected lifetime incomes, and therefore might have affected human cap-
ital investments as well. In addition, a school tax established in 1949 was abolished
in 1980. Further, the Alaska Permanent Fund was put in place in 1976 after the state
government encountered allegations that resource rents had not been sustainably in-
vested. 25 percent of annual revenues have been invested into the Alaska Permanent
Fund while 50 percent of annual profits from interests are disbursed to local residents.
Though modest, annual payments as part of the Alaska Permanent Fund might be
considered as unconditional transfers potentially affecting human capital investments
as well.
In an effort to relate educational investments to resource abundance, I compare
trends in educational investments of local residents in Alaska with the corresponding
educational investments in a control group composed of several US states not exposed
to any oil boom. In particular, as the main variable of interest, I draw upon the average
years of primary, secondary and college education. Positing a parallel counterfactual
trend in educational attainment between Alaska and the control group, I base the anal-
ysis on a difference-in-differences setup. In order to preclude confoundedness through
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migration and self-selection into the treatment group, I exclude interstate migrants in
the respective period. The results show that the income windfall led to a shortfall of
human capital development in Alaska compared to the control group. These results are
consistent with Gylfason (2001) in the sense that resource booms trigger crowding out
effects of human capital investments.
The paper which is empirically closest to my empirical setup is the one provided
by Kumar (2014) for Texas in the 1970’s. The author compares human capital invest-
ments in regions which were exposed to oil booms and those which were not exposed
to oil booms pre and post of the oil boom in the 1970’s within Texas. In contrast, I
am referring to income windfall gains irrespective of the fact whether the individual is
directly involved into the oil industry which is quite modest in terms of employment. As
Alaska saw a sharp and tremendous increase in oil revenues which were forwarded to the
household budget constraint through the Alaska Permanent Fund, it serves as a perfect
laboratory. Similarly, Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) make use of random wealth allocated
to families in order to investigate the intergenerational transmission of human capital.
However, the authors can not detect major educational disparities between treated and
untreated families.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, I set out a theoretical model
capturing the effect of income windfalls on educational investments. In section 4.3, I
descriptively lay out the details of the Alaska oil boom and various dimensions through
which the state economy was affected. In addition, I prescriptively make use of a
difference-in-differences setup in order to test the theoretical predictions. Section 4.4
concludes.
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4.2 Theory
In order to derive the theoretical link between the returns to skills and human capital
formation, I proceed in two steps. In a first step, I assume that returns to skills are
exogenous with respect to the resource boom in a closed economy. In a second step,
the economy is opened up for trade and returns to skills become endogenous.
4.2.1 Closed Economy: Exogenous Returns to Skills
I posit a representative agent maximizing life-time utility over two periods, t = 1, 2,
within a closed economy.4 In period 1 resource windfall gains, R, are easing the bud-
get constraint and the individual trades off human capital investments, h, and labor
supply, n1 = 1 − h. Educational costs are made up of both forgone earnings and di-
rect educational costs, C(h) > 0. Without loss of generality, following Rea Jr (1977),
I postulate a linear cost function for human capital formation, C(h) = αh. Educa-
tional investments translate into further productivity and labor income in the future,
according to the following function, w2 = φ(h) while incomes in period 1 are totally
exogenous, w1 ≤ w2. Similar to Eaton and Rosen (1980), I assume that the returns
to human capital investments are positive, φ′(h) > 0, but decreasing, φ′′(h) < 0. In
period 2, time is exclusively devoted to labor supply, n2 = 1, in the first place. However,
in a second scenario discussed below, the individual trades of labor supply and leisure
in period 2, which implies that n2 = 1 − l. In light of this framework, without loss
of generality, individuals decide self-responsibly about educational investments rather
than delegating educational decisions to parents.
Formally, the representative agent chooses consumption in period 1 and 2, ct, and
4Similar models were set out by Becker (1962), Heckman (1976), Eaton and Rosen (1980), Rea Jr
(1977) and Acemoglu (2017).
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educational investments in period 1, h, in order to maximize life-time utility,
max
ct,h
2∑
t=1
βt−1 log ct (4.1)
subject to his life-time budget constraint
2∑
t=1
ct
(1 + r)t−1
+ C(h)−
2∑
t=1
(1− τ)wt
(1 + r)t−1
nt −R = 0 (4.2)
where βt−1 equals the discount factor and τ represents a proportional labor income
tax rate which is time invariant. Apparently, human capital investments exclusively
impinge on the earnings potential such that educational investments do not depend
on the specific functional form of utility. This is commonly referred to as separation
theorem, originally laid out by Hirshleifer (1970). The first order conditions are given
by:
c1
c2
=
(
1
β(1 + r)
)
(4.3)
Φ′(h)(1− τ)
1 + r
n2 = α + (1− τ)w1 (4.4)
Equation 4.3 equates the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the relative
price, whilst equation 4.4 indicates that the optimal investment in human capital is
characterized by the equality of returns to educational investments and marginal ed-
ucational costs. The latter are made up of direct educational costs, α, as well as
opportunity costs of educational investments, (1− τ)w1.
In light of further fiscal capacity in the course of a resource boom, the state gov-
ernment might lower educational costs or might ease the household budget constraint
through unconditional transfers or a decline in proportional tax rates. The educational
effects of these policy options are discussed below in the course of three propositions.
Proposition 1: A resource windfall which lowers educational costs promotes edu-
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cational investments.
Proof: Totally differentiating equation 4.4 with respect to α while taking into
account that n2 = 1 yields
∂h
∂α
=
(1 + r)
(1− τ)Φ′′(h) < 0 (4.5)
According to this inequality, resource windfall gains which are invested into the quality
of the educational system are unambiguously conducive to human capital investments
as long as marginal educational costs are reduced since Φ′′(h) < 0. 
Proposition 2: A resource windfall spilling into unconditional transfers might lead
to a decline in educational investments as long as labor supply is endogenous.
Proof: Since the individual simultaneously decides upon human capital invest-
ments and labor supply, the effects of lump sum resource transfers on educational
investments and labor supply have to be evaluated concurrently. After differentiating
equation 4.4 with respect to windfall gains while taking into account that the time
devoted to work in period 2 is made up of the residual n2 = 1 − l under endogenous
leisure (l denotes the time devoted to leisure) and ∂U
∂l
> 0, I wind up with the following
equation:
Φ′(h)
∂l
∂R = Φ
′′(h)
∂h
∂R(1− l) (4.6)
Accordingly, human capital investments and resource windfall gains are negatively as-
sociated, ∂h
∂R < 0, as long as the demand for leisure and resource windfall gains are
positively related, ∂l
∂R > 0. This holds under the sufficient condition that returns to
skills are positive but decreasing. If leisure is a normal good, exogenous resource wind-
fall gains lower labor supply and returns to skills in the future. While encountering
lower returns to skills, individuals invest less in education at the present. Therefore,
resource windfall gains serve as an impediment rather than a propeller for human cap-
ital development. 
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Proposition 3: A resource windfall leading to a decline in proportional tax rates is
neutral regarding educational investments under exogenous labor supply and conducive
to educational investments under endogenous labor supply (if educational costs are fully
deductible in both cases).
Proof: I have to separate two cases. In the first case, labor supply is exogenous in
period 2, l = 0. Totally differentiating equation 4.4 with respect to τ yields
∂h
∂τ
= − w1(1 + r)
Φ′′(h)(1− τ) +
Φ′(h)
Φ′′(h)(1− τ) (4.7)
As the first order conditions imply that w1(1 + r) = Φ
′(h) if educational costs are fully
deductible, it directly follows that
∂h
∂τ
= 0 (4.8)
Conspicuously, proportional labor income taxes are neutral regarding educational in-
vestments. The neutrality of labor income taxation is due to the fact that the costs
of educational investments, forgone wages, and the benefits of educational investments,
gained wages, are equally affected through proportional labor income taxation. This
result has been similarly derived by Eaton and Rosen (1980).
In the second case, labor supply is endogenous, n2 = 1 − l. Again, totally differ-
entiating equation 4.4 with respect to R while taking into account that n2 = (1 − l)
yields
Φ′(h)(1− τ) ∂l
∂τ
+ Φ′(h)(1− l)− w1(1 + r) = Φ′′(h)∂h
∂τ
(1− τ)(1− l) (4.9)
However, as long as educational costs are fully deductible, Φ′(h)(1 − l) and w1(1 + r)
coincide and ∂h
∂τ
as well as ∂l
∂τ
are negatively associated. Namely, under endogenous
leisure, taxation unequally affects the opportunity costs of acquiring human capital at
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the present and the returns to human capital acquirement in the future. Returns to
skills are directly affected by labor income taxation and indirectly through a decline in
labor supply. Hence, the abrogation of labor income taxes unfolds neutral (exogenous
labor supply) or even positive (endogenous labor supply) educational effects. The lat-
ter are strengthened even more if educational costs are not fully deductible (King and
Rebelo (1990), Rebelo (1990)). 
The policy interventions in response to resource booms discussed above are par-
ticularly relevant for the specific case of Alaska. As a consequence of further fiscal
capacity in the course of the oil boom, Alaska put in place the Alaska Permanent Fund
which is equivalent to an unconditional transfer scheme. Moreover, the state govern-
ment enacted several tax reforms which were supposed to abrogate all state income
taxes. While the theory suggests a decline in educational investments as a consequence
of the Alaska Permanent Fund, abolishing progressive income taxes is conducive to ed-
ucational attainment as net returns to skills are increased in the future.
Thus far, I exclusively focused on a closed economy. However, in an open economy,
resource windfalls lead to further dampening effects on educational investments. These
effects are discussed in the following section.
4.2.2 Open Economy: Endogenous Returns to Skills
In the previous subsection, I postulated that the returns to skills, φ(h), are exogenous,
and hence not affected in the course of resource windfalls. However, in an open econ-
omy a resource boom sets the stage for a Dutch disease materializing in an appreciation
of the exchange rate (spending effect) along with intersectoral factor movements from
the tradable to the non-tradable sector (resource movement effect) as pointed out in
Chapter 2. Correspondingly, the boom of the non-tradable sector and the squeeze of the
tradable sector promotes heterogenous effects on educational premia across the skill dis-
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tribution. Namely, if the tradable sector is skilled labor intensive, skilled labor incomes
go down in nominal as well as in real terms due to the Stolper-Samuelson-theorem.
Again, in light of reduced skill premia in the future, individuals might invest less in
education at the present.
In order to derive the educational effects emerging as a consequence of a Dutch
disease, I have to augment the setup of the previous section. In a first step, I draw
upon the framework set out in Chapter 2, in order to derive the relationship between
resource booms and the returns to skills. Accordingly, the timing of the model is as fol-
lows: In period 1, the economy experiences a resource windfall, while resource windfall
gains are forwarded to the household budget constraint. At the same time, individuals
might engage in educational investments, h = 1, at educational costs, α, in order to
become skilled, H, while individuals not investing in education remain unskilled, L.
Hence, without loss of generality, skills are binary rather than continuous. Moreover,
I assume that individuals neither trade off labor supply and educational investments
in period 1 nor labor supply and leisure in period 2. Rather, educational attainment
exclusively induces pecuniary costs. In period 2, skilled labor earns a wage wH , whilst
unskilled labor still earns wL. According to the separation theorem, individuals choose
educational investments in order to maximize life-time income (e.g. Acemoglu (2017)):5
2∑
t=1
wL
(1 + r)t−1
+ 1{h = 1}
(
wH − wL
(1 + r)
− α
)
+R (4.10)
where 1{h = 1} is 1 if the individual acquires human capital and becomes skilled, h = 1.
For the sake of parsimony, I dispense with time indices in the first place. In light of
this framework, I proceed with proposition 4.
Proposition 4 : A Dutch disease leads to a crowding out of educational invest-
ments.
5Again, time is normalized to 1.
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Proof : As laid out in proposition 1 of Chapter 2, a Dutch disease leads to a
contraction of skill prima, wH −wL. In light of proposition 2 of Chapter 2, subsequent
changes in the returns to skills are not compensated for by initial resource transfers
under reasonable assumptions. According to the separation theorem it is sufficient to
evaluate human capital responses based on the life-time income. Apparently, in light
of the life-time income,
2∑
t=1
wL
(1 + r)t−1
+ 1{h > 0}
(
wH − wL
(1 + r)
− α
)
+R (4.11)
human capital is acquired as long as wH−wL
1+r
> α. As wH − wL contracts due to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, a Dutch disease leads to a crowding out of educational
investments. This holds even more if individuals encounter income losses along with
educational costs in the course of educational investments as in the previous model. 
According to proposition 4, a Dutch disease leads to a crowding out of the tradable
sector in favor of the non-tradable sector. As long as the tradable (non-tradable) sector
is skilled (unskilled) labor intensive, skilled labor is worse off while unskilled labor is
better off. In light of the previous propositions set out above, a Dutch disease might
deteriorate educational investments through two channels. First, the opportunity costs
of acquiring human capital at the present increase as unskilled labor incomes go up.
Second, the returns to skills in the future decrease as skilled labor incomes go down. In
combination, a Dutch disease leads to a crowding out of educational investments.
Thus far, the analysis was based on the assumption that households do not face
any credit constraints while acquiring human capital. I dispense with this assumption
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Credit constraints lower the crowding out of educational effects in
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the course of a Dutch disease.
Proof : Following Acemoglu (2017), under credit constraints savings are strictly
non-negative and the budget constraint becomes
0 ≤ s ≤ Y +R− 1{h = 1}α− c1 (4.12)
in period 1 (while s represents savings and Y exogenous income in period 1) and
c2 ≤ wL + 1{h = 1}(wH − wL) + (1 + r)s (4.13)
in period 2. Individuals not investing in education wind up with utility
U(h = 0|Y,R) = logwL + log(Y +R) (4.14)
while individuals investing in education end up with utility
U(h = 1|Y,R) = logwH + log(Y +R− α) (4.15)
. Contrasting the individual utilities leads to the conclusion that individuals acquire
human capital as long as
α ≤ wH − wL
wH
(Y +R) (4.16)
Apparently, under consideration of credit constraints, a Dutch disease unfolds reverse
effects on educational attainment. Firstly, a resource boom lowers the returns to skills
which disincentivizes educational investments in light of proposition 4. Secondly, re-
source windfall gains increase the capacity to bear educational costs which incentivizes
educational investments. Hence, the net educational effects of a Dutch disease are am-
biguous and depend on the relative size of both effects.6 
6The result is based on the assumption that resource windfall gains are equally distributed across
skills in line with the Alaska Permanent Fund which is studied in the empirical section.
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In the following section, I rely on a quasi-randomized experiment as part of an
empirical investigation.
4.3 Evidence
4.3.1 Descriptive Analysis
The Alaska Oil Boom
In order to verify or falsify theoretical predictions, I confront theory with data while
relying on a difference-in-differences setup. In particular, I make use of an exogenous
variation arising out of an enormous oil boom in Alaska. In 1968, a large oil and gas
field was discovered in Prudhoe Bay which is part of the North Slope Boroughin located
at the Arctic Ocean in Northern Alaska.7 With 25 billion barrels estimated in 1968,
Prudhoe Bay was supposed to be the largest oil field discovered in the United States
and among the 20 largest oil fields in the world.8 Figure 4.1 visualizes the state of
Alaska with Prudhoe Bay situated at the North Slope Boroughin.
7Along with oil, large gas fields were discovered in Prudhoe Bay. Beyond Prudhoe Bay, gas was
discovered in the Kenai Peninsula on the South Coast of Alaska as well where exploitation started in
1964. In this paper I mainly focus on the variation originating from the oil boom rather than the gas
boom as it was much more succinct.
8The general information regarding the Alaska Oil Boom and the institutional background are
drawn from Alaska Oil and Gas Association (2014).
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Figure 4.1: Map Alaska
In an effort to ship oil to the market, the Transalaska-Pipeline was completed be-
tween 1974 and 1977. By means of the pipeline, oil could have been shipped to Valdez,
1287 km to the south of Prudhoe Bay and the nearest harbor which is clear of ice. The
construction of the pipeline was a consequence of an oil embargo in 1973, which pushed
the oil price up from 3 to 12 USD per barrel between 1973 and 1974. With oil prices
soaring up, domestic oil production in Prudhoe Bay became economically beneficial,
following persistent legal disputes between oil companies and the state administration
by 1973. Due to the construction of the pipeline, full-scale production in Prudhoe Bay
began with some retardation, according to data from the US Energy Information Ad-
ministration. Namely, production started in 1977, following a linear increase peaking
in 1988 with a production of 2 billion barrels per day. However, as of 1988, Alaska
experienced a sharp and persistent decline in oil drilling for more than two decades.
Meanwhile, 26.61 billion barrels of oil are so far undiscovered but technically recover-
able, according to estimates from the Minerals Management Services (MMS). Similar
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to Chapter 3, figure 4.2 displays the development of oil drilling in the US in general in
the panel on the left-hand side and Alaska in particular in the panel on the right-hand
side.
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Figure 4.2: Trends US Oil Production
In contrast to Alaska, oil drilling in the US as a whole began already in 1859, though
documentation started in 1900 on a fairly low level, followed by a rapid increase until
1970, a year marked by the oil crisis. Since 1970 oil production dropped fiercely, followed
by a further transient increase. This increase is due to the oil embargo in 1973 which
laid the ground for additional oil drilling in Alaska where the Transalaska-Pipeline was
completed by 1977. Until 1973, oil production was mainly driven by Texas and Califor-
nia, though drilling dropped sharply in Texas and modestly in California over the final
quarter of the 20th century. Since the decline of oil production in Texas and California
was not compensated by other states between 1980 and 2005, US oil production saw
a steady decline. Driven by the discovery of additional oil fields, production went up
again as of 2005. Today, the US is the third largest producer of oil following Russia
and Saudi-Arabia. Alaska in particular is outnumbered by Texas, the Gulf of Mexico,
North Dakota as well as California with respect to oil production. Currently, oil rev-
enues mainly originate from North Dakota and Texas. In 2015 the share of oil drilling
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in North Dakota was 12.46 percent of the total US oil production, whereas Texas con-
tributed with 36.41 percent, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
As reported in figure 4.3, the oil boom set the stage for a deceleration of human
capital development. While the panel on the left hand side shows trends in the years
of schooling of local residents living in the same state 5 years ago, the panel on the
right hand side visualizes trends in the years of schooling of local residents living even
in the same house 5 years ago. Along with the educational trends in Alaska, I visu-
alize educational trends in a control group made up of all US states which were not
exposed to any oil boom in the 20th century. Namely, the control group consists of US
states excluding Alaska, North Dakota, Texas, California, New Mexico, Colorado and
Wyoming. The educational trends are based on an indicator capturing the completed
years of schooling up to grade 17, which is consistently defined for the treatment and
control group.9 Apparently, parallel educational trends between the treatment and con-
trol group prior to the oil boom are followed by converging trends post of the oil boom.
In particular, local residents in Alaska acquired more human capital than residents in
the control group prior to the oil boom, however, post of the oil boom the educational
trends are converging, and finally the control group took over in terms of human capi-
tal development in 1973. The volatility of educational investments in the short run in
both the treatment and control group might be due to business cycle effects. Mainly,
in a recession, students often contemplate to further enroll in educational institutions,
waiting for the next boom.
9In order to avoid that the results are driven by a rise in the number of children, I restrict the
analysis to individuals above age 25. Moreover, as graduation years can be retraced only for years of
schooling above grade 8, I henceforth rely on the years of schooling above grade 8.
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Figure 4.3: Educational Trends
Beyond education, there are several channels through which the Alaska oil boom
impinged on the local economy in a broad sense. Primarily, the oil boom served as a
propeller for the whole economy which is reflected in a massive increase in state income.
The following figure 4.4 displays trends in the state income per capita in Alaska and the
control group defined above. Apparently, especially after the completion of the pipeline
in 1977, state incomes per capita saw a fierce upward deviation in the treatment group
compared to the control group. The increase in state incomes per capita was accom-
panied by several tax reforms. In 1949, a personal income tax has been established
which amounted to 10 percent of federal tax income liabilities elevated to 16 percent
by 1961. Another tax reform in 1967 aimed at disentangling tax rates from federal
income liabilities at given progressive tax rates in the range between 3.5 percent and
14.5 percent with roughly neutral revenue effects. Finally, in 1980, the personal income
tax has been repealed due to further fiscal capacity. Established in 1949, an additional
school tax asked each wage earner to contribute with 10 USD to a fund supporting
schools. Along with the personal income tax, school taxes were abolished in 1980 in
light of further fiscal capacity. Among others, these tax enactments set the stage for
a transient increase in income inequality in the 1980’s. This shift becomes apparent
in the panel on the right hand side of figure 4.4, displaying the development of Gini
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coefficients in Alaska as well as the control group. Especially in the course of the oil
boom, Gini coefficients saw a sharp increase until the 1990’s and declined subsequently.
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Figure 4.4: GDP per Capita and Gini coefficients
The oil boom also fed into direct and indirect employment effects. Employment
effects entail the primary employment as well as secondary employment in jobs which
are generally related to the oil and gas industry. Further, there might be additional
employment effects arising out of a booming economy as a consequence of the resource
windfall. Again, based on data from the Alaska Oil and Gas Association (2014), the
primary employment effect amounts to 5,335 individuals and 4,700 residents, whilst
the jobs broadly related to the primary companies make up 51,000 individuals in 2013.
However, one third of the jobs in Alaska are related to the oil industry in a very broad
sense. The actual and anticipated employment effects set the stage for factor move-
ments towards Alaska. In the long run, population went up from 72,000 inhabitants
in 1940 to 710,000 individuals in 2010 based on US census data as already emphasized
in Chapter 3. In the short run, Alaska experienced two sharp deviations from the
upward trend. The first major deviation materialized between 1973 and 1977 during
the construction of the Transalaska-Pipeline connecting Purdoe Bay and Valdez. In
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particular, population went up from 330,000 to 403,000 during the construction period,
persisted on a constant level and went up again between 1980 and 1988 to 544,000.
The latter boom was due to an extended period of job creation and fiscal expansion as
a consequence of the resource windfall. The increase in population in the 1970’s and
1980’s has been mainly driven by migration rather than reproduction. Hence, I exclude
migrants from the sample in order to examine the educational investments among local
residents in response to the oil boom. Since the 1990’s population growth slowed down
as growth rates were primarily driven by reproduction rather than migration. Appar-
ently, even though the population followed a clear upward trend over the 20th century,
changes in the trend of population growth did not immediately follow the discovery of
oil reserves in 1968. This retardation is due to legal disputes and discussions preceding
the construction of the Transalaska-Pipeline and exploited as part of the identification
below. Starting with the construction of the Transalaska-Pipeline in 1974, population
went up steadily. Today, Alaska is the 47th most populous state and is less densely
populated than any other state in the United States.
Furthermore, oil companies pay taxes, thereby setting the stage for further fiscal
capacity both on a state as well as on a local level.10 According to the Alaska Oil and
Gas association (2014), in 2013, taxes from oil companies made up 47 percent of total
state revenues in Alaska, while 56 percent of the operating budget of the administra-
tion originates from the oil and gas industry. In addition, oil companies paid into an
unrestricted general fund which contributes, among others, to 80 percent of the budget
for public safety and 77 percent of education and early development. Solely between
1980 and 1981 total state revenues more than doubled, from 1.6 billion up to 3.4 billion
USD. However, the unprecedented boom in the first half of the 1980’s was followed by
a serious bust in the second half.
10According to the Alaska Oil and Gas Association, the 13 primary companies entail Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company, Apache Corporation, BP Exploration Inc., eni petroleum, ExxonMobil Production
Company, Flint Hills Resources, Hilcorp, Petro Star Inc., Pioneer Natural Resources Alaska Inc., Repsol
EP USA, Shell Exploration Production Company, Statoil, Tesoro Alaska Company, XTO Energy Inc..
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The enhanced fiscal capacity had a serious impact on the local economy as well.
Namely, a basic income scheme was placed in 1977 shortly before the completion of
the Transalaska Pipeline. The purpose of the so-called “Alaska Permanent Fund” was
twofold. Firstly, it was intended to set aside at least 25 percent of annual oil revenues
in order to partially redistribute oil windfall gains intergenerationally. Secondly, it was
a response to criticism the local state government faced when the revenues emerging in
the first round through oil field leasing contracts peaked 900 million USD but were not
sustainably invested. As a consequence, a referendum was held asking for the imple-
mentation of the Alaska Permanent Fund. The following figure depicts annual dividends
of the Permanent Fund which started in 1982.
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Notes: The figures depicts trends in dividends of the Alaska Permanent Fund. Data source: Alaska Permanent Fund (2017).
Figure 4.5: Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends
Enhanced fiscal capacity might feed into further government expenditures in general
and educational expenditures in particular. In the panel on the left hand side of figure
4.6, I contrast educational expenditures per capita in Alaska and the control group
prior to and post of the oil boom. According to the figure, government expenditures
roughly follow a parallel trend prior to the oil boom, but exhibit a divergence post of
the oil boom in 1968 and post of the completion of the pipeline in 1977. While figure
4.6 displays a progression for the control group, the progression is even more distinct
in Alaska, especially after the exploration of the oil field and the completion of the
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pipeline. However, since 1984 educational expenditures per capita saw a sharp decline
in Alaska and finally fell short of educational expenditures in the control group. Since
the 1960’s set the stage for an enormous educational expansion throughout industrial
countries, I go a step further and account for the share of educational relative to total
fiscal expenditures depicted in figure 4.6. The figure displays a sharp increase in the
ratio of educational to total expenditures following the discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay
in 1968. To make matters more concrete, the share of educational expenditure relative
to total expenditures increased by more than 10 percentage points. This is remarkable
in light of the fact that oil production increased moderately until the completion of the
Transalaska-Pipeline in 1977.
(a) Educational Expenditures per Capita
0
2
4
6
Ed
uc
at
io
na
l E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
pe
r C
ap
ita
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Year
Alaska Control Group
(b) Educational per Total Expenditures
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Ed
uc
at
io
na
l E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
pe
r T
ot
al
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Alaska Control Group
Notes: The figures depicts trends in educational expenditures per capita (panel on the left-hand side) and per total expenditures (panel
on the right-hand side) in Alaska and control group. Control Group: All US states besides of Alaska, North Dakota, Texas, California,
New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. Data source: United States Census Bureau (2015).
Figure 4.6: Trends in Relative Educational Expenditures
Before I provide summary statistics of the covariates of interest, I proceed with a
brief description of the educational system in the US.
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The Educational System in the US
Mandatory schooling in the US was established in 1852 and was followed by several
educational reforms throughout the 20th century. After the implementation of com-
pulsory schooling in general, several additional reforms were devoted to educational
federalism. For instance, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) im-
posed in 1965, requested centralized examinations on a state level, though prohibiting
a uniform curriculum. Hence, the reform strengthened the independence, and therefore
the competition between the educational systems across US states. Further educational
reforms entailed the implementation of similar educational standards throughout the
US.
In the US in general, each state is independently in charge of educational policies.
Depending on the state, mandatory schooling essentially starts between age 5 and 6
and ends between age 16 and 18. As most of the states request 12 compulsory years
of schooling today, the school system is traditionally referred to as K-12-system. Com-
pulsory schooling consists of elementary schools ranging from kindergarten in grade 1
serving students between age 5 and 6 up to the 4th grade via a middle school ranging
from grade 5 and 8 to the upper high school between grade 9 and 12. As a substitute
for middle schools, some states instead rely on junior and senior high schools. Upon
secondary school completion, students normally have to pass a standardized exam ad-
ministered and organized by the state government. Public schools are supplemented
by private schools which commonly preselect their students based on their previous
achievement. However, private schools have to be approved by the state government
and all students enrolled in private as well as public schools have to participate in stan-
dardized tests. Complementarily, students might further enroll in a college in order to
advance their academic skills in the course of post secondary education.
In Alaska in particular, students are obliged to attend school for at least 9 years
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before turning 16 excluding kindergarten which is not required in Alaska. Even though
population density is comparatively low, higher education is provided by the University
of Alaska which serves students through 10 campuses on a community level comple-
mented by 3 university campuses on an urban level in Fairbanks and Juneau. Hence,
even though population density is modest, it does not affect the potential of acquiring
higher education.
In the following section I provide summary statistics of all variables I make use of
below.
Summary Statistics
In order to sum up, I report descriptive statistics of outcome variables as well as covari-
ates I make use of in the empirical section below. In particular, the table below provides
information on the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum and maximum value
for each variable. The variables considered entail the years of schooling on the demand
side, educational expenditures and the teacher-student-ratio on the supply side, state
income per capita, the Gini coefficient, population size as well as the age and a dummy
for male graduates. However, in contrast to disparities in levels, I am interested in
changes in these levels in response to the Alaska oil boom. These changes are examined
in the following sections.
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The following section describes the empirical strategy in order to ascertain the link
between resource booms and educational attainment.
4.3.2 Empirical Strategy
In order to illuminate the link between resource booms and human capital investments
empirically, I compare human capital development in Alaska prior to and post of the
oil boom with the human capital development in a control group made up of several
US states based on a difference-in-differences setup. Formally, following the notation
in Roller and Steinberg (2017), let g ∈ {0, 1} denote a regional dummy which equals
1 for the treatment group (Alaska) and 0 for a control group legitimized below, whilst
t ∈ {0, 1} is a time dummy which equals 1 for graduation years post of the oil boom
and 0 for graduation years prior to the oil boom. For the sake of parsimony, I initially
assume that there is just one period observable prior to and one period observable post
of the oil boom.11 Let Y Ng,t denote the potential years of schooling of a graduate at time
t who belongs to group g not exposed to the oil boom and Y Ig,t the potential outcome
of graduates exposed to the oil boom. In an effort to estimate the educational effects
in response to the oil boom, I refer to the average treatment effect (ATE), defined as
the expected difference between potential years of schooling of treated and untreated
graduates. Formally,
ATEt = E
[
Y It − Y Nt
]
(4.17)
In contrast, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is defined as the ex-
pected difference between the years of schooling in the treatment group:
ATETt = E
[
Y I1,t − Y N1,t
]
(4.18)
while ATE and the ATET coincide if the oil boom is unrelated to the expected differ-
ence between the potential years of schooling in the control and the treatment group.
11In the course of several robustness checks, I adapt the timing below.
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As the oil boom is not totally random, I identify the ATET rather than the ATE.
I only capture graduates in Alaska or the control group. In particular, I observe the
treated outcome in the treatment group at t = 1, E
[
Y I1,1
]
, and the untreated outcome
at t = 0, E
[
Y N1,0
]
while the counterfactuals Y I1,0 and Y
N
1,1 are unknown for Alaska. The
difference-in-differences strategy might serve as a remedy which becomes obvious by
restating the ATET as follows:
ATET1 = E
[
Y I1,1 − Y N1,1
]
= E
[
Y I1,1
]− E [Y N1,1 − Y N1,0]− E [Y N1,0] (4.19)
The only unknown part of equation 4.19 is E
[
Y N1,1 − Y N1,0
]
, which is the expected change
in the potential untreated years of schooling in the treatment group. However, under
the assumption that the expected change in the potential untreated outcome in the
treatment group is the same as the change in the potential treated outcome in the
control group, E
[
Y N1,1 − Y N1,0
]
= E
[
Y I0,1 − Y I0,0
]
, equation 4.19 might be reformulated as
follows:12
ATET0 = E
[
Y I1,0 − Y N1,0
]
= E
[
Y I1,1
]− E [Y I0,1 − Y I0,0]− E [Y N1,0] (4.20)
which depends exclusively on observed outcomes. The latter assumption is often re-
ferred to as common-trend assumption and legitimized below.
Parametrically, I can estimate the ATET1 based on the following regression:
Yi,t = α + φgi + ηt+ ρIi,t + i (4.21)
where Yi,t captures the educational investment of student i at time t and Ii,t is an in-
dicator taking the value 1 if the individual was actually treated in t. If ALASKA is a
regional dummy variable which is 1 for Alaska and 0 otherwise and TIME69 is a time
12The difference-in-differences approach is standard in the literature while the notation in this chap-
ter has been introduced in Roller and Steinberg (2017).
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dummy variable which is 0 prior to the oil boom and 1 post of the oil boom, variable
Ii,t equals ALASKA × TIME69. The ATET1 is then equal to the coefficient ρ. As I
have annual observations, students in Alaska are treated for graduation years post of
the oil boom and untreated for graduation years prior to the oil boom. In light of the
econometric specification, I postulate that the educational effects are primarily driven
by the rise in income on the state level rather than employment effects on an individual
level. This particularly holds in light of modest direct employment effects in the oil
industry as pointed out in the descriptive section. In an effort to further take into
account subsequent policy changes as a response to the oil boom, i.e. the completion
of the Transalaska-Pipeline and payments of the Alaska Permanent Fund post of 1982,
I complementarily provide estimates for adjusted timing variables. Yet, adjusting the
timing of the model requires additional parallel trend assumptions with respect to the
outcome variables prior to subsequent interventions. I discuss the identifying assump-
tions in more detail below.
Regarding the outcome variable, Yg,t, I have to differentiate between the educational
investments on the demand side and educational expenditures on the supply side. With
respect to the demand side, I make use of the years of primary, secondary and college
education which are available between 1940 and 2010, henceforth denoted as years of
schooling. Even though the decennial census does not provide information on the year
of graduation, an approximation is derived by tracing back the graduation year based
on the individual age, the census year, the average school starting age and the individual
years of schooling. Yet, the graduation year can only be retraced for school years above
grade 8 as classes are grouped between grade 4 and 8. However, due to mandatory
years of schooling above grade 8 this assumption is not restrictive. Further, I account
for the ratio of pupils who completed at least one year of college relative to the overall
number of graduates based on the years of schooling. The respective ratio is denoted
as college ratio. With respect to the supply side, I make use of two outcome variables
as well, educational expenditures per capita and per total expenditures. The former
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might reflect both further fiscal capacity or additional educational priority while the
latter primarily signifies educational priority. In fact, the outcome variables have a unit
root as educational investments saw a steady increase over the 20th century due to path
dependencies in educational investments. Further, the oil boom in the 1960’s coincided
with an educational expansion in the USA in particular and industrial countries in gen-
eral. However, as the educational expansion and the unit roots materialized in both
the treatment and control group, unit roots and educational expansions do not under-
mine or even violate the main identification. Yet, according to Bertrand et al. (2002),
in case of unit roots in the outcome variable and more than 2 periods of observations
post of an intervention, I might end up with inconsistent standard errors. For the sake
of consistent estimates, I base my analysis on clustered standard errors as proposed
by Bertrand et al. (2002). Alternative remedies might be bootstrapping or collapsing
serially correlated data into two observations prior to and post of the exogenous change.
Complementarily, I account for covariates on a micro as well as on a macro level.
First, I have to control for variables unequally affecting the outcome variable in the
treatment and control group, and thereby undermining or even violating the common-
trend assumption. Secondly, I might control for further covariates impinging on the
outcome variable in order to increase the efficiency of the estimates as long as the
number of observations is not reduced due to missing values. Individual specific covari-
ates are exclusively efficiency enhancing as the treatment materializes on a state level.
Omitted variables, not undermining the common-trend assumption, do not violate the
consistency of the estimates, however, all covariates accounted for have to be exogenous
with respect to the treatment. In order to preclude feedback effects from the treatment
on covariates, I provide specifications accounting for and dispensing with covariates
below. In particular, I control for educational expenditures per capita on a macro level
originating from United States Census Bureau (2015). Government expenditures, es-
pecially educational investments, might elevate the quality of the school system, and
thereby pave the way for further educational investments. Additionally, I control for
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average incomes per capita originating from the United States Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2017). Further, I include state income inequality made available by Som-
meiller and Price (2014). On a micro level, I exclusively account for a gender dummy
which is one for male students and 0 otherwise. However, as shown in the descriptives,
educational expenditures, state income per capita as well as the state Gini coefficients
are endogenous and hence affected by the treatment. Therefore, the specifications with
covariates exclusively serve as a robustness check.
With respect to the control group, I rely on all US states which were not exposed
to any oil boom. In particular, the control group is composed of all US states excluding
Alaska, North Dakota, Texas, California, New Mexico, Colorado and Wyoming. The
following map visualizes the control group as part of the US graphically.
Control Group
Others
Figure 4.7: Control Group
Formally, the identification based on a differences-in-differences setup rests on four
assumptions, the common-trend assumption, the single treatment assumption, the sta-
ble unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) and quasi-randomization. Below, I dis-
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cuss and validate each assumption point by point in light of the Alaska oil boom.13
Common Trend Assumption
First, I assume a parallel trend in the years of schooling in Alaska and the control
group in a counterfactual scenario in which the treatment group would not have been
exposed to any oil boom. In an effort to validate the common trend assumption, I
provide placebo difference-in-differences estimates for the pretreatment period in table
4.2. In particular, prior to the oil boom, I should not detect any major deviations in
the years of schooling between Alaska and the control group. In fact, the estimates of
the coefficients attached to the interaction of the regional and time dummy variables
are insignificant. Complementarily, I visualized trends in educational attainment and
expenditures for the pretreatment period in figure 4.3 in the descriptive section above.
Namely, in the panel on the left-hand side, I show educational trends for local residents
living in the same state 5 years ago while in the panel on the right hand side I display
educational trends of residents living even in the same house 5 years ago. Consistently,
both panels in figure 4.3 point at parallel pretreatment trends in line with the main
identifying assumption. Below, I validate that the main estimates of the effect of the
Alaska oil boom on educational investments are insensitive to the composition of the
control group conditional on parallel pretreatment trends as well.
13Roller and Steinberg (2017) evaluate similar assumptions in light of a school intervention.
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As I make use of educational expenditures as an outcome variable as well, figure 4.8
shows parallel pretreatment trends for educational expenditures per capita prior to the
oil boom in 1968 (panel on the left-hand side) and prior to the completion of the pipeline
along with the implementation of the Alaska Permanent Fund in 1977 (panel on the
right hand side). Post of both the oil boom as well as the implementation of the Alaska
Permanent Fund, however, educational expenditures per capita deviated between the
treatment and control group which indicates that expenditures are responsive to the
treatment.
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Notes: The figures depict trends in educational expenditures per capita in Alaska and control group for the pretreatment periods prior
to 1968 and 1977, respectively. Control Group: All US states besides of Alaska, North Dakota, Texas, California, New Mexico, Colorado
and Wyoming. Data source: United States Census Bureau (2015).
Figure 4.8: Common Trend Relative Educational Expenditures
In order to sum up, both figure 4.3 with respect to educational attainment and fig-
ure 4.8 with respect to educational expenditures point at roughly parallel pretreatment
trends.
Single Treatment Assumption
Second, I postulate that, coinciding with the oil windfall, Alaska and the control
group were not exposed to additional shocks or interventions which unequally affected
the evolution of years of schooling between Alaska and the control group. Multiple
coinciding interventions would make it harder to separate the causal impacts. Hence,
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multiple shocks or interventions coinciding with each other and undermining the com-
mon trend assumption have to be precluded. As the educational trends in Alaska were
affected through numerous channels in the course of the oil boom as pointed out in the
descriptives, I do not pretend to point identify the effect of the oil boom on human
capital development. Rather, I aim at isolating major changes in human capital trends
of student cohorts exposed to the oil boom. In fact, the 1960’s set the stage for an
educational expansion, however, this expansion materialized in both the treatment and
control group, and hence does not undermine the identification. Figure 4.3 suggests
that the deviation in 1968 is mainly driven by a shift in educational outcome variables
in the treatment rather than the control group. In order to disentangle the impact of
sequential rather than simultaneous treatments, I separately account for the oil boom
starting in 1969, and the implementation of the Alaska Permanent Fund which led to
unconditional transfers since 1982.
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption
Third, the stable unit treatment value assumption has to be satisfied, which im-
plies that the number of potential outcomes coincides with the number of treatment
values. One implication of the stable unit treatment values assumption is the absence
of externalities, i.e. spillover effects from treated units on untreated units have to be
precluded. In particular, the resource windfall gains attracted numerous people from
other US states. In line with the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), I
exclude interstate migrants moving between US states 5 years ahead of the respective
census. Complementarily, I examine changes in the years of schooling of inhabitants
born in Alaska, who still live in Alaska and did not change the place of residence within
the past 5 years in table 4.8 below. This serves as a remedy in order to preclude self-
selection effects into the treatment group through migration which might change the
composition of the treatment and control group.
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Quasi-Randomization
As pointed out previously, since Alaska is not a representative sample of the US
population, I identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) rather than
the average treatment effect (ATE). Clearly, inhabitants in Alaska might differ from in-
habitants in other US states both because the socio-demographic structure is different
and the educational systems exhibit further disparities. In fact, US states differ slightly
in educational systems, e.g. the compulsory years of schooling. However, as long as
compulsory education does not change coinciding with the oil boom, the identification
is not undermined. Rather, differences in the school systems are just reflected in dif-
ferent levels in educational attainment rather than changes in these levels. However,
controlling for socio-demographic characteristics might lead to a measure closer to ATE.
A further implication of a quasi-randomized experiment is the absence of self-selection
effects, as pointed above. Self-selection effects might originate from migrants moving
into or out of Alaska or the control group. However, I preclude interstate mobility by
excluding interstate and international migrants that might change the composition of
the treatment or control group.
After validating the identifying assumptions, I make use of the difference-in-differences
setup in order to derive estimates for the impact of the Alaska oil boom on educational
investments in the following section.
4.3.3 Results
Demand Side
In order to examine the impact of the Alaska oil boom on educational investments, I
compare long run changes in the years of schooling in Alaska with the corresponding
changes in a control group made up of several US states not exposed to any oil boom
in the respective time period. In the first place, I provide separate estimates for the
coefficients of the baseline model 4.21 while dispensing with and accounting for further
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covariates. Dispensing with covariates does not undermine the consistency of the esti-
mates due to the common-trend assumption. However, accounting for covariates might
undermine the identification as long as covariates are not exogenous with respect to the
treatment. Therefore, I provide separate specifications dispensing with and accounting
for covariates. The latter serves as a robustness check as most of the covariates, i.e.
income inequality, GDP per Capita and educational expenditures are affected by the
oil boom as well.
Before I proceed with the estimates of model 4.21, I display Kernel density estimates
for the completed years of schooling above grade 8 in figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Kernel Density Estimate: Years of Schooling
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Table 4.3 reports difference-in-differences estimates of the Alaska Oil Boom on the
average years of schooling while dispensing with covariates. The specifications reported
in columns (1) - (4) refer to the years of schooling, while specifications reported in
columns (5) - (8) account for the share of graduates who completed at least one year
of college by graduation year. As the results should be insensitive to slight shifts in
the sample, I report estimates for different sample periods as well, i.e. the estimates
shown in columns (2) and (6) are based on a limited sample period spanning the years
from 1940 to 2000, the specifications in columns (3) and (7) refer to the sample period
from 1950 to 2000 and the specifications in columns (4) and (8) to the sample period
from 1960 to 1980. Conspicuously and consistently, the oil boom appears to dampen
educational investments through all specifications according to the coefficient attached
to the interaction of the treatment and the time dummy variable. With respect to
the years of schooling, the decline in educational attainment compared to the control
group ranges between 0.278 and 0.372, while with respect to the college ratio the decline
ranges between 0.0601 and 0.0799, each significant at the 1 percent level. Apparently,
even in the long sample ranging until 2000, resource booms unleash negative effects
on educational investments. This might be due to the Alaska Permanent Fund which
smoothes unconditional transfers as a consequence of the resource boom. This result is
qualitatively in line with the prediction of Gylfason (2001) suggesting a crowding out
of human capital as a consequence of resource booms.
Complementarily, I derive difference-in-differences estimates while accounting for
covariates in table 4.4 as a robustness check. Again, table 4.4 reports the effect of the
oil boom on educational investments in terms of the outcome variables years of school-
ing (columns (1) - (4)) and the college ratio (columns (5)-(8)). In line with the previous
results, according to the estimates in table 4.4, the oil boom set the stage for a shortfall
of educational investments compared to the control group which was not exposed to any
oil boom. The result consistently holds with respect to both educational indicators, the
average years of schooling as well as the share of college graduates by graduation year.
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Regarding the former, the decline in the years of schooling post of the oil boom ranges
between 0.135 and 0.590, while with respect to the latter the decline ranges between
0.0700 and 0.158.
Apparently, the main coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged when controlling
for individual and state specific covariates. In general, I include covariates for the sake
of efficiency, however, as long as covariates are affected by the treatment, accounting for
these covariates might contaminate the identification. As pointed out in the descriptive
section, state specific covariates, i.e. state income per capita, educational expenditures
per capita as well as income inequality might be affected by the oil boom. Control-
ling for these covariates might therefore contaminate the identification of causal effects.
Hence, I explicitly separated setups accounting for covariates (table 4.4) and dispensing
with covariates (table 4.3). Omitted variables do not affect the consistency of the esti-
mates due to the common-trend assumption. The supposition that outcome variables
might have a unit root, does not impinge on the consistency of the estimates either, as
I rely on clustered standard errors as proposed by Bertrand et al. (2002).
As pointed out above, conditional on parallel pretreatment trends, the estimates
should be insensitive to shifts in the composition of the control group. In order to vali-
date this main assumption, I provide several placebo tests in tables 4.13 to 4.16 in the
appendix. In particular, I run the same procedures as above with each US state sep-
arately serving as a control group. Conspicuously, the results are mainly in line with
the baseline results. Namely, the oil boom set the stage for a retardation of human
capital development. Hence, the baseline results are not driven by the composition
of the control group conditional on common pretreatment trends. Complementarily,
I provide difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of the tax reform, i.e. the
abolition of all state income taxes, on income inequality measured in Gini coefficients
in table 4.12. The distributional effects of the tax reform are crucial as they reflect
transient or even structural changes in the returns to skills. Apparently, the abrogation
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of progressive taxes in 1980 promoted a tremendous increase in income inequality in
terms of Gini coefficients in line with the descriptives provided in the panel on the
right hand side of figure 4.4. In light of the distributional effects, the educational ef-
fects of the oil boom are even more astonishing. Namely, even in light of a fierce but
transient increase in the returns to skills, human capital investments saw a deceleration.
I order to ascertain whether the tax reform precludes a shortfall of educational
investments in response to the oil boom, I adapt the timing of the baseline specifica-
tion. Thus far, I exclusively referred to the oil boom in 1968 which set the stage for
an enormous income windfall. However, the payments of the Alaska Permanent Fund
started in 1982 directly after the tax reform. Hence, in table 4.6, I test for the shift in
educational attainment post of the implementation of the Alaska Permanent Fund pay-
ments in 1982. Again, the specifications differ with respect to the underlying sample,
i.e. the specifications in columns (1) and (5) rely on the whole sample, the specifica-
tions in columns (2) and (6) are based on graduation years between 1978 - 1995, the
specification in columns (3) and (7) refer to graduation years between 1979 and 1990
and the specifications in columns (4) and (8) rely on students graduating between 1980
and 1986. In line with the previous results, the income windfalls imposed in 1982 cor-
responded with a shortfall in educational investments compared to the control group
through all underlying samples. This even holds when I account for compounding re-
forms in the sample 1978 - 1995 comprising the tax reform in 1980 and the payments
of the Alaska Permanent Fund starting in 1982. Hence, the increase in the returns to
skills due to the tax reform 1980 does not compensate for the shortfall of educational
investments in response to the income windfall in 1982. The robustness checks in table
4.7 which are augmented by covariates are qualitatively in line with this result.
Thus far, I excluded migrants changing the state of residence 5 years before the
respective census, in order to preclude self-selection effects into the treatment group.
However, as I retraced back the year of graduation based on the individual years of
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schooling, the school starting age and the individual age, excluding migration patterns
within 5 years before the decennial census might not fully control for migration patterns.
In order to test whether the baseline results are driven by changes in the composition of
the treatment or control group, I additionally rely on local residents which were born and
still live in the respective state. In fact this might exclude residents which completed
the education in one state but continued working in another state. However, as the
theoretical predictions particularly pointed at educational responses of students which
qualify for resource windfall gains, the latter problem becomes less severe. Table 4.8
reports difference-in-differences estimates for the effect of the oil boom on educational
attainment of local residents which were born and still live in the respective state while
participating in the census. In essence, the results consistently point at a shortfall of
educational investments compared to the control group post of the oil boom. This
shortfall is qualitatively insensitive to slight shifts in the sample and in line with the
baseline specifications above. Comparing the estimates in table 4.8 for individuals which
were born and still live in Alaska with the same estimates in table 4.5 for individuals
which did not change the state of residence within 5 years shows that the effect for the
former is even stronger for the respective time periods.
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Rather than examining the educational effects of the oil boom on the demand side,
the following section sheds light on the supply side.
Supply Side
Thus far, I exclusively referred to years of schooling on the demand side, though control-
ling for fiscal and educational expenditures on the supply side. In order to ascertain the
change in educational expenditures as a consequence of the oil boom, I rely on further
difference-in-differences estimates of the Alaska Oil boom on educational expenditures
per capita. In a first step, figure 4.10 displays Kernel density estimates of educational
expenditures per capita approximating a Gaussian normal distribution.
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Figure 4.10: Kernel Density Estimate: Educational Expenditures
Again, in order to isolate the impact of the oil boom on educational expenditures,
I have to rely on a common-trend assumption. However, in light of figure 4.6 pre-
treatment trends are parallel exclusively for educational expenditures per capita. Hence,
table 4.9 depicts the short run as well as the long run effects of the Alaska Oil Boom
on educational expenditures per capita. The short run effects only capture changes in
educational expenditures 4 to 7 years post of the oil boom in 1969 in columns (2) - (3)
and post oft the completion of the pipeline 1977 which induced a fierce increase in fiscal
capacity in columns (5) - (6), respectively. Complementarily, the long run effects are
reported in column (1) with respect to the Alaska Oil Boom and in column (4) with
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respect to the completion of the pipeline.
Complementarily, the specifications in table 4.10 rely on the same structure while
accounting for covariates. With respect to covariates, Hanushek (1986) as well as
Hanushek and Rivkin (1996) specifically relied on the US between 1890 and 1990 in
order to explain the rise in educational expenditures. The authors decompose the time
series 1890-1990 into three main transitions. Namely, The Great Expansion spanning
the period from 1890 to 1940, the Baby Boom between 1940 and 1970 and the The
Great Intensification spanning the period between 1970 and 1990. The “decomposition
of the spending growth shows that it resulted from a combination of falling pupil-staff-
ratios, increasing real wages to teachers, and rising expenditures out of the classroom.”
(Hanushek and Rivkin (1996), p. 35) In addition, Morgan et al. (2001) highlight the
importance of student enrollment in explaining, among other educational outcomes,
educational expenditures. Moreover, they point at costs arising from employees in the
educational sector as a major contributor to educational expenditures.14 In light of the
literature, I control for the teacher-student ratio, the state income per capita and Gini
coefficients. Further, I control for the population size and interest payments. Again, as
state income per capita and Gini coefficients are endogenous with respect to the treat-
ment, the estimates controlling for covariates exclusively serve as a robustness check.
In line with the descriptives in figure 4.6, the estimates in tables 4.9 and 4.10 show
a transient, significant increase in educational expenditures post of the oil boom and a
structural decline in educational expenditures in the long run. This result is reflected in
figure 4.6 as well. Contrasting the results on the supply and demand side of educational
attainment, it becomes apparent that post of the oil boom, further fiscal capacity was
in fact spilled into educational expenditures. However, further educational expendi-
14Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) conclude that trends in educational expenditures correspond with
trends in per capita income while the number of students appears to dampen educational expenditures
per capita. In addition, Busemeyer (2007) specified an econometric model which mainly draws upon
the GDP per capita, tertiary enrollment, tax revenues and the share of conservatives in the parliament
as covariates in a cross country study.
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tures on the supply side corresponded with a decline in the years of schooling on the
demand side. In particular, in light of the descriptive statistics, the decline in educa-
tional investments precedes the decrease in educational expenditures. This suggests,
that the decline in educational expenditures is at least partially due to the decline in
the average years of schooling compared to the control group. Alternatively, it might
be possible that the general fund to which oil companies contributed partially crowded
out educational expenditures.
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In the following section, I check the sensitivity of the results with respect to an
external and synthetic control group and I derive distributional effects in the course of
a changes-in-changes procedure.
4.4 Robustness Checks
4.4.1 Control Group
In the previous sections I based my analysis on an internal control group within the US
composed of states which were not exposed to any oil boom in the respective period.
Further, I verified that, conditional on parallel pretreatment trends, the identification
is insensitive to an internal shift in the control group. However, as the treatment group
is segregated from the US directly adjacent to the Canadian boarder, it is pending
to show that the identification is insensitive to an external shift in the control group
as well. The latter is particularly relevant due to the segregation of Alaska in North
America pointing to Canada as a natural control group.
In the following section, I test whether the results are in fact driven by the specific
composition of the control group within the US. This is particularly relevant in light of
the fact that Canada and Alaska are much more similar in terms of the geographic and
population structures. Even though the identification is based on the assumption of a
common trend in the outcome variable between the treatment and control group in a
counterfactual scenario without any oil boom, and hence explicitly allows for disparities
between the treatment and control group, the estimates might be biased if the effects of
the intervention are unequally mediated through certain covariates (confoundedness).
For instance, coinciding with the resource boom in the 1960’s, an educational expansion
might be mediated through population density. Namely, in a less densely populated
state, an educational expansion might materialize with retardation due to the lack in
educational institutions. However, as pointed out previously, the University of Alaska
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is spread throughout the entire state serving students throughout 10 local campuses
and 3 urban campuses in Fairbanks and Juneau. Hence, the educational institutions
do not serve as an impediment for human capital development.
Treatment Group
Control Group
Figure 4.11: Map Canada
In order to test the robustness of the results, I formulate alternative control groups
composed of each Canadian States in light of oil reserves in several Canadian provinces.
The alternative control groups are displayed in figure 4.11. Again, relying on parallel
pretreatment trends, the results depicted in table 4.11 show that the Alaska oil boom
elicited a deceleration of human capital development consistently for each Canadian
state serving as a separate control group. Consistently with the previous section, the
analysis excludes migrants moving in or out of Alaska within 5 previous years, in order
to preclude self-selection and sample selection problems. Further, the international
educational indicator exclusively differentiates between primary, secondary and college
education and is less precise compared to the estimates in the previous section. Hence,
I can conclude that the baseline results are not driven by the specific composition of
the internal control group. Rather, the results are insensitive to the formulation of an
external control group as well.
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4.4.2 Synthetic Control Method
Thus far, I constructed the control group based on a sample of untreated states, a com-
position which was legitimized by parallel pretreatment trends. In addition, I provided
several placebo-tests in an effort to validate the assumption that conditional on par-
allel pretreatment trends, the estimates are insensitive to changes in the composition
of the control group. However, “even if aggregate data are employed, there remains
uncertainty about the ability of the control group to reproduce the counterfactual out-
come trajectory that the affected units would have experienced in the absence of the
intervention or event of interest.” (Abadie et al. (2010), p. 493) A recent approach
proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al.
(2015) suggests a synthetic control group which is constructed based on a weighted
combination of control units.
Formally, I was interested in the ATE defined as the difference between the potential
outcome of the treated and the potential outcome of the untreated:
pi = Y I1,t − Y N1,t (4.22)
The synthetic control method is based on a weighted combination of untreated units.
If weights are denoted as wj, the treatment effect can be estimated as follows:
pˆi = Y I1,t −
T+1∑
j=2
wjYjt (4.23)
with w2 + ...+ wJ+1 = 1. Empirically, I make use of the entire pretreatment period in
order to derive a weighted composition of the control group. In the panel on the left
I build a synthetic control group while educational attainment is exclusively predicted
by state GDP per capita, while in the panel on the right hand side a synthetic control
group is constructed based on a prediction of educational attainment by the state GDP
per capita, state Gini coefficients, educational expenditures and the teacher-students
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ratio.
(a) Synthetic Control based on log(GDP per
capita)
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(b) Synthetic Control based on log(GDP per
capita), EduExpenditures, Gini coefficients
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Figure 4.12: Synthetic Control Group
Contrasting figure 4.12 and figure 4.3 suggests that even in light of a synthetic
control group, average educational achievement in the treatment group fell short of
educational attainment in the control group post of the oil boom, in line with the
previous findings.
4.4.3 Changes-in-Changes
In the previous sections, I estimated the average treatment effect on the treated. How-
ever, in order to examine whether the result is actually driven by a decline in educa-
tional attainment in the lower or the upper tail of the distribution, I complement my
difference-in-differences setup with a changes-in-changes model proposed by Athey and
Imbens (2006).15 The latter compares the evolution of educational attainment in the
treatment group with the evolution of educational attainment in the control group for
each percentile of the educational distribution. While making use of the notation set
out in the previous section, the effect at the pth percentile is defined as the difference
between the pth percentile of the potential distributional outcome of the treated and
15Roller and Steinberg (2017) ascertain the distributional effects in the course of preponed school
tracking in Germany.
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the potential distributional outcome of the untreated:
∆CiCg,t (p) = F
−1
Y Ig,t
(p)− F−1
Y Ng,t
(p) (4.24)
Unlike the potential distributional outcome of the treated, FY I1,1 , the potential distribu-
tional untreated outcome , FY N1,1 , is unobservable. According to the changes-in-changes
model, I can estimate the counterfactual distribution in the following way:
∆CiC1,1 (p) = F
−1
Y I1,1
(p)− F−1
Y I0,1
(
FY I0,0
(
F−1
Y N1,0
(p)
))
(4.25)
After determining the counterfactual distribution, I can derive quantile treatment ef-
fects with respect to the oil boom in the 1960’s (panel on the left hand side of figure
4.13) and the implementation of the Alaska Permanent Fund payments in 1982 (panel
on the right hand side of figure 4.13) below. Conspicuously, the decline in educational
attainment after the implementation of the Alaska Permanent Fund payments in 1982
disproportionately affected students between the 4th and 8th percentile of educational
attainment, while the decline with respect to the initial oil boom is much more moder-
ate and equally distributed.
(a) Changes-in-Changes 1969
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Figure 4.13: Changes-in-Changes Estimates
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4.5 Conclusion
Introductorily, I basically raised three questions: How can the relationship between
natural resource shocks and human capital responses be theoretically explained? Do
resource booms give rise to a crowding out or a crowding in effect with respect to human
capital formation? Which policy recommendations can be invoked for resource booming
economies? In order to tackle these questions, I combined a theoretical analysis with
an empirical investigation.
Theoretically, I showed that a resource boom translating into a Dutch disease might
be detrimental to educational investments measured in the years of schooling. A Dutch
disease crowds out the tradable sector which is relatively skilled labor intensive in favor
of the non-tradable sector which is relatively unskilled labor intensive. In light of lower
returns to skills due to the Dutch disease, individuals might invest less in education at
the present. Moreover, unconditional resource transfers might lower labor supply, and
hence the returns to skills as well. Conversely, windfall gains feeding into additional
educational expenditures might be conducive to human capital development as long as
educational costs are reduced.
Empirically, I set out a differences-in-differences framework while making use of the
the Alaska oil boom as an exogenous variation. In line with the theoretical predictions,
the income windfall led to a shortfall in educational attainment compared to a control
group composed of several US states. For instance, between 1969 and 1980 graduates
from Alaska experienced a shortfall in the years of schooling compared to the control
group of 0.278. These results are robust to internal as well as external shifts in the
composition of the control group.
In line with Gylfason (2001), this chapter showed that income windfalls might lead
to educational shortfalls. In order to turn the curse into a blessing, the government
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might contemplate to lower educational costs rather than providing unconditional re-
source transfers.
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4.6 Appendix: Distributional Effects in the Course
of the Oil Boom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD DiD
Alaska 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.00344 0.00258 0.00277 0.00207 0.00103 0.00792∗∗
(0.00250) (0.00259) (0.00285) (0.00313) (0.00335) (0.00346) (0.00348)
Time80 0.0513∗∗∗
(0.00143)
Alaska × Time80 0.0517∗∗∗
(0.00143)
Time81 0.0523∗∗∗
(0.00144)
Alaska × Time81 0.0696∗∗∗
(0.00144)
Time82 0.0529∗∗∗
(0.00147)
Alaska × Time82 0.0765∗∗∗
(0.00147)
Time83 0.0540∗∗∗
(0.00167)
Alaska × Time83 0.0832∗∗∗
(0.00167)
Time84 0.0560∗∗∗
(0.00193)
Alaska × Time84 0.0927∗∗∗
(0.00193)
Time85 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.00213)
Alaska × Time85 0.105∗∗∗
(0.00213)
Time86 0.0599∗∗∗
(0.00223)
Alaska × Time86 0.104∗∗∗
(0.00223)
Constant 0.484∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.00250) (0.00259) (0.00285) (0.00313) (0.00335) (0.00346) (0.00348)
N 752 752 752 752 752 752 752
R2 0.214 0.299 0.368 0.434 0.508 0.576 0.615
Notes: The table displays differences-in-differences estimates of the Alaska oil boom on Gini coefficients. The
control group is made of all US states which were not exposed to an oil boom in the respective period. Educational
Expenditures, State Income and the Population Size are put in log terms. Robust standard errors in parentheses.*
p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Table 4.12: Difference-in-Differences Gini Coefficients
4.7. Appendix: Placebo Difference-in-Differences 203
4
.7
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
:
P
la
ce
b
o
D
iff
e
re
n
ce
-i
n
-D
iff
e
re
n
ce
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
A
la
b
a
m
a
A
ri
z
o
n
a
A
rk
a
n
sa
s
C
a
li
fo
rn
ia
C
o
lo
ra
d
o
C
o
n
n
e
c
ti
c
u
t
D
e
la
w
a
re
C
o
lu
m
b
ia
F
lo
ri
d
a
G
e
o
rg
ia
A
la
sk
a
1
.8
3
9
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
2
1
4
1
.8
5
0
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
7
2
5
∗
-0
.2
1
0
∗∗
∗
0
.1
4
4
∗∗
∗
0
.3
7
1
∗∗
∗
0
.3
4
9
∗∗
∗
0
.2
9
0
∗∗
∗
1
.6
8
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
9
9
)
(0
.0
3
9
7
)
(0
.0
4
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
7
8
)
(0
.0
3
9
1
)
(0
.0
3
8
9
)
(0
.0
4
5
9
)
(0
.0
4
4
6
)
(0
.0
3
8
2
)
(0
.0
3
9
3
)
T
im
e
-1
.1
4
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
7
4
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
1
8
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
8
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
4
3
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
4
9
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
0
3
∗∗
∗
-2
.2
6
3
∗∗
∗
-1
.4
2
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.7
9
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
2
)
(0
.0
2
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
8
4
)
(0
.0
4
4
6
)
(0
.0
4
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
(0
.0
1
5
5
)
A
la
sk
a
×
T
im
e
-0
.8
1
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
8
7
0
-0
.8
4
3
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
7
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
1
8
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
1
2
∗∗
-0
.0
5
8
2
0
.3
0
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
3
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
7
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
5
6
9
)
(0
.0
5
7
1
)
(0
.0
5
9
1
)
(0
.0
5
4
1
)
(0
.0
5
6
6
)
(0
.0
5
6
8
)
(0
.0
6
9
9
)
(0
.0
7
0
7
)
(0
.0
5
4
7
)
(0
.0
5
5
9
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
0
.2
3
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
9
∗∗
∗
1
0
.2
2
∗∗
∗
1
2
.1
5
∗∗
∗
1
2
.2
8
∗∗
∗
1
1
.9
3
∗∗
∗
1
1
.7
0
∗∗
∗
1
1
.7
2
∗∗
∗
1
1
.7
8
∗∗
∗
1
0
.3
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
1
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
5
)
(0
.0
2
6
2
)
(0
.0
2
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
1
5
)
N
3
0
4
4
2
1
2
1
8
1
2
2
1
8
3
6
1
5
1
9
8
1
5
3
1
2
3
9
1
0
9
2
4
7
4
5
9
6
3
4
7
6
7
1
6
1
9
7
1
5
0
7
4
4
4
2
2
4
2
R
2
0
.0
1
8
4
0
.0
3
7
8
0
.0
2
1
8
0
.0
3
6
9
0
.0
3
5
8
0
.0
4
0
7
0
.0
3
9
4
0
.0
4
8
2
0
.0
2
5
4
0
.0
0
8
8
7
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
p
la
ce
b
o
d
iff
er
en
ce
s-
in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
th
e
A
la
sk
a
o
il
b
o
o
m
o
n
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
.
T
re
a
tm
en
t
G
ro
u
p
:
A
la
sk
a
.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
G
ro
u
p
:
R
es
p
ec
ti
v
e
S
ta
te
.
T
h
e
g
ra
d
u
a
ti
o
n
y
ea
rs
a
re
re
tr
a
ce
d
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
a
g
e,
th
e
y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
,
th
e
ce
n
su
s
y
ea
r
a
n
d
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
sc
h
o
o
l
st
a
rt
in
g
a
g
e.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
T
ab
le
4.
13
:
P
la
ce
b
o
T
es
ts
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
u
p
1
204 Chapter 4. Income Windfalls and Educational Shortfalls
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
H
a
w
a
ii
Id
a
h
o
Il
li
n
o
is
In
d
ia
n
a
Io
w
a
K
a
n
sa
s
K
e
n
tu
c
k
y
L
o
u
is
ia
n
a
M
a
in
e
M
a
ry
la
n
d
M
a
ss
a
c
h
u
se
tt
s
M
ic
h
ig
a
n
A
la
sk
a
0
.5
7
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
9
0
0
.4
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.4
9
9
∗∗
∗
0
.1
3
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
3
0
1
.8
2
6
∗∗
∗
1
.8
8
0
∗∗
∗
0
.4
0
9
∗∗
∗
0
.4
0
2
∗∗
∗
0
.1
9
3
∗∗
∗
0
.4
3
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4
5
6
)
(0
.0
4
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
8
0
)
(0
.0
3
8
3
)
(0
.0
3
8
6
)
(0
.0
3
8
9
)
(0
.0
4
0
5
)
(0
.0
4
0
1
)
(0
.0
4
0
6
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
3
8
2
)
(0
.0
3
8
0
)
T
im
e
-1
.4
5
1
∗∗
∗
-2
.5
9
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
0
4
∗∗
∗
-2
.0
1
3
∗∗
∗
-2
.3
9
9
∗∗
∗
-2
.2
3
8
∗∗
∗
-1
.0
7
7
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
2
6
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
9
2
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
9
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
5
0
∗∗
∗
-2
.0
1
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
8
3
)
(0
.0
3
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
(0
.0
2
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
2
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
6
4
)
(0
.0
1
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
8
7
)
A
la
sk
a
×
T
im
e
-0
.5
1
0
∗∗
∗
0
.6
3
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
5
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
1
9
0
.4
3
8
∗∗
∗
0
.2
7
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
8
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
3
5
∗∗
∗
0
.2
3
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.3
6
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.3
1
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
9
5
(0
.0
6
6
0
)
(0
.0
6
2
6
)
(0
.0
5
4
6
)
(0
.0
5
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
6
5
)
(0
.0
5
7
2
)
(0
.0
5
7
5
)
(0
.0
5
7
0
)
(0
.0
6
1
2
)
(0
.0
5
6
2
)
(0
.0
5
5
3
)
(0
.0
5
4
7
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
1
.5
0
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
3
∗∗
∗
1
1
.6
6
∗∗
∗
1
1
.5
7
∗∗
∗
1
1
.9
4
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
2
∗∗
∗
1
0
.2
5
∗∗
∗
1
0
.1
9
∗∗
∗
1
1
.6
6
∗∗
∗
1
1
.6
7
∗∗
∗
1
1
.8
8
∗∗
∗
1
1
.6
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
8
)
(0
.0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
4
0
)
(0
.0
1
5
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
0
)
N
8
3
4
1
7
8
7
8
5
4
8
9
5
6
6
3
4
3
9
8
3
5
2
4
4
7
5
5
2
0
6
0
0
4
2
6
5
4
3
8
3
1
0
7
2
8
1
0
7
2
0
1
3
2
1
7
9
0
4
8
1
0
3
1
7
4
5
7
1
5
R
2
0
.0
2
6
3
0
.0
6
4
2
0
.0
3
8
0
0
.0
4
9
1
0
.0
6
7
7
0
.0
5
7
8
0
.0
1
7
2
0
.0
1
7
5
0
.0
5
3
8
0
.0
2
8
3
0
.0
3
3
8
0
.0
4
7
7
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
p
la
ce
b
o
d
iff
er
en
ce
s-
in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
th
e
A
la
sk
a
o
il
b
o
o
m
o
n
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
.
T
re
a
tm
en
t
G
ro
u
p
:
A
la
sk
a
.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
G
ro
u
p
:
R
es
p
ec
ti
v
e
S
ta
te
.
T
h
e
g
ra
d
u
a
ti
o
n
y
ea
rs
a
re
re
tr
a
ce
d
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
a
g
e,
th
e
y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
,
th
e
ce
n
su
s
y
ea
r
a
n
d
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
sc
h
o
o
l
st
a
rt
in
g
a
g
e.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
T
ab
le
4.
14
:
P
la
ce
b
o
T
es
ts
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
u
p
2
4.7. Appendix: Placebo Difference-in-Differences 205
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
M
in
n
e
so
ta
M
is
si
ss
ip
p
i
M
is
so
u
ri
M
o
n
ta
n
a
N
e
b
ra
sk
a
N
e
v
a
d
a
N
e
w
H
a
m
p
sh
ir
e
N
e
w
J
e
rs
e
y
N
e
w
M
e
x
ic
o
N
e
w
Y
o
rk
N
o
rt
h
C
a
ro
li
n
a
N
o
rt
h
D
a
k
o
ta
A
la
sk
a
0
.0
3
0
7
2
.1
4
7
∗∗
∗
0
.6
7
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
9
6
0
.1
6
3
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
5
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
8
2
0
.3
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.3
6
5
∗∗
∗
1
.5
7
9
∗∗
∗
0
.4
7
4
∗∗
∗
0
.6
3
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
8
5
)
(0
.0
4
1
7
)
(0
.0
3
8
6
)
(0
.0
4
2
2
)
(0
.0
3
9
6
)
(0
.0
4
1
4
)
(0
.0
4
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
2
)
(0
.0
3
7
9
)
(0
.0
3
9
1
)
(0
.0
3
7
9
)
(0
.0
3
9
5
)
T
im
e
-2
.0
7
7
∗∗
∗
-1
.3
3
9
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
2
3
∗∗
∗
-2
.4
9
1
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
9
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
7
2
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
3
6
∗∗
∗
-1
.6
5
4
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
9
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
5
6
∗∗
∗
-2
.0
0
2
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
2
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
5
0
)
(0
.0
2
4
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
3
5
8
)
(0
.0
2
4
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
8
)
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
A
la
sk
a
×
T
im
e
0
.1
1
6
∗∗
-0
.6
2
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
3
8
∗∗
∗
0
.5
3
0
∗∗
∗
0
.2
3
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
8
8
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
2
4
9
-0
.3
0
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
6
7
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
0
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
0
7
-0
.1
3
2
∗∗
(0
.0
5
5
8
)
(0
.0
5
9
2
)
(0
.0
5
5
6
)
(0
.0
6
4
6
)
(0
.0
5
9
0
)
(0
.0
6
1
5
)
(0
.0
6
3
0
)
(0
.0
5
5
1
)
(0
.0
5
4
3
)
(0
.0
5
5
8
)
(0
.0
3
9
5
)
(0
.0
5
7
0
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
2
.0
4
∗∗
∗
9
.9
2
5
∗∗
∗
1
1
.4
0
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
5
∗∗
∗
1
1
.9
1
∗∗
∗
1
2
.2
2
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
2
∗∗
∗
1
1
.6
9
∗∗
∗
1
1
.7
1
∗∗
∗
1
0
.4
9
∗∗
∗
1
1
.6
0
∗∗
∗
1
1
.4
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
3
0
)
(0
.0
1
8
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
9
)
N
3
3
1
8
2
1
2
0
0
5
8
7
3
9
2
4
2
2
8
0
1
2
9
1
4
0
8
7
4
8
6
1
2
5
8
7
3
1
4
5
5
2
8
2
3
1
3
9
6
5
1
6
4
6
1
8
8
1
8
7
3
5
2
6
2
4
6
4
6
5
R
2
0
.0
4
8
4
0
.0
2
8
0
0
.0
3
4
9
0
.0
5
9
0
0
.0
5
4
2
0
.0
4
1
2
0
.0
4
3
0
0
.0
3
2
8
0
.0
3
8
3
0
.0
0
9
7
5
0
.0
4
8
6
0
.0
3
7
8
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
p
la
ce
b
o
d
iff
er
en
ce
s-
in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
th
e
A
la
sk
a
o
il
b
o
o
m
o
n
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
a
tt
a
in
m
en
t.
T
re
a
tm
en
t
G
ro
u
p
:
A
la
sk
a
.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
G
ro
u
p
:
R
es
p
ec
ti
v
e
S
ta
te
.
T
h
e
g
ra
d
u
a
ti
o
n
y
ea
rs
a
re
re
tr
a
ce
d
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
a
g
e,
th
e
y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
,
th
e
ce
n
su
s
y
ea
r
a
n
d
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
sc
h
o
o
l
st
a
rt
in
g
a
g
e.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
T
ab
le
4.
15
:
P
la
ce
b
o
T
es
ts
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
u
p
3
206 Chapter 4. Income Windfalls and Educational Shortfalls
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
O
h
io
O
k
la
h
o
m
a
P
e
n
n
sy
lv
a
n
ia
S
o
u
th
D
a
k
o
ta
T
e
n
n
e
ss
e
e
T
e
x
a
s
U
ta
h
V
e
rm
o
n
t
V
ir
g
in
ia
W
e
st
V
ir
g
in
ia
W
is
c
o
n
si
n
W
y
o
m
in
g
A
la
sk
a
-0
.1
3
6
∗∗
∗
0
.6
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.7
8
7
∗∗
∗
1
.9
7
8
∗∗
∗
0
.2
5
0
∗∗
∗
1
.6
2
5
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
5
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
9
∗∗
1
.0
1
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
0
9
∗∗
∗
1
.4
5
0
∗∗
∗
0
.3
3
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
8
8
)
(0
.0
3
8
0
)
(0
.0
4
2
2
)
(0
.0
4
1
2
)
(0
.0
4
3
5
)
(0
.0
3
9
6
)
(0
.0
3
9
9
)
(0
.0
4
4
8
)
(0
.0
3
9
2
)
(0
.0
3
8
4
)
(0
.0
4
1
7
)
(0
.0
3
8
5
)
T
im
e
-2
.0
7
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
4
8
∗∗
∗
-1
.5
0
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
5
0
∗∗
∗
-2
.5
9
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
9
9
∗∗
∗
-2
.5
0
1
∗∗
∗
-2
.2
7
8
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
3
4
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
9
7
∗∗
∗
-1
.8
8
2
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
4
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
0
9
)
(0
.0
3
4
1
)
(0
.0
2
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
9
5
)
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
(0
.0
2
4
0
)
(0
.0
4
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
5
9
)
(0
.0
1
3
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
4
1
)
A
la
sk
a
×
T
im
e
0
.1
1
4
∗∗
-0
.1
1
3
∗∗
-0
.4
5
4
∗∗
∗
-1
.0
1
1
∗∗
∗
0
.6
3
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.9
6
2
∗∗
∗
0
.5
4
0
∗∗
∗
0
.3
1
7
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
2
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
6
2
-0
.0
7
8
8
-0
.0
1
9
7
(0
.0
5
6
6
)
(0
.0
5
4
5
)
(0
.0
6
3
7
)
(0
.0
5
8
3
)
(0
.0
6
6
7
)
(0
.0
5
6
5
)
(0
.0
5
8
9
)
(0
.0
7
0
6
)
(0
.0
5
5
8
)
(0
.0
5
5
5
)
(0
.0
6
0
1
)
(0
.0
5
5
6
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
2
.2
1
∗∗
∗
1
1
.4
3
∗∗
∗
1
1
.2
9
∗∗
∗
1
0
.0
9
∗∗
∗
1
1
.8
2
∗∗
∗
1
0
.4
5
∗∗
∗
1
2
.3
2
∗∗
∗
1
1
.9
6
∗∗
∗
1
1
.0
6
∗∗
∗
1
2
.2
8
∗∗
∗
1
0
.6
2
∗∗
∗
1
1
.7
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
9
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
(0
.0
2
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
4
)
(0
.0
1
3
4
)
(0
.0
2
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
3
7
6
)
(0
.0
1
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
1
6
)
N
2
2
2
3
0
6
9
2
5
6
5
7
9
3
1
5
4
2
3
7
5
9
0
7
2
7
8
6
3
4
5
5
3
9
1
3
4
2
4
8
5
8
8
5
3
3
9
6
7
1
2
3
5
1
7
9
5
1
5
0
7
7
4
3
7
8
3
5
0
R
2
0
.0
5
2
9
0
.0
4
2
2
0
.0
3
0
4
0
.0
1
5
9
0
.0
6
1
2
0
.0
1
3
7
0
.0
5
8
2
0
.0
4
9
2
0
.0
1
4
1
0
.0
4
8
8
0
.0
4
3
2
0
.0
4
3
7
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s
p
la
ce
b
o
d
iff
er
en
ce
s-
in
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
th
e
A
la
sk
a
o
il
b
o
o
m
o
n
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
a
l
a
tt
a
in
m
en
t.
T
re
a
tm
en
t
G
ro
u
p
:
A
la
sk
a
.
C
o
n
tr
o
l
G
ro
u
p
:
R
es
p
ec
ti
v
e
S
ta
te
.
T
h
e
g
ra
d
u
a
ti
o
n
y
ea
rs
a
re
re
tr
a
ce
d
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
a
g
e,
th
e
y
ea
rs
o
f
sc
h
o
o
li
n
g
,
th
e
ce
n
su
s
y
ea
r
a
n
d
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
sc
h
o
o
l
st
a
rt
in
g
a
g
e.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
T
ab
le
4.
16
:
P
la
ce
b
o
T
es
ts
C
on
tr
ol
G
ro
u
p
4

5Conclusion
209
“The conventional view concerning the role of natural resources in economic
development has been that resource endowment is most critical in the early low-income
stage of the development process.”
– Auty (1993), p. 1.
This dissertation was devoted to the relationship between natural resource booms,
the selectivity of factor mobility and human capital formation. Accordingly, I raised
the following research questions in the introductory chapter: Do resource booms lay
the ground for brain drain or brain gain effects? Are selective migration patterns medi-
ated through distributional effects? Do the selectivity patterns of migration materialize
consistently in international and regional contexts? How can the relationship between
resource abundance and human capital formation be explained theoretically? Are quasi-
experimental setups appropriate for the analysis of educational investments in response
to resource booms?
In order to tackle these questions, I formulated 3 essays. Chapter 2 was devoted
to the selectivity effects of international migration patterns as a consequence of resource
booms. Theoretically, selective migration effects emerge as a consequence of a deindus-
trialisation in response to the real appreciation. The bust of the tradable sector makes
skilled labor relatively worse off while unskilled labor is better off. These distributional
effects of a Dutch disease materialize in nominal terms as well as in real terms due to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. If the subsequent decline in skilled labor income falls short
of initial resource transfers, the Dutch disease increases the probability of brain drain
effects. However, the theoretical setup was referring to labor income inequality rather
than total income inequality. Even though the returns to skills decline, total income
inequality might still see an increase if the political elite appropriates significant shares
of resource windfall gains. Hence, the net inequality effects are ambiguous. Empirically,
I relied on static and dynamic panel models as well as a simultaneous equation model
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in order to test the theoretical predictions. Consistently through all model specifica-
tions, resource booms foster brain drain effects in the long run. In order to preclude
brain drain effects, the Dutch disease might be cured or even prevented in the first
place. In this regard, the competitiveness of the tradable sector might be strengthened
through public educational investments in the long run. Further, an increase in the
savings rate in the economy might prevent or lower the appreciation of the exchange
rate (Matsen and Torvik (2005)). Alternatively or complementarily, resource revenues
might be invested into a financial fund set up abroad, in order to smooth the inflow of
resource windfall gains (Stiglitz (2004)). Rather than curing the Dutch disease in the
beginning, brain drain effects in particular might be lowered in the end if a resource
transfer is accompanied by tax cuts in a proportional or progressive tax system. The
predictions raised in this chapter might be relevant for the analysis of foreign aid as
well. As long as income windfalls originating from foreign aid are substantial enough in
order to translate into a Dutch disease, a foreign aid gain might lead to a brain drain
in the long run.
While Chapter 2 referred to international migration patterns, Chapter 3 was de-
voted to interstate mobility patterns within the US in response to natural resource
abundance. Theoretically, a resource boom lowers the relative educational background
of prospective immigrants, as unskilled labor derives a stronger utility gain from un-
conditional resource transfers. Empirically, I rely on static and dynamic panel models
which consistently point at negative selectivity effects of internal immigration as a
consequence of resource booms. In order to internalize counterfactual trends in the
selectivity of immigration, I further relied on a selectivity measure which was defined
as the difference in the selectivity of migrants moving into oil abundant states and the
average selectivity of migrants moving across non-oil abundant states. These robust-
ness checks based on counterfactual trends are inevitable, as long as migrant selection
follows some path dependencies. Path dependencies became in fact apparent in light of
dynamic panel models set out in Chapter 2 for international migration patterns and in
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Chapter 3, though modest, for regional migration patterns. Clearly, the baseline results
are not affected by internalizing counterfactual trends. Complementarily, I made use
of a non-parametric setup proposed by Douglas and Wall (1993), Douglas (1997) and
Douglas and Wall (2000), which relates the quality of life to the relative amount of
net migration and serves as a means to take into account the multilateral character of
migration decisions. Even accounting for multilateral migration decisions, the empirical
results are in line with the theoretical conjectures.
Rather than relating resource booms to the human capital of migrants, Chapter
4 was devoted to changes in educational investments among local residents as a conse-
quence of the Alaska oil boom. Theoretically, I pointed out that unconditional resource
transfers might lead to a decline in labor supply, and hence might disincentivize ed-
ucational investments. Moreover, in an open economy, a Dutch disease increases the
opportunity costs of acquiring education as low-skilled wages go up and reduces the
returns of educational investments as high-skilled wages go down. If individuals antic-
ipate the decline in the returns to skills in the future, this might lead to a decay in
educational investments at the present as well. Empirically, I relied on a difference-in-
difference setup, comparing the evolution of the years of schooling among local residents
in Alaska with the evolution of the years of schooling in a control group composed of
several US states right after the oil boom while focussing on local residents. The results
suggest a shortfall of educational investments in Alaska compared to a control group in
response to the oil windfall in the 1960’s. The results are robust to the definition of a
synthetic control group as well as to an external control group in Canada which is much
more similar in terms of the geographic structure and population density. Moreover,
the results are qualitatively insensitive to the definition of local residents. Even in an
extreme scenario which accounts for residents born and still living in Alaska, the results
remain qualitatively unaffected. In light of the results of Chapter 3 and 4, a government
encountering resource windfalls might contemplate to improve the quality of the school
system or lower educational costs rather than easing the household budget constraint
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through resource transfers.
The role of educational investments for economic prosperity has been highlighted
for several decades since the seminal contributions of Schultz (1961) and Becker (1962).
However, the skill composition of a society is not only affected by educational invest-
ments of local residents but also by the selectivity of migration. This dissertation
related natural resource booms, selective migration and education in the course of 3
essays. The essays support the view that natural resource abundance serves as a curse
rather than a blessing. In particular, resource windfalls might crowd out human capital
through both a decline in educational investments and through brain drain effects.
In the beginning of this conclusion, I referred to Auty (1993) pointing at the stage
of economic development which determines whether resource abundance materializes
as a curse or a blessing. However, this dissertation shows that elements of a resource
curse might even materialize in developed countries.

Bibliography
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2010). Synthetic control methods for
comparative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control pro-
gram. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 105(490):493–505.
Abadie, A., Diamond, A., and Hainmueller, J. (2015). Comparative politics and the
synthetic control method. American Journal of Political Science, 59(2):495–510.
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: A case study
of the Basque country. The American Economic Review, 93(1):113–132.
Abramitzky, R., Boustan, L. P., and Eriksson, K. (2012). Europe’s tired, poor, huddled
masses: Self-selection and economic outcomes in the age of mass migration. The
American Economic Review, 102(5):1832–1856.
Abramitzky, R., Boustan, L. P., and Eriksson, K. (2013). Have the poor always been
less likely to migrate? Evidence from inheritance practices during the age of mass
migration. Journal of Development Economics, 102:2–14.
Acemoglu, D. (2017). Lectures in labor economics. mimeo.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. (2001). The colonial origins of compar-
ative development: An empirical investigation. The American Economic Review,
91(5):1369–1401.
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2006). De facto political power and institutional
persistence. The American Economic Review, 96(2):325–330.
Bibliography 215
A’Hearn, B., Baten, J., and Crayen, D. (2009). Quantifying quantitative literacy:
Age heaping and the history of human capital. The Journal of Economic History,
69(3):783–808.
Alaska Oil and Gas Association (2014). Economic impact study. mimeo.
Alaska Permanent Fund (2017). Alaska permanent fund dividends. mimeo.
Alexeev, M. and Conrad, R. (2009). The elusive curse of oil. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 91(3):586–598.
Anderson, J. and Van Wincoop, E. (2002). Gravity with gravitas: A review of theory
and evidence. The American Economic Review, 93:170–192.
Anderson, J. E. and Van Wincoop, E. (2001). Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the
border puzzle. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Anderson, T. and Hsiao, C. (1981). Estimation of dynamic models with error compo-
nents. Journal of American Statistical Association, 76:598–606.
Anderson, T. W. and Hsiao, C. (1982). Formulation and estimation of dynamic models
using panel data. Journal of Econometrics, 18(1):47–82.
Andersson, F. and Konrad, K. A. (2003). Human capital investment and globalization
in extortionary states. Journal of Public Economics, 87(7):1539–1555.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte
carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic
Studies, 58(2):277–297.
Athey, S. and Imbens, G. W. (2006). Identification and inference in nonlinear difference-
in-differences models. Econometrica, 74(2):431–497.
Auty, R. M. (1993). Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource
Curse Thesis. London: Routledge.
216 Bibliography
Auty, R. M. (2001). The political economy of resource-driven growth. European Eco-
nomic Review, 45(4):839–846.
Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic growth in a cross section of countries. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 106(2):407–443.
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J.-W. (2012). A new data set of educational attainment in the
World, 1950-2010. Journal of Development Economics, 104:184–198.
Bartel, A. P. (1989). Where do the new US immigrants live? Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 7(4):371–391.
Baten, J. (2016). Was there a curse of natural resources? In Baten, J., editor, A History
of the Global Economy, pages 158–161. Cambridge University Press.
Baten, J. and Juif, D. (2014). A story of large landowners and math skills: Inequal-
ity and human capital formation in long-run development, 1820–2000. Journal of
Comparative Economics, 42(2):375–401.
Baten, J. and Mumme, C. (2010). Does inequality lead to civil wars? A global long-term
study using anthropometric indicators (1816–1999). European Journal of Political
Economy, 32:56–79.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in human capital: A theoretical analysis. The Journal
of Political Economy, 70(5):9–49.
Becker, G. S., Murphy, K. M., and Tamura, R. (1990). Human capital, fertility, and
economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5):S12–S37.
Behrman, J. R. (2010). Investment in education inputs and incentives. Handbook of
Development Economics, 5:4883–4975.
Behrman, J. R. and Taubman, P. (1990). The intergenerational correlation between
children’s adult earnings and their parent’s income: Results from the Michigan Panel
Survey of income dynamics. Review of Income and Wealth, 36(2):115–127.
Bibliography 217
Beine, M., Docquier, F., and Rapoport, H. (2008). Brain drain and human capi-
tal formation in developing countries: Winners and losers. The Economic Journal,
118(528):631–652.
Beine, M. and Salomone, S. (2013). Network effects in international migration: Educa-
tion versus gender. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115(2):354–380.
Belot, M. V. and Hatton, T. J. (2012). Immigrant selection in the OECD. The Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, 114(4):1105–1128.
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. (2002). How much should we trust
difference-in-difference estimates? NBER working paper No. 8841.
Bjornland, H. C. (1998). The economic effects of North Sea oil on the manufacturing
sector. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45(5):553–585.
Blake, J. (1985). Number of siblings and educational mobility. American Sociological
Review, 50(1):84–94.
Blanden, J. and Gregg, P. (2004). Family income and educational attainment: A
review of approaches and evidence for Britain. Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
20(2):245–263.
Bleakley, H. and Ferrie, J. (2016). Shocking behavior: Random wealth in Antebellum
Georgia and human capital across generations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
131(3):1455–1495.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1):115–143.
Borjas, G. (1987). Self-selection and earnings of immigrants. The American Economic
Review, 77(4):531–553.
Borjas, G. J. (2002). The impact of welfare reform on immigrant welfare use. Center
for Immigration Studies Washington, DC.
218 Bibliography
Borjas, G. J. (2015). The wage impact of the Marielitos: A reappraisal. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Borjas, G. J., Bronars, S. G., and Trejo, S. J. (1992). Self-selection and internal migra-
tion in the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 32(2):159–185.
Bougheas, S. and Nelson, D. (2012). Skilled worker migration and trade: Welfare
analysis and political economy. The World Economy, 35(2):197–215.
Bruecker, H., Capuano, S., and Marfouk, A. (2013). Education, gender and interna-
tional migration: Insights from a panel dataset 1980-2010. Institute for Employment
Research.
Brunnschweiler, C. and Bulte, E. (2008). The resource curse revisited and revised,
a tale of paradoxes and red herrings. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 55(3):248–264.
Busemeyer, M. R. (2007). Determinants of public education spending in 21 OECD
democracies, 1980–2001. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(4):582–610.
Card, D. (1990). The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market. ILR
Review, 43(2):245–257.
Chiquiar, D. (2005). Why Mexico’s regional income convergence broke down. Journal
of Development Economics, 77(1):257–275.
Chiquiar, D. and Hanson, G. H. (2002). International migration, self-selection, and
the distribution of wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chiquiar, D. and Hanson, G. H. (2005). International migration, self-selection, and
the distribution of wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States. Journal of
Political Economy, 113(2):239–281.
Cohn, R. (2009). Mass Migration under Sail: European Immigration to the Antebellum
United States. Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 219
Collier, P. and Hoeﬄer, A. (2005). Resource rents, governance, and conflict. Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 49(4):625–633.
Corden, W. M. (1984). Booming sector and Dutch disease economics: Survey and
consolidation. Oxford Economic Papers, 36(3):359–380.
Corden, W. M. and Neary, J. P. (1982). Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a
small open economy. The Economic Journal, 92(368):825–848.
Crayen, D. and Baten, J. (2010). Global trends in numeracy 1820–1949 and its impli-
cations for long-term growth. Explorations in Economic History, 47(1):82–99.
David, H., Kerr, W. R., and Kugler, A. D. (2007). Does employment protection reduce
productivity? Evidence from US states. The Economic Journal, 117(521).
Docquier, F., Lodigiani, E., Rapoport, H., and Schiff, M. (2016). Emigration and
democracy. Journal of Development Economics, 120:209–223.
Douglas, S. (1997). Estimating relative standard of living in the United States using
cross-migration data. Journal of Regional Science, 37(3):411–436.
Douglas, S. and Wall, H. J. (1993). Voting with your feet and the quality of life index:
A simple non-parametric approach applied to Canada. Economics Letters, 42(2):229–
236.
Douglas, S. and Wall, H. J. (2000). Measuring relative quality of life from a cross-
migration regression, with an application to Canadian provinces. In Research in
Labor Economics, pages 191–214. Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Downey, D. B. (2001). Number of siblings and intellectual development: The resource
dilution explanation. American Psychologist, 56(6-7):497.
Dustmann, C., Fabbri, F., and Preston, I. (2005). The impact of immigration on the
british labour market. The Economic Journal, 115(507):F324–F341.
220 Bibliography
Eaton, J. and Rosen, H. S. (1980). Taxation, human capital, and uncertainty. The
American Economic Review, 70(4):705–715.
Egger, P. and Pfaffermayr, M. (2003). The proper panel econometric specification of
the gravity equation: A three-way model with bilateral interaction effects. Empirical
Economics, 28(3):571–580.
Elbadawi, I. A. and Soto, R. (1997). Real exchange rates and macroeconomic adjust-
ments in Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries. Journal of African
Economies, 6(3):74–120.
Enchautegui, M. E. (1997). Welfare payments and other economic determinants of
female migration. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(3):529–554.
Ermisch, J. and Francesconi, M. (2001). Family matters: Impacts of family background
on educational attainments. Economica, 68(270):137–156.
Fardmanesh, M. (1990). Terms of trade shocks and structural adjustment in a small
open economy: Dutch disease and oil price increases. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 34(1-2):339–353.
Feenstra, R. (2016). Advanced international trade: Theory and evidence. Princeton
Univsersity Press.
Fernandez, R. and Rogerson, R. (1997). The determinants of public education expen-
ditures: Evidence from the States, 1950-1990. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Fum, R. M. and Hodler, R. (2010). Natural resources and income inequality: The role
of ethnic divisions. Economics Letters, 107(3):360–363.
Galor, O. (2011). From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory, pages 171–293.
Handbook of Economic Growth.
Bibliography 221
Galor, O. and Weil, D. N. (2000). Population, technology, and growth: From Malthu-
sian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond. The American Economic
Review, 90:106–128.
Galor, O. and Weil, David, N. (1999). From Malthusian stagnation to modern economic
growth. The American Economic Review, 89:150–154.
Gelb, A. H. (1988). Oil Windfalls: Blessing Or Curse? Oxford University Press.
Glitz, A. (2012). The labor market impact of immigration: A quasi-experiment exploit-
ing immigrant location rules in Germany. Journal of Labor Economics, 30(1):175–213.
Goderis, B. and Malone, S. (2011). Natural resource booms and inequality: Theory
and evidence. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(2):388–417.
Goldin, C. and Katz, L. F. (2007). The race between education and technology: The
evolution of US educational wage differentials, 1890 to 2005. Technical report, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research.
Grogger, J. and Hanson, G. H. (2011). Income maximization and the selection and
sorting of international migrants. Journal of Development Economics, 95(1):42–57.
Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education and economic development. European
Economic Review, 45(4-6):847–859.
Gylfason, T. and Zoega, G. (2003). Inequality and economic growth: Do natural re-
sources matter? In Eicher, T. S. and Tumovsky, S. J., editors, Inequality and Growth.
Theory and Policy Applications, pages 255–292. MIT Press.
Haber, S. and Menaldo, V. (2011). Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A
reappraisal of the resource curse. American Political Science Review, 105(1):1–26.
Hamilton, J. D. (2011). Historical oil shocks. Technical report, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
222 Bibliography
Hamilton, K. and Clemens, M. (1999). Genuine savings rates in developing countries.
World Bank Economic Review, 13(333-356).
Hanushek, E. A. (1986). The economics of schooling: Production and efficiency in
public schools. Journal of Economic Literature, 24(3):1141–1177.
Hanushek, E. A. (2013). Economic growth in developing countries: The role of human
capital. Economics of Education Review, 37:204–212.
Hanushek, E. A. and Rivkin, S. G. (1996). Understanding the 20th century growth in
US school spending. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hanushek, E. A. and Woessmann, L. (2009). Do better schools lead to more growth?
cognitive skills, economic outcomes, and causation. Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Heckman, J. J. (1976). A life-cycle model of earnings, learning, and consumption.
Journal of Political Economy, 84(4):S9–S44.
Hirshleifer, J. (1970). Investment, Interest and Capital. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European
Economic Review, 50:1367–1386.
Isham, Jonathan, M. W. L. P. and Busby, G. (2005). The varieties of resource ex-
perience: Natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic
growth. World Bank Economic Review, 19(2):141–174.
Ismail, K. (2010). The structural manifestation of the ‘Dutch disease’: The case of oil
exporting countries. mimeo.
Kaestner, R. and Malamud, O. (2014). Self-selection and international migration: New
evidence from Mexico. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(1):78–91.
Bibliography 223
King, R. G. and Rebelo, S. (1990). Public policy and economic growth: Developing
neoclassical implications. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Krugman, P. (1987). The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive
consequences of Mrs. Thatcher. Journal of Development Economics, 27:41–55.
Kumar, A. (2014). Impact of oil boom and bust on human capital investment in the
US. Available at SSRN 2474618.
Lama, R. and Medina, J. P. (2012). Is exchange rate stabilization an appropriate cure
for the Dutch disease? International Journal of Central Banking, 8(1):1–46.
Leamer, E., Maul, H., Rodriguez, S., and Schott, P. (1999). Does natural resource
abundance increase Latin American income inequality. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 59:3–42.
Levine, P. B. and Zimmerman, D. J. (1999). An empirical analysis of the welfare magnet
debate using the NLSY. Journal of Population Economics, 12(3):391–409.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 22(1):3–42.
Luce, R. D. (2005). Individual choice behavior: A theoretical analysis. Courier Corpo-
ration.
Maddala, G. (1983). Qualitative and limited dependent variable models in econometrics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Matsen, E. and Torvik, R. (2005). Optimal Dutch disease. Journal of Development
Economics, 78(2):494–515.
Mayer, T. and Zignago, S. (2011). Notes on CEP II’s distances measures: The geodist
database. CEPII Working Paper 25.
McFadden, D. (1978). Modeling the choice of residential location. Transportation
Research Record, (673).
224 Bibliography
McFadden, D. et al. (1973). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behav-
ior. In Zarembka, P., editor, Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, New York.
Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California.
McKenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2007). Network effects and the dynamics of migra-
tion and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development
Economics, 84(1):1–24.
McKenzie, D. and Rapoport, H. (2010). Self-selection patterns in Mexico-US migration:
The role of migration networks. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4):811–
821.
McKinnish, T. (2007). Welfare-induced migration at state borders: New evidence from
micro-data. Journal of Public Economics, 91(3):437–450.
Mincer, J. A. (1974). Schooling and earnings. In Schooling, experience, and earnings,
pages 41–63. NBER.
Monschauer, Y. (2013). Brain drain in a long-run perspective - Is there an impact of
migrant selectivity on growth? unpublished.
Moradi, A. and Baten, J. (2005). Inequality in sub-saharan Africa: New data and new
insights from anthropometric estimates. World Development, 33(8):1233–1265.
Moraga, J. F.-H. (2011). New evidence on emigrant selection. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 93(1):72–96.
Morgan, D. R., Kickham, K., and LaPlant, J. T. (2001). State support for higher
education: A political economy approach. Policy Studies Journal, 29(3):359–371.
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica,
49(6):1417–1426.
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., and Cheibub, J. A. (2000). Democracy and Development.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bibliography 225
Razin, A., Sadka, E., and Suwankiri, B. (2011). Migration and the welfare state. MIT
Press, Cambridge.
Rea Jr, S. A. (1977). Investment in human capital under a negative income tax. Cana-
dian Journal of Economics, 10(4):607–620.
Rebelo, S. T. (1990). Long run policy analysis and long run growth. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Robinson, J. A., Torvik, R., and Verdier, T. (2006). Political foundations of the resource
curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79(2):447–468.
Roine, J., Vlachos, J., and Waldenstro¨m, D. (2009). The long-run determinants of
inequality: What can we learn from top income data? Journal of Public Economics,
93(7):974–988.
Roller, M. and Steinberg, D. (2017). The distributional effects of early school stratifi-
cation - Non-parametric evidence from Germany. mimeo.
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. The Journal of Political
Economy, 94(5):1002–1037.
Roy, A. (1951). Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings. Oxford Economic
Papers, 3(2):135–146.
Ruggles, S., Alexander, T., Genadek, K., Goeken, R., Schroeder, M. B., and Sobek, M.
(2010). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota.
Ruggles, S., King, M. L., Levison, D., McCaa, R., and Sobek, M. (2003). IPUMS-
international. Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary
History, 36(2):60–65.
Sachs, J. D. and Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic
growth. NBER Working Paper 5308.
226 Bibliography
Sala-i-Martin, X. and Subramanian, A. (2003). Addressing the natural resource curse:
An illustration from Nigeria. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Sayan, S. (2005). Heckscher-Ohlin revisited: Implications of differential population dy-
namics for trade within an overlapping generations framework. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 29(9):1471–1493.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. The American Economic Review,
51(1):1–17.
Simpson, E. H. (1951). The interpretation of interaction in contingency tables. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B, 13(2):238–241.
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The costs and returns of human migration. Journal of Political
Economy, 70:80–93.
Solon, G. (1992). Intergenerational income mobility in the United States. The American
Economic Review, 82(3):393–408.
Solow, R. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 70(1):65–94.
Sommeiller, E. and Price, M. (2014). Income inequality by state, 1917 to 2012. mimeo.
Steinberg, D. (2017). Resource shocks and human capital stocks - Brain drain or brain
gain? Journal of Development Economics, 127:250–268.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2004). We can now cure the Dutch disease. mimeo.
Stijns, J.-P. (2006). Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation.
World Development, 34(6):1060–1083.
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (2008). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for
fixed effects panel data regression. Econometrica, 76(1):155–174.
Bibliography 227
Stolper, W. and Samuelson, P. A. (1941). Protection and real wages. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 9:58–72.
Stolz, Y. and Baten, J. (2012). Brain drain in the age of mass migration: Does relative
inequality explain migrant selectivity? Explorations in Economic History, 49(2):205–
220.
Teachman, J. D. (1987). Family background, educational resources, and educational
attainment. American Sociological Review, 52(4):548–557.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political
Economy, 64(5):416–424.
Torvik, R. (2001). Learning by doing and the dutch disease. European Economic
Review, 45:285–306.
Trostel, P. A. (1993). The effect of taxation on human capital. Journal of Political
Economy, 101(2):327–350.
United Nations (2011). International migration in a globalizing world: The role of
youth. Population Division Technical Paper, 1.
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). US GDP per capita by state.
mimeo.
United States Census Bureau (2015). US fiscal census. mimeo.
Van der Ploeg, F. (2011). Natural resources: Curse or blessing? Journal of Economic
Literature, 49(2):366–420.
Wall, H. J. (2001). Voting with your feet in the United Kingdom: Using cross-migration
rates to estimate relative living standards. Papers in Regional Science, 80(1):1–23.
Wijnbergen, S. v. (1984a). The Dutch disease: A disease after all? The Economic
Journal, 94:41–55.
228 Bibliography
Wijnbergen, S. V. (1984b). Inflation, employment, and the Dutch disease in oil-
exporting countries: A short-run disequilibrium analysis. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 99(2):233–250.
World Bank (2015). World development indicators.
Zanden, J. L., Baten, J., Foldvari, P., and Leeuwen, B. (2014). The changing shape of
global inequality 1820–2000; exploring a new dataset. Review of Income and Wealth,
60(2):279–297.
Zipf, G. K. (1946). The p1 p2/d hypothesis: On the intercity movement of persons.
American Sociological Review, 11(6):677–686.
